The War That Never Ends Begins A Violent New Chapter

By Michael Elliott

"Everybody sees a difficulty in the question of relations between Arabs and Jews. But not everybody sees that there is no solution to this question. No solution! There is a gulf, and nothing can bridge it ... We, as a nation, want this country to be ours; the Arabs, as a nation, want this country to be theirs." --DAVID BEN-GURION June 1919

Why do they fight? What is it about the Middle East that makes its conflicts so intractable, such that one summer's guns ineluctably conjure up so many earlier spasms of violence? Why the hate, and where is the healing? A British Royal Commission on Palestine had it right nearly 70 years ago: "An irrepressible conflict has arisen between two national communities within the narrow bounds of one small country. There is no common ground between them. Their national aspirations are incompatible." But why has there been no movement between these incompatibles in seven decades? Why has the two-state solution that every fair-minded observer has long endorsed been so difficult to establish?

The mystery deepens because Israel is not unique. Its creation is rooted in the decay of the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and Russian empires at the end of the 19th century and in the desire of persecuted peoples for homelands. The Jews of Eastern Europe were not the only ones who dreamed such dreams; so did Serbs, Czechs, Poles, Croats and others. As the empires were carved up at the end of two world wars, new nations took shape. The state of Israel, to be sure, was created on someone else's land (whose is a matter of debate), but it was hardly alone in that. Today's Polish towns of Wroclaw and Bydgoszcz, for example, went by their German names of Breslau and Bromberg not long ago. Israel's case differs from that of other new nations mainly because many have never reconciled themselves to its existence.

It has been said that the Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity--and certainly they have failed to secure their objective of nationhood. But Israel's strategic position too is less strong than it might seem. By holding on to the West Bank and Gaza after the Six-Day War in 1967, Israel sacrificed international goodwill. Political leadership in the Islamic world, meanwhile, has shifted to religious radicals, including the founders of Hamas and Hizballah. And new forms of warfare challenge Israeli capabilities. In 1948, 1967 and 1973, Israel defeated all comers in traditional battle. But it is now fighting an asymmetrical war against small cells who hide among civilians in Gaza and southern Lebanon. It is hard to wage such a war without alienating those you want on your side. Insurgents commit an atrocity--and wait for the ruling power to overreact, kill civilians and give the cycle of hatred another twist.

Can things change? Here's an Israeli view on what overwhelming displays of force can bring: "A living people makes enormous concessions ... only when there is no hope left. Only then do extreme groups lose their sway, and influence transfers to moderate groups. Only then would these moderate groups come to us with proposals for mutual concessions." That could have been written last week. In fact, it is from a 1923 pamphlet by Ze'ev Jabotinsky, whose ideology inspired the Likud Party. If it speaks for Israeli policy today, the summer's guns will not soon fall silent.