Can the U.S. Turn Off Iraq's Oil?

By Bruce W. Nelan

Fifty years ago, when Hitler's tanks were poised at the English Channel and his bombers were pounding London, Franklin D. Roosevelt decided that the U.S., though still neutral, had to supply Britain with the military equipment it desperately needed. "We must admit that there is risk in any course we may take," F.D.R. said on a national radio broadcast. But backing America's natural ally "involves the least risk now and the greatest hope for world peace in the future."

America's resolution came very late -- almost too late -- in the game. Now the slow reactions that helped produce World War II are weighing anew on decision makers' minds in the wake of Iraq's anschluss with Kuwait. A consensus is taking shape that Saddam Hussein should be punished. More important, he must be deterred from further aggression.

"We need to draw a line in the sand," says Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. General George Crist, who directed U.S. planning for defense of the Persian Gulf until he retired in 1988, agrees: "We have to show Saddam Hussein he can't take another step." The question is how. Freezing Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets and officially deploring Saddam's behavior are sensible first steps, but largely pro forma. More pressure will be required for Saddam to feel the bite.

After a decade of military buildup and the expensive creation of a rapid- deployment Central Command to protect oil supplies from the gulf, Americans naturally wonder: Why not a military response? The answer is that Iraq is too strong. The country has 1 million battle-hardened men under arms, plus 500 combat aircraft and 5,500 tanks. The U.S. has no ground troops in the region; its presence is limited to six medium-size ships of the Joint Task Force * Middle East, based on the island of Bahrain. The aircraft carrier Independence is steaming toward a station off the Straits of Hormuz, and the carrier Saratoga will join the Eisenhower in the Mediterranean, but they would be hard pressed to roll back Iraq's army.

Reluctant to talk tough at first, George Bush began to stress as events sank in, that "all options remain open." But Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, was doubtful. "I don't think we have a military option at the moment, nor do we have a treaty obligation," he said. A senior Pentagon general confirmed, "On the ground, in the short run, we are not players." Several thousand airborne troops and Marines could be sent in quickly, but they would be no match for the 100,000 Iraqis who invaded Kuwait.

A force of 300,000 would be needed to counter the Iraqis, Pentagon experts estimate, and "U.S. military operations would cease everyplace else in the world" in order to move and support them. Just to get such large numbers to the war zone would take time. Although light airborne forces could arrive in a week, heavy units capable of really dealing with the Iraqis would take more than a month. "If you are going to defeat Iraq," says Admiral William Crowe, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "it's a hell of a campaign."

The U.S. could use Navy or Air Force bombers and cruise missiles to strike military targets in Iraq, but there is no certainty that such bombardment would have the desired effect. Saddam's country endured eight years of war with Iran, including heavy civilian bombing, and did not budge. A U.S. strike could make Saddam angry enough to send his tanks across the border into Saudi Arabia. Just as worrisome, the Iraqis could hold hostage the 3,800 Americans in Kuwait and, in effect, the population of Kuwait. Eleven Americans were apparently detained by the invading forces but later turned up unharmed in Baghdad.

With no plausible short-term military options, the response of the West, led by the U.S., can initially be only economic. American diplomats set to work last week at the United Nations and in world capitals to produce a resolution imposing comprehensive sanctions. The object is to keep Iraq from selling oil and buying arms. The Security Council, reflecting the new amity between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, resolved that Iraq must withdraw or face further international action.

Sanctions mandated by the Security Council would be compulsory for all members. That would make it easier for Japan and some European countries heavily dependent on Middle Eastern oil to take a stand against Iraq. Articles 41 and 42 of the U.N. Charter allow the imposition of a total embargo against an offending state and "action by air, sea or land forces" to restore peace and security.

Experience with sanctions has shown that someone usually cheats. Oil is particularly easy to sneak through secret channels. U.S. officials believe that the only truly effective course would be to keep Iraqi oil bottled up at the well. This could be done by cutting off the three outlets through which Iraq exports its crude: two pipelines through Saudi Arabia, another leading to Turkey, and ships in the Persian Gulf. Oil-industry and academic experts say Iraq would collapse under such pressure in a few months or a year.

Such a plan is more easily proposed than accomplished. The U.S. last week suggested a tight naval blockade of Iraqi and Kuwaiti ports, but it has yet to find many takers among its allies. Halting the oil in the pipelines would mean persuading Turkey and Saudi Arabia to shut off the tap, or turn a blind eye while the U.S. blew up the lines. Both countries are vulnerable to Iraqi reprisals, especially Saudi Arabia.

After talking with Turkish President Turgut Ozal by phone last week, Bush said that he and Ozal shared the same "sense of urgency and concern." Asked if Turkey would be willing to close the pipeline, Bush replied carefully, "That will be an option, I'm certain."

Turkey would probably insist that Saudi Arabia take the same step, and the Saudi attitude is unclear. Ideally, Washington would like to see the Arab states stand up to Iraq so that U.N. resolutions can be pursued as support for initiatives from the countries most immediately imperiled by the Iraqi threat. In practice there is little optimism in Washington that the gulf states will display such toughness. And why should they without strong -- and credible -- guarantees of protection?

The entire embargo plan would come apart if the Saudis did not give it full support. Shutting down the pipeline would be only the first step for Riyadh. An effective halt to Saddam's oil exports would eliminate 10% of the free world's supply from the market. Saudi Arabia would be expected to increase its output to help make up the shortfall and keep prices from soaring. That would be another red flag to Saddam. In short, if an embargo is to work, the U.S. must provide credible guarantees of military protection to Saudi Arabia. Already there were proposals in Washington for dispatching a wing of U.S. fighter aircraft to Saudi bases and even perhaps a brigade (8,000) of U.S. troops.

Yet even with an American security umbrella, the Saudis would find it difficult to go all out against Iraq. The underpopulated kingdom would be risking attack by Saddam, from bombs, rockets and poison-gas-filled missiles to invasion. More than that, the Saudis would be rejecting attempts at an "Arab solution" and accepting the high-profile alliance with the U.S. they have always tried to avoid. Saudi diplomats said privately last week that such an alliance was dangerous for them because of America's links with Israel.

That caution did not stifle the warnings from Washington that an attack on Saudi Arabia would trigger a wider war. Such a move by Iraq, said Speaker of the House Thomas Foley, "would call for a direct military response by the United States."

This determination closes the vicious circle. The U.S. cannot fight Iraq on the ground because it has no bases in the region. It has no bases because the gulf Arabs are unwilling to be seen collaborating with the friend of their enemy Israel. Unless all parties can make common cause to stand up to Iraq, history threatens to repeat itself.

With reporting by Richard Hornik and Bruce van Voorst/Washington and Robert Slater/Jerusalem