Consequences: What If Saddam Pulls Out?

By Lisa Beyer

The first word of Iraq's peace proposal last week touched off rapturous celebrations in Baghdad, expressions of relief mixed with skepticism from allied troops and burgeoning peace hopes around the world. At the White House, however, there was surprise at the move and concern that a hastily arranged cease-fire might scuttle Washington's goal of neutralizing the Iraqi military and toppling Saddam Hussein. By attaching impossible conditions to the | proposal, Baghdad ensured that it would be rejected by the coalition and that hostilities would continue -- for now. But Saddam may soon find it necessary, particularly after the start of a ground battle, to make a serious peace offer that Washington can't refuse. What then?

The exact shape of a postwar scenario, of course, would depend on the details of the Iraqi proposal and of the negotiations that would follow. But it is possible to sketch the broad outlines. The most significant fact is that Iraq will emerge from battle with the menacing, bristling war machine that Saddam built up over the past decade substantially defanged, if not yet completely tamed. The allies have seen to that from the first days of the war, knocking out Iraq's ability, at least for the time being, to produce chemical, biological and nuclear arms and later obliterating about a third of its tanks and artillery.

But has Baghdad's military been weakened enough? Washington's goal has never been to liquidate Iraq's armed forces. Rather, the objective was to leave the country with enough military power to defend against hostile neighbors -- but not so much that it could continue to threaten them. A rough gauge of where that balance lies can be found in the military muscle of Iran and Syria, the two heavies that Iraq's forces must counterweigh. Iran commands 504,000 soldiers, 185 combat aircraft and perhaps 500 tanks. Syria has 404,000 troops, 558 combat planes and 4,000 tanks. Iraq's losses in the current struggle have pared its hardware roughly to Syria's level. But since a country that is only defending its territory generally needs less firepower than its attacker, Iraq's weaponry could still use considerable trimming, say U.S. military planners. As for manpower, though it is not known exactly how many Iraqi soldiers have been killed by allied bombardments, no one believes that Saddam's forces, once 1 million strong, have yet been drawn down to the levels of the other regional powers.

Consequently Iraq's neighbors are far from ready to trust Saddam again -- even if he withdraws completely from Kuwait. The gulf states and Saudi Arabia must find better ways of defending themselves than they had before Aug. 2. One possibility is that they will offer Egypt financial inducements to remain in the region as a deterrent force. Cairo sent two of its crack armored divisions to Saudi Arabia and does not expect them back in the foreseeable future.

The Western forces, in contrast, will probably leave the gulf fairly rapidly. Although Washington may leave some troops in the region temporarily, a permanent military presence would probably provoke more political trouble than it would be worth. It would be preferable if nearly all the non-Arabs were out of the area before the annual Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca begins in June, but that timetable is probably unrealistic. Once the Westerners do leave, United Nations troops, including Arab units, are likely to provide peacekeeping forces in Kuwait, though the Western powers will have Kuwait's open invitation to return if necessary.

To ensure that Saddam cannot patiently rebuild his military to its former glory, the U.S. and Britain will seek to maintain sanctions forbidding the sale to Iraq of weapons and munitions or the equipment for domestically producing them. Historically such embargoes have proved very leaky. At the moment, as many as 110 German firms are under investigation for breaking or attempting to circumvent the U.N. embargoes against any kind of trade with Iraq.

The prospect of a still powerful Iraq would be far less worrisome if Saddam were not at the helm. His continuation in power would be a great disappointment to the allies. It is conceivable that a surrender, however artfully packaged, would leave Saddam vulnerable to a coup. The euphoria in Baghdad that initially greeted reports of the pullout offer suggests a high level of public anxiety over the war. To have been subjected to such horrific bombings and wind up with nothing to show for it might be too much for some Iraqis. But the decisive question is whether it would be too much for the small circle of officials Saddam allows to get near him.

Given the sudden political shifts that are commonplace in the Arab world, it is possible that most of the Arab governments standing against Saddam may make amends to him after the war. Two exceptions: Syria's President Hafez Assad, who has a long-running personal rivalry with Saddam, and the Emir of Kuwait. At the same time, Jordan's King Hussein and President Bush are expected to patch things up. Bush still prefers the King to the more radical regime that would most likely replace him, while Hussein is eager for renewed financial assistance from the West and the Saudis.

Containing Arab resentment over the allied pounding of Iraq could prove a difficult and delicate task. Above all, it will require a serious effort -- especially on the part of the U.S. -- to pursue a settlement of the Palestinian problem. Who will speak for the Palestinians is a crucial unresolved question. By allying himself with Saddam, P.L.O. Chairman Yasser Arafat has made himself more unpalatable than ever to the West; he has long been anathema to the Israelis. Given Arafat's exploded credibility, some Western diplomats say their governments might again look to King Hussein as the Palestinians' spokesman.

Whoever speaks for the Palestinians will find Israel a prickly interlocutor. The target of dozens of unprovoked Scud attacks, the Israelis will be in no mood to compromise and may use Saddam's continued leadership as yet another excuse to avoid negotiations. Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir put it bluntly last week: "There can be no peace in the region so long as Saddam Hussein remains in power." But Shamir has yet to face the fact that, regardless of Saddam's personal fate, the Middle East will never achieve a lasting peace until Israelis and Palestinians are ready to sit down and talk seriously about the future.

With reporting by Scott MacLeod/Amman and Christopher Ogden/Washington