The Political Interest

By Michael Kramer

As thousands of Soviet dissenters march against Mikhail Gorbachev's rule, the West's message reflects a studied neutrality: do what you must, internally, but continue your cooperative and nonthreatening foreign policy. "We have privately told Gorbachev that what he is doing at home is a mistake," says a senior Bush Administration official, "but our own national interest demands only that he continue his new thinking abroad."

There is little to argue with here. Railing against something you can do nothing about may be morally satisfying, but it can be strategically foolish.

What happens, though, if the forces that have combined to steer Gorbachev toward conservatism at home conspire to revive old thinking abroad? Washington may soon know. Barring a last-minute change, Gorbachev's fourth ambassador to the U.S. in six years will be Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Komplektov, 59, a fluent English speaker and classic old-school hard-liner. A Carter Administration aide who negotiated a fair amount of SALT II with Komplektov describes him as "having spent many years developing a reputation for calculated nastiness. He was charming enough when it suited his purposes, but across the table it was like pulling teeth. Viktor's idea of negotiating is to offer you a choice between your mortgage and your daughter."

During Eduard Shevardnadze's tenure as Foreign Minister, Komplektov oversaw Latin American affairs. By design, he had little substantive power -- which was lucky for both superpowers since each knew that improving their relations generally required easing their rivalry in Central America.

Komplektov's doctrinal rigidity was amply demonstrated on June 20, 1989, at the first and only Central America negotiating session he attended with Bush Administration representatives. For almost two hours, Komplektov did little but rehash old Soviet positions while lecturing Assistant Secretary of State Bernard Aronson about the sensibilities of small Latin nations condemned by geography to live in Washington's shadow. Key U.S. and Kremlin aides agree that the subsequent Soviet-American cooperation that resulted in Nicaragua's first free elections would never have been possible if Komplektov had controlled the talks that followed.

Is Komplektov's posting to Washington an unambiguous bad omen? "It isn't good," admits a Soviet Foreign Ministry official. "If Gorbachev were in complete control, if he didn't have to worry about the conservatives' power, Komplektov probably would have been retired by now."

The CIA offers a counterview. "The intelligence community still believes that ((Foreign Minister Alexander)) Bessmertnykh thinks like Shevardnadze, and that he is calling the important shots," says an aide to Secretary of State James Baker. "Their view is that Bessmertnykh has his own line of communication to Baker and that Komplektov's well-known tough views mean that he will be a figurehead ambassador only. The theory is that Bessmertnykh and Gorbachev have cleverly thrown a bone to the conservatives, and that Komplektov can do less damage in Washington than in the Foreign Ministry in Moscow."

Reminded that arms-control talks are once again stalled, and that Moscow appeared to be undermining Bush's gulf policy before the ground war began, this official paused only a moment when asked which view seemed more credible at State: "The Soviets'," he said. "Obviously."