The Gulf Saddam's Strategies

By GEORGE J. CHURCH

Does Saddam Hussein think he can break the ever tightening blockade being imposed on Iraq by most of the rest of the world? Failing that, might he actually believe he can achieve his goals by going to war against the immensely powerful ground, naval and air forces of the U.S. and its allies? Or might he instead offer to negotiate a compromise solution to the gulf crisis?

The answer, paradoxically, seems to be yes on all three counts. U.S. officials are concerned that Saddam may have found in Iran, against which Iraq fought a bloody eight-year war, an ally to help him punch a hole in the embargo. Nonetheless, they think, and diplomats in Baghdad agree, that Iraq may soon propose a new negotiated solution -- though on terms the U.S. would find highly unacceptable.

Should it come to war, however, American analysts see signs that the Iraqi dictator is preparing a three-part scenario for victory. To Western ears it sounds more like a script for Gotterdammerung: most of Iraq would undoubtedly be bombed into flaming ruins. But the U.S. and the West might well suffer horrifying consequences too: economic ruin brought on by superexpensive oil, biological as well as chemical-warfare attacks on troops and civilians, and terrorist outrages on a scale and of a deadliness never seen before.

On the surface, a noose was tightening around Saddam's neck last week. The U.N. Security Council prepared a resolution, scheduled to be passed this week, extending the embargo to all passenger and cargo flights in and out of Iraq. The move is unlikely to have much practical effect; only a few supplies from Libya, Yemen, North Korea and Vietnam are thought to be reaching Baghdad by air. But it is one more sign of worldwide solidarity against Saddam's aggression.

Iraq, however, showed signs of digging in for a prolonged confrontation. It reportedly increased its forces in and around Kuwait to 360,000 men and 2,800 tanks. In addition, Iraq stepped up the stridency of its rhetoric. Though Baghdad officials insisted Iraq would not strike first, the Revolutionary Command Council predicted "the mother of all battles" and denounced the "dwarfs led by Bush and his two servants ((King)) Fahd and Hosni ((Mubarak))." Saddam conceded that the U.S. is "the No. 1 superpower" but added that, nonetheless, "we are confident that we can hurt America" in a war with Iraq.

In Baghdad, however, TIME correspondent Carl Bernstein picked up from Arab and Western diplomats some glimmerings that Iraq might offer negotiations looking toward a withdrawal from part -- though not all -- of Kuwait. One of Saddam's principal advisers spoke hopefully of a possible compromise. "I don't say it will be withdrawal," he said, but "everything is open for the future."

Washington has been anticipating such an offer, and American expectations of the terms tally fairly closely with the speculation in Baghdad. The gist: Iraq would keep Bubiyan and Warba islands in the Persian Gulf and a portion of northern Kuwait; that would give Iraq control of all the vast and rich Rumaila oil field, part of which had been claimed by Kuwait. But Iraqi troops would pull out of some 50% (Washington musings) to 80% (Baghdad speculation) of Kuwait's pre-invasion territory. In the version some American analysts expect, Saddam would propose elections to choose a new government in the portion of Kuwait that Iraq abandoned -- though with the lists of those allowed to vote heavily rigged in Iraq's favor, for example by excluding Kuwaiti refugees who might return and including Iraqis who took their place.

In any case, such an offer would fall far short of President Bush's and the U.N.'s minimum terms for ending the confrontation: unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from all of Kuwait and restoration of the ruling al-Sabah family. Bush's advisers do recognize that Saddam would need a fig leaf and hint that his claims to the islands and the oil field could be negotiated, but only after withdrawal. Since Iraq is aware of that, an offer from Baghdad might be less of a serious attempt to defuse the crisis than an effort to buy time and sow disunity in the anti-Iraq coalition.

Inconspicuous amid these events, but extremely worrisome to the U.S., were four Iraqi tankers that last week turned up at the Iraqi terminal of Mina al- Bakr. By week's end three had been filled with the first oil loaded there since the invasion of Kuwait. American analysts fear that these tankers could take their oil to the Iranian terminal at Kharg Island, hugging the Iranian coast rather than venturing out into the international waters of the Persian Gulf, where they would be stopped by warships enforcing the embargo. Iran could then export their oil by passing it off as its own. An alternate script calls for Iraq to rebuild and pump oil through a 25-mile pipeline crossing its border into Iranian territory.

U.S. intelligence officials estimate that Iraq could smuggle out 500,000 bbl. of oil a day through Iran. Though that would be less than one-fifth of Iraq's pre-embargo exports of 2.7 million bbl. a day, it would still earn the Saddam regime $10 million a day (figuring a price of $30 per bbl., below the current market, minus a $10 cut for Iran). Iraq could then use the cash to buy grain and other foods that could also be smuggled from Iranian ports by truck into Iraq.

U.S. officials claim to have certain knowledge that Iran and Iraq have discussed just such a scheme although Tehran is still publicly vowing to abide by the sanctions. It also contends that Iraq proposed to Iran last week that the two countries relink their oil pipelines. Iran did not immediately reply.

Would Iran really help its once deadly enemy Iraq, and why? The Tehran government appears to be split into at least two factions, and has been sending out conflicting signals. On Sept. 15 the national security council voted to continue respecting the embargo, but the next day two-thirds of the Majlis, Iran's parliament, voted to approve a call by Ayatullah Ali Khamenei for a jihad (holy war) against the U.S. It is in part a question of whether Iran's leaders hate Saddam Hussein or Uncle Sam more, in part a problem of where the nation's pragmatic interests lie -- and of whom it expects to win.

Iran wants Western help to rebuild its shattered economy, but is unlikely to receive such assistance if it violates the embargo. On the other hand, an American victory over Iraq could give the U.S. sufficient leverage in the Middle East to greatly reduce Iran's influence -- and its bargaining power over oil prices. President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani figures the best way to get America's growing military presence out of the Middle East is to get Iraq out of Kuwait, so he is believed to favor observing the embargo. His reasoning is likely to be reinforced by Syrian President Hafez Assad, who visits Tehran this week. Whether that line will prevail, however, is by no means certain.

"If Iran starts helping Iraq sell its oil," says a White House official, "that would be a mortal blow to the sanctions. We would have to change our whole approach." Aerial laying of mines over the tankers' probable routes constitutes the mildest likely American response. The U.S. also might attack and possibly sink the tankers; if oil was smuggled out by pipeline, U.S. planes would bomb the portion of the pipeline on Iraqi soil.

Either move, of course, could touch off war. Otherwise, American officials do not plan any military action, unless there is some extreme Iraqi provocation, at least until mid-November. They will reassess then whether the embargo is working; if it is starting to leak badly, they may lower the level of Iraqi provocation that would touch off a U.S. military strike.

Paradoxically, war could also come if the embargo is so successful that it prods Saddam Hussein into lashing out to avoid slow strangulation of his country. In any case, however and whenever fighting might begin, some Bush Administration officials believe Saddam really thinks he could win. Says one: "When he says he can beat the forces arrayed against him, he means it."

How would the Iraqi dictator expect to achieve victory? Three ways:

By destroying Western economies. American analysts believe Iraq would immediately launch missile attacks on Saudi Arabian oil facilities. Some of the most critical, notably the pumping center and oil field at Abqaiq and the loading facilities at Ras Tanura, are within range of missiles fired from Kuwait. Those missiles would be fitted not just with chemical but with biological warheads. American experts believe that besides mustard and nerve gases, Iraqi warheads could spread powders that, when inhaled, cause anthrax and botulism, two diseases that can be fatal in two to three days. U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia are being inoculated against anthrax. Underlining U.S. worries, CIA Director William Webster last week mentioned the biological warfare threat publicly for the first time in a speech in New York.

Iraqi missiles would not have to blow up many of the oil facilities; scattering enough poison gas and anthrax or botulism powder to make it impossible for workers to labor there would also disrupt production. Says a U.S. analyst: "With a shortfall of only 1 million bbl. of oil a day, now the price has gone to $35 ((from $18 before the invasion of Kuwait)). Imagine the impact of the loss of a big portion of Saudi Arabia's 7 million bbl. a day." Conceivably, the price could reach as high as $100, far more than enough to cause both a crippling recession, with widespread joblessness, and ruinous inflation throughout the industrial world. The U.S. would certainly retaliate with devastating bombing of Iraq. From Saddam's viewpoint, says one American expert on the Middle East, "the West bombs Baghdad, and he bombs the New York Stock Exchange." The Iraqi dictator would be betting that his nation could stand the physical destruction longer than the U.S. and allies could take the economic punishment.

By attacking Israel. U.S. analysts have already detected the movement of missiles toward areas of western Iraq from which they could hit Jerusalem and Tel Aviv in five minutes. Americans fear that Iraq could launch a salvo of 50 to 60 missiles, accompanied by an aircraft attack. Saddam, they say, would try to make it appear that the U.S. and Israel had provoked the attack, possibly by having an Iraqi aircraft drop a bomb on Baghdad.

Iraq would pay a fearful price. "The Israelis would wipe out Baghdad," says an American analyst -- assuming the U.S. did not beat them to it. But Israeli involvement would cause an enormous upheaval in the Arab world. "No American would be safe anywhere in the region," says one U.S. official. Saddam would also be betting that America's Arab allies, such as Egypt and Syria, would either switch sides or face popular outrage strong enough to overthrow their governments.

By igniting terrorism. U.S. intelligence is picking up indications of an Iraqi terrorist network being set up. "People are moving; gear is under way," says one source. The attacks would not be confined to the Middle East; they would hit targets in Europe, Japan and the U.S. Nor would the terrorists confine themselves to the classic means of bomb and bullet; they too might resort to biological warfare. Some analysts conjure up nightmare visions of a light plane scattering anthrax powder around the Washington area.

There are some indications that these scenarios are more than American paranoia. Bassam Abu Sharif, an adviser to Yasser Arafat, the head of the pro- Iraq Palestine Liberation Organization, visited Baghdad last week. Abu Sharif reports that if war comes, Saddam is threatening to strike Israel and oil-loading installations throughout Saudi Arabia and the gulf states.

Such threats certainly cannot be lightly dismissed. Saddam Hussein is said to believe that he personally could survive even a war as terrible as he plans, hiding in one of several secret Soviet-built bunkers in Baghdad while most of Iraq goes up in flames. He may be wrong in that calculation, and in believing that Iraq could take the pounding longer than the U.S. and its allies could withstand economic devastation and the arrival back home of thousands of body bags. But proving him wrong might be possible only by paying a ghastly price.

Saddam has often been compared with Adolf Hitler. It would be no comfort at all to those making the comparison if he too died in a bunker amid the blazing ruins of his capital at the end of a war in which he had loosed fearful bloodshed and destruction on the world.

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CAPTION: HOW IRAN COULD HELP IRAQ GET OIL OUT

IRAQ'S TOTAL FORCES

IRAQ'S FORCES IN KUWAIT

ALLIED FORCES IN THE PERSIAN GULF NOW

With reporting by William Dowell/Cairo and Bruce van Voorst/Washington