Military Options: Three Ethical Dilemmas 1

By Lisa Beyer

Ordering a hit on any particular person, even one as diabolical as Saddam, is dirty business. But assuming Saddam's death would stop the Iraqi war machine cold, it would mean one life in exchange for the thousands, or tens of thousands, who might die if the battle continued. British Prime Minister John Major spoke for many people around the world when, alluding to the prospect of Saddam's murder, he said, "I for one will not weep for him."

Under a 1981 Executive Order, the U.S. government is forbidden to participate in assassination. But the rules of battle arguably supercede that prohibition. In wartime, international law recognizes military commanders as legitimate targets; as commander in chief of Iraqi forces, Saddam thus qualifies. (Of course, so does President Bush.) Washington's denials notwithstanding, Saddam has been pursued by allied bombers. His presidential palace has been hit; his command-and-contro l centers have been hit; most of the places allied intelligence thought Saddam might be have been hit.

Saddam reportedly shuttles among half a dozen underground bunkers -- including one that is luxuriously appointed and designed to withstand a nuclear blast -- or hides out in civilian neighborhoods, which he knows the U.S. will not intentionally attack. Israeli military officials say privately that if they were to retaliate for Iraqi assaults on their territory, they would happily go after Saddam. But even with their renowned ability to ferret out foes, the Israelis cannot get a fix on him. "When it was possible, nobody thought of it," says a high-ranking official in Jerusalem, "and now that everybody is thinking of it, it's almost impossible."

The difficulty of zeroing in on Saddam is one reason the Bush Administration has so assiduously denied that it is gunning for him. Washington does not want to declare killing Saddam as a goal and risk failing to achieve it, repeating last year's humiliation of having Manuel Noriega slip through U.S. hands during the invasion of Panama. "Every day that Saddam survived," says a White House official, "would be seen as a victory for him and a loss for us."

There are other compelling explanations for Washington's denials. An explicit U.S. threat to kill Saddam might encourage terrorist attacks on U.S. targets, including President Bush, and might subject allied POWs to even worse treatment by Iraq. It could conceivably make assassination a more acceptable political tool. Most important, if the allies are seen to have slain Saddam on purpose, they will make him a martyr among many Arabs. Washington's hope, and it is probably an unrealistic one, is that if Saddam dies "incidentally" in a raid, his canonization can be avoided.

Would a successful strike on Saddam end the war? The assumption of most allied military analysts is that with its leadership decapitated, the Iraqi regime would quickly wither. Saddam has built his government on little else but a cultish loyalty to himself, enforced by fear. There is no deputy waiting in the wings. Saddam's survivors, reared in his school of terror, might rip one another apart competing to replace him, leaving the Iraqi war effort adrift without a pilot. If a clear successor regime does emerge, it might well sue for peace, since the confrontation over Kuwait was of Saddam's making, not some realization of deep-rooted Iraqi ambition. Given the decisive blow Saddam's departure would deal Baghdad, it is safe to assume that the allies in future raids, as in past ones, will try to hit him.

With reporting by Michael Duffy and Dan Goodgame/Washington and Gavin Scott/Chicago