Will We Have To Go To War For Taiwan?

By Bruce W. Nelan/Taipei

On all the maps, the beautiful, bustling island 100 miles off the coast of China is clearly labeled: Taiwan. The swarms of tourists and businessmen who arrive at the cavernous Chiang Kai-shek International Airport know they have landed in Taiwan. Even hostile communist officials in Beijing sometimes refer to their old foes, the Nationalists, as "the authorities on Taiwan." But if the government on the island should ever begin calling itself the Republic of Taiwan, signaling that it is declaring its full independence from the mainland, the most likely reply from the People's Republic of China across the straits would be a military attack and a war the U.S. would have trouble staying out of.

The uncomfortable truth is that Taiwan is already independent in all but name and that Beijing is sharpening its weapons to reverse the process. Last month Chinese President Jiang Zemin summoned his top officials for a three-day review of Taiwan policy and urged them to "speed up the reunification of the motherland." Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan says Taiwan is "the most important core issue" in relations with the U.S., and President Bill Clinton will hear all about that when he arrives in China next week.

Clinton will insist that he too supports the concept of one China and is not colluding in creating an independent Taiwan. But he will probably refuse to put that in writing, and he will not agree to stop selling modern weaponry to the Republic of China on Taiwan. The U.S. is caught right in the middle of one of the most explosive confrontations left in the world.

Washington's promises that it will not tamper with Taiwan's future by signing a new U.S.-China communique have not reassured Taipei. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has already responded to Chinese demands with a policy statement nicknamed "the three nos": that is, the U.S. will not support a two-China policy, nor Taiwan's independence, nor Taiwan's membership in the U.N. These are the points that China wants Clinton to write down and sign.

The mere possibility of such a Clinton-Jiang agreement has officials in Taipei frazzled. China hopes to use better relations with the U.S. as bait, to entice Washington into a joint effort to put pressure on Taiwan. Taiwan is worried that some arm-twisting could be coming. "We believe the U.S. should not discuss the three nos with Beijing," says Chen Chien-jen, director-general of the Government Information Office in Taipei. Adds Vice Foreign Minister David Lee: "We don't want this written down because we don't want Beijing to interpret what independence means."

Washington has been hip deep in China's civil war for 50 years, since General George C. Marshall tried unsuccessfully to mediate between the Nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek, and the communists led by Mao Zedong. Even now, under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, the U.S. sells "arms of a defensive character" to Taiwan and warns Beijing that Washington expects "that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means." Any use of force would be "of grave concern."

The Chinese leaders tested that American commitment in 1996 when they lobbed a barrage of missiles perilously close to major ports in Taiwan. Clinton replied by dispatching two U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups to the waters around Taiwan. Everyone learned a lesson from the scrape. Taipei and Washington found out that Beijing will respond militarily to what it thinks are President Lee Teng-hui's tendencies toward independence. China discovered that the U.S. would not let Taiwan be shoved around if it had done nothing wrong. Since then, Washington has indicated that it is not ready to help defend Taiwan if it opts for official independence but that it is likely to pitch in if China attacks without provocation.

But there are various ways to define independence. Taiwan and its governing Nationalist Party say they accept the principle of one China, but they also argue that China contains two governments and theirs has as much legitimacy as the one in Beijing. "No party governs all of China," says Chang King-yuh, chairman of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council. "China since 1949 has been divided into two political entities. The Republic of China was the first. We have never lost our sovereignty."

Americans are constantly telling Beijing and Taiwan that they should sit down and resume the tentative talks broken off in 1995. They will probably do so before the end of this year, but they have different agendas. Taiwan is ready for agreements on such issues as fisheries, illegal immigration and drug smuggling; Beijing is eager to get right into such tough topics as direct air and sea links and steps toward unification.

While accepting in theory that unification could come in some form someday when the mainland is democratic and prosperous, Taiwan has no intention of ever going back to being one province in a China ruled from Beijing. Taipei is not impressed with Jiang's offer of a special status like that of Hong Kong. "It will never happen," says John Chang, secretary-general of the Nationalist Party, the Kuomintang. "We are not Hong Kong, a British colony that could not choose its future. This is a Chinese government."

It is also increasingly a Taiwanese government. The tight control by the mainlanders who came over with Chiang in 1949 has vanished, replaced by a feisty, wide-open democracy. Polls indicate that 83% of the population identify themselves either as Taiwanese and Chinese or as Taiwanese. Only 16.3% say they are simply Chinese. As for the future, 86% of Taiwan's people favor holding on to the status quo and putting off unification. The status quo, as they see it, includes efforts to conduct foreign relations and join international organizations, which stoke China's fury.

If they didn't fear China's wrath, the majority would probably opt for de jure independence right now. And why not? Life in Taiwan is freer, more comfortable and more fun than it is going to be on the mainland for a long time. But the status quo is the political equivalent of independence and is more irreversible each year. Beijing's leaders know that, so how long will they tolerate it?

Jiang and his colleagues dislike Taiwan's President Lee personally and believe he is bent on splitting the island from the mainland. Still, it could get even worse from their point of view. The platform of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party calls for "the establishment of a sovereign Taiwan Republic." But the straits crisis of 1996 sobered the party's leaders, and they are busy revising their approach, now saying they would hold off indefinitely on independence and use it as a defensive tool. If China became too threatening, the D.P.P. says, it would call a referendum on independence, then appeal to the world to recognize the new state of Taiwan and support the political will of a free people.

"We do favor independence," says D.P.P. secretary-general Chiou I-jen, "but not right now. Taiwan is already a de facto independent state." With this revision, the party is gaining strength and should do well in the legislative elections next December. It even has a shot at winning the presidency in 2000, something that could put Beijing in a fighting mood.

In many ways, Taiwan has been America's star pupil. Under U.S. tutelage Taiwan has modernized its economy, built a thriving democracy, opened up a free press. It is one of the world's leading trading nations and one of the most prosperous. And yet, by succeeding, Taiwan has become a problem for Washington. Taipei's dynamic de facto independence may one day trigger a Chinese ultimatum: blockade or attack. It will then be up to the U.S. to decide whether Taiwan's status quo has a future.

--With reporting by Jaime A. FlorCruz/Beijing

With reporting by Jaime A. FlorCruz/Beijing