The Night That Bush Decided

George Bush, as is his habit at times of crisis, escaped the White House on Thursday for a bit of what he calls "prudent recreating" -- an evening at Ford's Theater to see Black Eagles, a play about black airmen in World War II. Says one of his top advisers: "I think it helped clear his mind" for what he knew would be one of the most fateful decisions of his presidency.

Shortly before Bush departed for the show, he had spoken with Mikhail Gorbachev, who reported that he and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz had agreed on terms for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, terms that would allow Saddam Hussein to preserve much of his military machine and political prestige.

Bush quickly convened nine top aides, and while he watched his play, they plotted a countermove. "It was a very delicate business," said a senior official. "We wanted to maintain as good a relationship as possible with the Soviets, but at the same time, we were determined not to back down -- to make Saddam either surrender to us or face military defeat."

At 10:20 p.m., when Bush returned to his private study on the second floor of the White House residence, his war cabinet was waiting. It was a warm evening for February; the fireplace was dark. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin Powell was clad in a green turtleneck and sports jacket. Vice President Dan Quayle and Defense Secretary Dick Cheney wore tuxedoes, having come from a dinner for visiting Queen Margrethe II of Denmark. Cheney had removed his eyeglasses and was absentmindedly chewing one end of the frames. Like everyone else, he was studying a pair of freshly copied documents in his lap.

One was a list of "criteria" by which the allies would judge whether an Iraqi withdrawal was unconditional and worthy of an allied cease-fire. The second was a single-page argument about why the Gorbachev-Aziz agreement was "unacceptable."

Bush scanned the drafts, nodded and said, "I like both of these. Let's put them together. It's not enough to just say we don't accept the Soviet plan. I went through this with Gorbachev on the phone, and he knows it's unacceptable and he knows the specific reasons why, and we ought to lay them out to the whole world."

"Well, let's set a date and set a time," suggested Powell.

"I think that's a good idea," Bush replied immediately.

Powell explained that a deadline would be "helpful to the military because then my guys in the field know what to expect. They know exactly what to be looking for and when." National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft agreed.

The discussion then turned to the question of "Do we make the date tomorrow night or Sunday or Monday or when?" Bush wanted it as soon as possible. So did Powell. Secretary of State James Baker cautioned that the U.S. ultimatum must have allied support and must be seen to allow a reasonable time for Iraqi acceptance. "The diplomatic question was the toughest," said a participant. "We had 28 partners, and the biggest concern was making sure we could get everybody on board."

Someone suggested that noon Saturday be the deadline. Bush: "I think that's a good idea. What's it do for you, Colin?" Powell: "It's good for me." Noon in Washington was sundown in Kuwait, where allied forces hold the advantage in night-fighting ability. Bush then asked, "What's it do for you, Jim?" Baker: "It's good for me too, but it is a new item that the allies don't know about and we need to get back to them about."

At that point, about 11:15 p.m., Bush said, "O.K., we're agreed then. It's noon Saturday."

The meeting broke about midnight. Baker went back to his office to phone the allied foreign ministers, and Bush went off to bed, confident that whatever course Saddam chose, he would be acting on a timetable and conditions set not by himself or the Soviet Union but by the U.S. and its allies.