Deadline: Jan. 15 Iraq gets an ultimatum -- leave Kuwait in six weeks or face the threat of war. Washington's nightmare is that Saddam will partially comply.

By Michael Kramer

There was a stroke! Or two, to be precise. With a war resolution in hand, George Bush last week took steps to begin a high-level dialogue with Saddam Hussein. Less than 18 hours after the Security Council authorized the use of force against Iraq if Saddam fails to comply with the U.N.'s call for an unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait by Jan. 15 -- a triumph for U.S. diplomacy -- Bush made a surprise announcement. Iraq's Foreign Minister would be welcome at the White House during the week of Dec. 10, and Secretary of State James Baker could meet with Saddam in Baghdad thereafter.

By giving content to the "one last chance" aspect of the latest U.N. resolution, Bush had, for the time being at least, confounded his domestic opponents -- especially those on Capitol Hill. Few will dispute the President's assertion that he is attempting to "go the extra mile for peace." Few will seek to constrain his handling of the crisis, at least not until the Baker-Saddam meeting is concluded -- and by then it may be too late to again cry "Wait!"

But what exactly will the U.S. and Iraq talk about? Everything and nothing, it seems. During his midday press conference last Friday, Bush said Baker would be prepared "to discuss all aspects of the gulf crisis," words that appeared to telegraph the possibility of a face-saving compromise. But there "can be no face-saving," Bush added only minutes later. Baker's will not be a "trip of concession," the President insisted. His sole purpose will be to make sure Saddam "understands the commitment of the U.S." to "implementing to a T . . . the United Nations position." That would mean Bush and Baker are ready only to discuss the manner and timing of Iraq's capitulation.

Whether Saddam would be receptive to that message remained highly doubtful. In a tough statement at week's end, the Iraqi government agreed to the proposed meetings but referred to Bush as "arrogant" and an "enemy of God." Baghdad also vowed to bring up the Palestinian question and other Arab grievances at the talks.

If Bush's elaboration accurately reflects his real intentions, then the diplomatic shuttling to come is probably best viewed as a clever public- relations exercise, a dance designed to convince audiences at home and abroad that the anti-Saddam coalition has exhausted every possibility for a peaceful resolution to the crisis before going to war. "When ((Bush)) saw us last month," says a senior Kuwaiti official, "we were told we would hear and see a lot of things that might be upsetting but that he was not going to give in and that in the end it will be important for the world to believe we have spared no effort to bring Saddam to his senses."

If long-term gulf stability is the Administration's primary goal, then last week's highlight was Bush's assertion that the "status-quo ante will not be enough." Since Aug. 8 the President's stated objective has been to get Iraq out of Kuwait. Period. Now Bush has publicly indicated what he has told allied leaders privately: he will not allow Iraq's awesome ability to wage war to remain intact.

The anti-Saddam coalition has three options if it wants to neutralize the worst of Saddam's war-fighting capacity:

War would do it, but at what cost? Some military commanders believe the conflict might be over quickly and with minimal casualties, but a messy horror is also possible. Depending on the outcome, Bush could pay a heavy political price -- defeat in 1992 -- or come away a hero headed for an easy re-election even if the economy is faltering.

Containment is possible, at least theoretically. If Saddam pulls out peacefully, the U.S. and its allies can continue the embargo on military shipments to Iraq and perhaps create a regional security structure. But the Saudis recoil at the prospect of an enduring foreign-troop presence on their soil, even for the purpose of defending their kingdom, and a new region-wide defense pact is easier to conjure than to craft. The Kuwaitis would welcome an American presence indefinitely, but even they would prefer to avoid the complications that would invariably attend an open-ended effort to keep Saddam at home.

Negotiation could do the trick, but what would Saddam give up, and what would he demand in return? Bush has ruled out a territorial compromise -- the Kuwaiti islands Iraq covets, for example -- and he repeated that stance to the exiled Kuwaiti Emir in a phone call shortly after his press conference. But the Kuwaitis themselves had been willing to discuss leasing some territory to Iraq before the Aug. 2 invasion. Such a deal might still be possible if, say, Saddam were willing to downsize his military and destroy his weapons of mass destruction.

However the next six weeks play out, the Administration's real nightmare is that Saddam will get "too smart," in the words of a senior U.S. official. "If we get down to the war wire, what if Saddam pulls out from most but not all of Kuwait's territory? We and everyone else say that that would be an unacceptable outcome, that it would be a victory for Saddam. Well, it's not so clear."

The partial-pullout scenario contemplates Saddam retreating to the northern third of Kuwait, an area of few people but some oil. The Rumaila field, whose southern tip reaches into Kuwait, has long been a sore point for Baghdad. Saddam has accused Kuwait of slant drilling -- siphoning oil from the Iraqi portion of the field through equipment located in Kuwait, an allegation the Kuwaitis deny. "Do you want to know what would probably happen if Saddam retreated to that remote part of Kuwait?" asks a White House aide. "The coalition not only wouldn't go to war to drive Iraq out, it would go piff."

Will Saddam proceed shrewdly? Might he seize on Baker's visit to claim victory and retreat? Those who have dealt with him most closely in the past, his Arab neighbors, think not. "He believes in American weakness and sees everything through that prism," says an Egyptian official. For example, according to Administration officials, the Iraqis saw the firing of U.S. Air Force chief of staff Michael Dugan as an act that might precipitate a military coup against Bush. Similarly, Baghdad is reported to have understood the President's budget troubles, Republican setbacks in the midterm elections and even Margaret Thatcher's ouster as signs that the anti-Saddam coalition is fraying.

If these reports are accurate -- and no one has ever claimed that Saddam % appreciates the untidiness of democracy -- then Baghdad undoubtedly took further comfort from the parade of skeptics counseling delay before Sam Nunn's Senate Armed Services Committee last week. Echoing other experts, a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, David Jones, said that the economic embargo was "biting heavily" and that if the sanctions "work in 12 to 18 months . . . the trade-off of avoiding war with its attendant sacrifices and uncertainties would . . . be more than worth it."

If Saddam runs true to type, he may see Bush's diplomatic overture as further proof that the coalition has neither the resolution nor the stamina to stay the course against him. If so, he will stiff James Baker as he has other emissaries -- and war will be inevitable.