So, Who's Next?

By Michael Elliott

It is in the nature of empires to confuse victory in battle with a mandate for unending dominion and to find out the hard way that the two are different. Hannibal was unable to translate triumph at Cannae into final victory over Rome; Napoleon, with all of Europe at his feet, disastrously marched the Grand Army into Russia. A little more than a year after the British slaughtered 11,000 Sudanese at the Battle of Omdurman while losing only 48 of their own men, they were on the run from the artillery and rifles of the Boers.

To be sure, past is not prediction. Simply because other imperial powers have succumbed to hubristic temptation does not mean that the U.S., basking in the glow of military triumph in Iraq, will do the same. But some cheerleaders of the Bush Administration have said enough to make those outside the U.S. believe that Washington wants to change more regimes than just Iraq's and that it is happy, if necessary, to go its own merry way, ignoring the interests and concerns of others. In the most notorious of such comments, James Woolsey, a member of the Pentagon's advisory Defense Policy Board and former director of the CIA, claimed the U.S. was now engaged in "World War IV" against not only Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq but also the mullahs of Iran and Syria's "fascists." On NBC's Meet the Press, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz mildly dissociated himself from Woolsey's views while allowing "there's got to be change in Syria." But in the Middle East, where governments and commentators are reeling from the American victory, some are viewing Woolsey's remarks as settled policy.

In fact, within the Bush Administration there is no agreement on what the next step should be. Military action against Syria or Iran, says a White House official, is "not being contemplated in any serious way. It has not been discussed at any level in interagency meetings." That does not mean a new military adventure won't happen. But as long as there's any chance that it will, it's worth going back to first principles, to remember what it is that the Bush Administration wants to achieve in foreign policy and assess how it might best realize its goals.

Since September 2001, the overarching mission of the Administration has been to enhance the security of the U.S. and its allies by cracking down on global terrorists and the states that succor them. It is an article of faith in Washington--and in London--that if terrorists ever possess weapons of mass destruction, they will use them. Hence states that have connections to terrorism must not be permitted such weapons. Within that framework, encouraging the development of democratic structures in the Middle East--the pet project of some neoconservatives in the Administration--is a way of advancing the primary policy. Citizens of states with legitimate channels for political expression are less likely, the argument goes, to be swayed into the terrorists' camp. In other words, if there were a group of democratic states in the Middle East, including a democratic Palestine, the troubles of the region would no longer spill over into the wider world.

If you accept that analysis, then what should the Administration do now? The government of Iran has supported terrorism in the past--it is, with Syria, a supporter of Lebanon's Hizballah--and has long coveted nuclear weapons. In principle, the mullahs of Tehran should be quaking in their sandals. Indeed, one State Department official says a debate is emerging within the Administration along the lines of, When do we start shifting our policy toward isolating Iran and toward bringing down that regime as well?

The most likely answer is, Not anytime soon. For a start, obvious American pressure on the theocratic hard-liners in Iran would make the position of liberal reformers there untenable, forcing them to choose between nationalism and the perils of appearing to be U.S. lackeys. Second, the U.S. would have no allies in a war against Iran and powerful enemies arrayed against it. The British, who maintain diplomatic relations with Tehran, have made it plain that they would not join in any such campaign. London points out that there is no record of U.N. Security Council resolutions condemning Iran as there was for Iraq, and there is no international consensus that the mullahs pose a threat outside their borders. Russia has important economic ties to Iran and has a vital national interest in seeing that the oil-rich Caspian Basin is not dominated by those who are beholden to the U.S.

But if the mullahs can sleep relatively easily, their proteges in Hizballah should not. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage--considered a dove in this Administration--last year showed his talons. "Hizballah," he said, "may be the A Team of terrorists. They're on the list, and their time will come. There is no question about it." A senior Republican foreign-policy analyst says a possible attack on Hizballah's camps is "not too big to swallow."

Such an assault on Syria's client state Lebanon would enrage Damascus. To which the view in the Administration seems to be, Too bad. Even some officials who are privately dismissive of the neoconservative agenda seem prepared to yank the chain of Syrian President Bashar Assad, whom they consider a disappointing, feeble reformer who has failed to rein in his own security forces. U.S. intelligence believes Syria allowed men and materiel--including night-vision goggles--to cross its border and join Saddam's forces during the war. When asked last week what he would do if Saddam's weapons of mass destruction were spirited to Syria, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld replied in his vulpine way that the question would be addressed "if and when the point arrives." British sources seem convinced that some of Saddam's weapons scientists have fled to Syria, which is one reason why the British--who are careful not to say anything bad about Iran--are quite happy to pile on Damascus. Syria denies helping Iraq or its fleeing officials. It is the presence of Iraqi weapons expertise, says a senior British official, that makes "dealing with Syria so important." None of this implies that after the allied troops take Tikrit, they will smartly turn left and head to Damascus. Administration policy, insofar as there is one, holds that the demonstration of American power in Iraq will encourage Syria to forswear terrorism and any ambitions to acquire weapons of mass destruction. But the Syrian regime is on notice that if it does not start to change its policies, it may find that the U.S. is prepared to do the job for it.

Relative caution on Iran, relative hawkishness on Hizballah and Syria. Within the terms of the Administration's policy objectives, that sort of pecking order makes sense. But in the Middle East--and among Washington's closest allies--such a to-do list would have a gaping hole. The U.S. cannot meet its objective of building a safer world without determinedly addressing the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. The suffering of Palestinians, beamed into televisions in homes all over the Middle East, is a recruiting sergeant for militant groups. "We are demanding that serious results be made on the Israel front, not just talk," Jordanian Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher told TIME last week. "Radicalization has already started in the Arab world. We need to show the people that the U.S. does not only care about Iraq but other problems too."

Well, does it? Earlier this year, a senior Administration official said that reviving the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians would be "front and center" once Iraq was settled. When that happened, he said, the Administration would have to make some "tough choices," which presumably meant that it would apply pressure on the Israeli government. Since then, Bush has promised to publish a "road map" to peace once a new Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority has assembled his government. When it was written last year, the road map contemplated the establishment of an independent Palestine by 2005.

Is Bush serious? London thinks he is. "One thing that has been made clear to us privately in the last few weeks," says a senior British official, "is that Bush is absolutely committed not just to publishing the road map but to implementing it, despite the political pressures. He certainly gives us the impression that he isn't just saying it to shut us up." Skeptics will say the British have to say that; otherwise, their claim to have any influence in Washington would lie empty. But an American official who has been privately doubtful of the Administration's commitment to the peace process now echoes this view. "I'm convinced the President will lay his own political life on the line for it," says this official. "When I do the gut check, he's got it."

If Bush were to promote a lasting settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian tragedy, many of the suspicions that attach to his policies would melt away. The power of the U.S. is too great and its influence too pervasive for it ever to be loved by all. But an America that tried to settle a dispute that has bedeviled the globe and caused deep human suffering for generations could not be dismissed as simply a descendant of the heartless empires of history--and might have a chance of lasting longer than most of them. --With reporting by Scott MacLeod/Cairo, J.F.O. McAllister/London and Massimo Calabresi/Washington

With reporting by Scott MacLeod/Cairo, J.F.O. McAllister/London and Massimo Calabresi/Washington