France "Fighting for The Same Cause"

By FREDERICK UNGEHEUER/PARIS

When a French force under General Jean Baptiste Rochambeau linked up with George Washington's revolutionary army in 1781 to fight the British, France became America's first wartime ally. Thus it was fitting that the code word assigned to the first target in the French-U.S. thrust into Iraq was Rochambeau. The choice not only saluted France's fighting commitment to the allied cause but also symbolized France's newfound solidarity with the U.S. when war came.

Nowhere was the sight of the French tricolor flying above advancing armor greeted with more relief than at allied headquarters in the gulf. When Desert Storm began, there had been fears that the 12,600-strong French contingent, reluctant to accept U.S. leadership, might stand aloof from the coalition's integrated command structure, much as France does in NATO, perhaps even disdaining to fight. During the countdown to hostilities, President Francois Mitterrand had courted British and American anger by launching an eleventh- hour peace proposal that would have handed Saddam Hussein a diplomatic victory by rewarding an Iraqi withdrawal with the convening of a Middle East peace conference.

But as the first air strikes were launched against Iraqi targets, the French, under General Michel Roquejoffre, closed ranks with the other allies, putting themselves under U.S. operational command. Guided by U.S. AWACS aircraft, French pilots flew their Jaguar fighter-bombers on combat missions deep into Iraqi territory, while French ground forces, including Foreign Legion units, committed themselves wholeheartedly to the battle.

Mitterrand was the deciding influence in France's fortitude. There were understandable reasons for his initial go-it-alone diplomacy. Iraq had long been France's best customer in the Middle East arms bazaar: Paris was owed about $3 billion for past weapons deliveries when Iraq invaded Kuwait. But more than markets and money was at stake. Mitterrand had to consider the legacy of General Charles de Gaulle, who believed it was part of France's destiny to develop a special relationship with the Arab world. The President also had to weigh the probable impact of his actions on neighboring Arab states around the Mediterranean -- not to mention 4 million North Africans living in France.

But in the end Mitterrand's fine-tuned political instincts told him that in the face of battle, talk of French independence -- "la difference francaise" -- could not be maintained without loss of credibility at home and abroad. Once Saddam had rejected France's last-minute peace bid, Mitterrand put everything behind securing an allied victory, telling aides, "We are face-to- face with history." He forced the resignation of his anti-American Defense Minister, Jean-Pierre Chevenement, a co-founder of the Franco-Iraqi Friendship Association who had tried to limit any military action by France strictly to Kuwaiti territory. French forces in the gulf were not only placed under General Norman Schwarzkopf's overall command but were also integrated with other allied contingents. Overflights of France by U.S. B-52 bombers on their way to Iraq were promptly permitted, as was the big planes' refueling at a French air base. Braving critics who accused him of becoming "a vassal" of the Americans, Mitterrand endorsed the need "to destroy Iraq's military- industrial potential."

"It is true that France insists on her differences," he said last week, "but during combat, when soldiers are down there together, like brothers, - fighting for the same cause, when the safety of one depends on that of the other, are we going to engage in games of divergence or opposition?"

With each week of war, French approval of Mitterrand's stand deepened, despite perceptible unease about the ultimate objectives of the conflict. The conservative opposition backed him; the only sniping came from the far right, the Communists, and pacifists within his own Socialist Party. But as a member of the so-called Munich generation, which witnessed the West's failure in 1938 to nip Hitler's deadly ambitions in the bud, Mitterrand stood firmly against appeasement. Elysee Palace aides noticed a deep anger taking hold of him as he watched Saddam's cynical maneuvering, his wanton destruction and his contempt for human life.

Frequent telephone contact with President Bush brought the two leaders closer and helped reinforce their resolve. Differences emerged mainly in the kind of language they used. A master of innuendo, Mitterrand never called, as did Bush, for Saddam's "overthrow," but described the Iraqi's "political, moral and military authority" as "seriously weakened"; privately, Mitterrand is known to believe Saddam has little chance to survive as head of state. Nor did Mitterrand reject Mikhail Gorbachev's belated peace plan outright: Foreign Minister Roland Dumas called it a step in the right direction -- and then sliced it to shreds with diplomatic "corrections" and an insistence on deadlines that helped Bush fashion the ultimatum.

With victory in hand, France may become a more difficult ally once again. There is a national consensus in the country that a homeland for the Palestinians must be part of any new order in the Middle East; thus Mitterrand will push not for one but several international conferences on the Middle East. "We will spell out the objectives we consider just, and no one will give us orders," he declared a few days before the fighting stopped. Having done his part in the war, the President clearly expects France's voice to be heard -- and heeded -- now that it is over.