Unlikely Detonator Of Change

By JOHN BORRELL and TADEUSZ KUCHARSKI WARSAW Wojciech Jaruzelski

Q. What would have happened had you not declared martial law in December 1981?

A. The general situation, combined with the apprehension and concern voiced by our neighbors and a general network of pressure directed against us, probably would have led to the internationalization of our internal conflict. We were very close to a fraternal regional communist conflict and to the kind of situation that occurred in Hungary in 1956 ((when the Soviets intervened militarily to put down an uprising)).

Q. Would the Soviets have actually invaded had you not declared martial law?

A. You would have to ask the Soviets that question. I cannot say exactly how the Soviet leadership would have reacted. But in September 1981 we were told by the Soviets that the following year they would be able to supply us with ) only 4 million tons of crude oil, compared with the normal 13 million tons. We were also warned that there would be similar proportional reductions in supplies of other raw materials, including cotton. Other members of the bloc would have reacted in a similar fashion. In other words, a total economic blockade awaited us unless we resolved our internal problems.

Q. When the Soviets made this threat in September, did you ask the West if it would make good the shortfall in these deliveries?

A. No, but it would have been impossible on such a scale. It was a question not only of raw materials but of cooperation and markets. Our economy was based on specific trading patterns within Comecon. Hundreds of enterprises were working to produce goods for the Soviet economy, goods the West would not buy because of quality or other factors. We could not switch overnight, and we still cannot do it today. Imagine the scenario had the opposition ((Solidarity)) taken over in the autumn of 1981 and inherited such an economic situation on the eve of winter, when there were already serious shortages in the marketplace. It would have been a catastrophe and may have even made impossible all the changes that have taken place this past year.

Q. You have often said that throughout your life you frequently had to choose between two evils. Would you say that declaring martial law was the lesser of two evils?

A. Absolutely. I have thought and said so since the first moment. There is a saying by Tadeusz Kosciuszko ((the 18th century Polish military hero)) that one sometimes has to lose a lot in order to save everything.

Q. Polish historians of the future will, I suspect, judge you solely on this period of your career. Does that worry you?

A. I regret that I might be remembered solely as someone associated with martial law. While I understand the drama of that moment, I would like also to be remembered as the initiator of the round-table talks with Solidarity in 1989. This was a breakthrough, and it became an example for others. It is not that the man who declared martial law and the one who initiated the round- table talks were two totally different people. One might even say that had it not been for martial law, there could have been no round table.

Q. Could there have been serious talks with the opposition had Mikhail Gorbachev not been in power in the Soviet Union?

A. Gorbachev's policies were undoubtedly very important, enabling us to accelerate change. But perhaps it is not too farfetched to say that had it not been for the developments in Poland at the time of martial law, perestroika in the Soviet Union might not have developed the way it did.

Poland was in some ways the detonator of the process of change in the whole communist system. I was and am in close contact with Gorbachev, and I think the Polish experience had a great influence on what happened in the Soviet Union. But keeping a sense of proportion here, what has been the single most important contribution to change was Gorbachev's new thinking on East-West relations. When Poland stopped being the place that both sides treated as an instrument of policy, we were suddenly given much greater maneuvering space in our internal and foreign policies.

Q. But even when the election results were in last year, not even Solidarity was sure the Soviets would allow the reform process to go on, or that they wouldn't somehow intervene. Were you sure then?

A. One could never be certain. But knowing Gorbachev and his openness and broad horizons, I knew I could trust him to see that what was happening was the only realistic way.

Q. Looking back on it, do you have any regrets at all about that period, about declaring martial law?

A. Yes. I regret that I was not able to prevent all kinds of abuses that took place -- limiting the scope of internments, for example. Wrong and sometimes scandalous decisions were made to intern people who should not have been interned. I also did not manage to limit the powers of the conservatives ((hard-liners)) in the party. Once the danger was over, they used the umbrella of martial law to block reforms I had in mind when I imposed martial law. It was not my program, but of course I cannot avoid responsibility because I was the man with overall responsibility.

Q. Did some people in the party want to go further, to put ((Lech)) Walesa and others on trial for treason, for example?

A. Yes, of course.

Q. Was it a powerful group?

A. Yes, it included people from the highest echelons of power.

Q. You say it could all have been handled much better. But it could also have turned out worse, couldn't it?

A. It could have been worse. Seven people died. That was seven too many. But in a country of 40 million people it also was a sign that martial law was not too cruel -- and nothing like martial law in Chile, where thousands of people died. The moderation shown by the authorities was why in this country no abyss developed that could not later be crossed.

That is why we were able to sit down at the round-table talks in 1989, which led to elections and all the other changes. It was a matter of walking through purgatory so as not to find ourselves in hell. Afterward both the opposition and the regime were different.

Q. As much as a man can shape history, history also shapes men. How do you see yourself in relation to Poland's recent history?

A. Someone once asked me whether, if Gorbachev or my modest self had not appeared at the time we did, the changes that have taken place in recent years would have been possible. I do not underestimate the role of the individual in history. But he is often not the determining factor in events. An individual's stature can only be measured by how correctly he has read the trends of the moment.

Q. Well, when did you yourself see there was no future in communism?

A. A very significant moment for me was in 1987, when in a referendum Poles rejected proposals for painful but necessary economic reforms. I realized then that without popular support we would be unable to follow the communist route any further.

Q. And your thoughts on what has happened during the past year?

A. There is no rose without thorns. Society has shown patience over the painful but necessary economic reforms. But it is beginning to get impatient. Unfortunately, that is occurring at a time when politically things are not the best. All kinds of demons are appearing -- nationalism, anti-Semitism and populism. I understand this is a time of transition. But lifting the lid from a pot where a new dish is being cooked may not be a good idea.