Japan: In Search of a Triumph

By Barry Hillenbrand/Tokyo

What a difference a year makes. In March 1990 Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu came away all aglow from a meeting with President Bush in California. The two leaders claimed to have forged the basis for a new "global partnership," and Japan seemed ready to play a role in world politics corresponding to its ever expanding economic power. Kaifu affirmed his commitment: "I am determined that Japan must be one of the countries to bear the responsibility for maintaining and strengthening international order."

This week Kaifu will travel once again to California for meetings with Bush, but he is no longer glowing. He is all too well aware of American displeasure with Japan's failure to live up to expectations during the gulf war. Not only did Tokyo prove unable to muster even noncombatant participation in the conflict, but its purse also seemed as hard to crack as a Republican Guard bunker. The Japanese felt chastened by Bush's postponement of a spring visit to Tokyo while the President and Secretary of State James Baker undertook a round of meetings with leaders from nations that contributed militarily to the victorious coalition. Worried about U.S. ill-feeling, Tokyo hurriedly arranged this week's Kaifu-Bush meeting to repair the damage.

That will not be easy. Japanese foreign policy, seldom clear and never bold, is now a shambles. In recent years Tokyo has navigated a cautious course that emphasized its commitment to the Western alliance, and to the United Nations as a forum for settling international disputes. But the Japanese began to chafe under Washington's domination as their economic clout seemed to entitle them to a more prominent voice in policymaking. And as American strength waned, the U.S. found itself increasingly resentful that its former enemy had profited so well from the lessons of the West.

Yet when the opportunity came to assume a strong role in the gulf, Japan stumbled. It condemned Iraq's invasion and joined in the sanctions. But it took noisy prodding from Washington and endless haggling in the Diet before Tokyo finally pledged a financial contribution considered acceptable by the coalition.

The dithering annoyed many of Japan's friends. "No one expected Japan to send combat troops," said a senior British diplomat in London. "But they abysmally failed to grasp helpful alternatives." In the U.S., an ABC News/ Washington Post poll showed that 30% of Americans lost respect for Japan during the gulf crisis. In this case, admits a Japanese diplomat, "we projected the image of someone who sat back on the sofa without undertaking the duties expected of an important nation."

Tokyo is bracing for some retribution. Warns Sony chairman Akio Morita: "I am seriously concerned about suffering a backlash from an America full of self-confidence." But U.S. officials deny they intend to be vindictive. "We're not going to use the gulf situation to make exorbitant demands," says a State Department official. In fact, a confident America may find it easier to deal with a rich, sometimes smug Japan. It is when the U.S. feels threatened that it attempts to contain its rival.

The Kaifu-Bush meeting is intended to demonstrate that nothing is really wrong between the two allies, despite the rise in the emotional temperature. "These meetings let the public know what the national leaders think about the importance of the relationship," says a State Department official, who added that it might "turn people's attitudes away from emotions and toward our fundamental interests." Nevertheless, there could be tough going ahead, not only in bilateral trade negotiations but also in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade talks, where Japan has sided with Europe in protecting domestic agriculture.

The otherwise passive role of Japan at GATT is emblematic of one of its basic problems in foreign affairs: its reluctance to take a visible leading role. Says an Asian diplomat in Tokyo: "The Japanese are not willing to make the hard political choices that go with being a great power." As a result, Japanese foreign policy lacks focus or clear direction. For their part, U.S. officials voice the desire that Tokyo express its views more robustly: open exchanges not only signal the underlying equality of a relationship but also make it easier to manage.

In part, the reticence is a product of poor public diplomacy and an inability to get Japan's message across. In part, it exists because Japanese diplomats lack a strong national image to project. The U.S. can proselytize democracy, but Japan has nothing comparable to offer. In recent years Tokyo spoke of its nonmilitary approach to international relations. But, says a Japanese official, "we have learned that just being a peaceful nation is not much of a philosophy if it is not backed up by a willingness to take action in defense of peace. We now realize we can't just do business in the world without shouldering our share to maintain the basic order of the international community."

Some in Japan are eager for the country to assume new responsibilities around the world commensurate with the country's economic power. But the inertia of 45 years of passive foreign policy, coupled with a deep public commitment to pacifism, makes the present generation of politicians leery of foreign entanglements. Tokyo may soon test new diplomatic waters with a peace initiative in Cambodia, but for better or worse, the country seems destined to measure its diplomacy in terms of its relations with the U.S., its only ally.

With reporting by William Mader/London and J.F.O. McAllister/ Washing ton