Soviet Union Flanked by Trouble

By JOHN KOHAN MOSCOW

Boris Yeltsin has an exquisite sense of timing. Just when Mikhail Gorbachev had soundly defeated hard-line rival Yegor Ligachev and secured his control over the divided Communist Party, Yeltsin threw down an even greater challenge. He quit the party, threatening to wrest the embattled reform movement from Gorbachev's hands and turn the party into a sideshow.

For the five years Gorbachev has been in power, his every move has been dogged by these two men, shadow members of a strange political troika. Ligachev was the archconservative, unwilling to sacrifice ideological certainties for the risks of change; Boris Yeltsin, the maverick populist, wanting to go further, faster in forcing the pace of reform. At times the two have seemed like Gorbachev's alter egos, the right and left boundary markers on his political horizon. But mostly they have been his rivals, vying to force him off the careful centrist course he has charted for himself.

Last week, as Gorbachev struggled to bring the party whole and united out of the 28th Congress, the two men figured in one of his most remarkable triumphs -- and abrupt setbacks. After 10 days of harsh attack, he put down the right- wing revolt with a display of personal authority so convincing that his victory might justly have been dubbed "Ligachev's last stand." It was then, from his left flank, that Yeltsin pounced. When the chairman of the Russian parliament announced he was pulling out of the party, he paved the way in effect for a potentially dangerous split in the 18 million-member body.

Yeltsin's move was not unexpected, but it still caused a sensation. With his huge popular following, he could spark a wave of defections. More important, he appears to have established himself as the leader most in sync with the public appetite for rapid change. As head of the Russian republic, which covers 76% of the U.S.S.R.'s landmass and is home to 147 million of its 289 million people, he holds a strong power base where he is now free to try his own more radical brand of reform. Even if the party does not split formally, Gorbachev could be left trying to implement perestroika through a rump dominated by moderates unable to keep pace with leftists outside the party.

Ligachev was the first to make his move. The blistering attacks against Kremlin policies in the opening days of the Congress left no doubt that conservatives were intent on forcing the party to the right -- and the party leader with it. Wielding his muscle, Gorbachev handily kept the job of General Secretary. The right wing decided instead to wage war for the key post of deputy, who would supervise day-to-day party business. Whoever controlled that job would in effect control the party.

Gorbachev threw his support behind Politburo member Vladimir Ivashko, 58, a tough-talking moderate from the Ukraine, committed to the Soviet leader's kind of reform. Without rejecting Ligachev by name, Gorbachev pointedly reminded the delegates that it was important that the two people at the top of the party are "close in their views." Ivashko won 3,109 votes, Ligachev 776, a showing so poor that when he was later asked about his chances of being on the new Politburo, he candidly replied, "There is no need for me to be."

Gorbachev did not have long to savor the triumph. As the Congress began discussing candidates for the new Central Committee, Yeltsin signaled that he wanted to speak. "I am announcing my resignation from the Soviet Communist Party," he said. "In view of my great responsibilities toward the people of Russia, I cannot fulfill only the instructions of the Communist Party." % Yeltsin explained, "As the highest elected figure in the republic, I have to bow to the will of all the people."

Amid cries of "Shame! Shame!" -- and scattered applause -- Yeltsin turned on his heel, marched down the aisle and out the doors. Gorbachev managed to respond, with a wry smile, "That ends the process logically."

It was, in fact, only the beginning. Barely an hour after Yeltsin departed, Vyacheslav Shostakovsky, a leader of the radical Democratic Platform group, took the Russian leader's declaration one step further. Although faction delegates had come to the Congress hoping for "resolute change," said Shostakovsky, the decisions taken there had convinced them that no real democratic renewal was possible. With that, Shostakovsky described his group's plans to set up an independent party. Next day the reform-minded mayors of Moscow and Leningrad, Gavril Popov and Anatoli Sobchak, resigned as well.

Suddenly, Gorbachev's strategy of cobbling together a middle-of-the-road party, with a less centralized and more democratic organization, seemed in danger of unraveling. As President, he has successfully freed himself from much of the party's oversight and diluted the Moscow power base of the new 24- member Politburo by dropping several key government officials and bringing in the party heads of the 15 republics. But if there was to be no solid left flank, Gorbachev's revitalized party would be about as airworthy as a bird with one wing.

It was apparent from Yeltsin's statements last week that he ruled himself out as a new party leader. He seemed more interested in playing the role of a nonpartisan referee who has withdrawn from the political fray to concentrate on furthering reform. Even if Yeltsin's decision does inspire like-minded liberals to turn in their party cards, they may also choose not to align themselves with any other political movement.

If a true parliamentary democracy is to develop in the Soviet Union, the best interim solution might be the creation of a "nonparty" system, with the Communists joining other groups in a national coalition to promote reform. Yeltsin has clearly been faster out of the starting block than Gorbachev to embrace this idea. Given the size and economic clout of the Russian republic, a nonpartisan Yeltsin might set up a rival power center in Moscow that could turn the national party apparatus -- to say nothing of the federal government -- into a Soviet Vatican City, its power and influence bounded by the Kremlin walls. ;

In contrast, Gorbachev has staked his future on keeping a foothold in both the national presidency and the party leadership. He believes that the party, whatever its internal divisions, still has the most effective organizational structure for promoting reform.

The key question Gorbachev must answer is whether the party has not fallen so far behind the dramatic changes taking place that it has already become largely irrelevant. Tens of thousands of coal miners staged a one-day political strike, calling for, among other things, the resignation of the government, the nationalization of $12 billion worth of property belonging to the party, and the dissolution of local party cells. Gorbachev dismissed the demands with the brisk comment that "there was no general strike." Maybe not, but the party can hardly afford to ignore the miners and millions of other Soviets who share their thirst for change more rapid and sweeping than the party proposes.

And what about President Gorbachev? For the moment, many of the coal miners still have grudging respect for the initiator of perestroika, but their patience is wearing thin. "Gorbachev can stay a while longer," said striking coal miner Yuri Boldyrev, "but we need a government of national agreement, a government people are going to trust." He no doubt meant a government not under the control of the Communist Party -- a government led, perhaps, by someone like Boris Yeltsin.

With reporting by James Carney/Moscow and Paul Hofheinz/Donetsk