Should the U.S. Help Gorbachev?

By RICHARD NIXON

The headline over a recent editorial in the New York Times proclaimed, THE COLD WAR IS OVER. President Bush has rightly taken issue with that statement. But as the "spirit of Malta" washes over the West, he may soon find that he is a very lonely member of a virtually silent minority. On all sides we hear that Western ideas have won and that Communism has been defeated. And yet a Communist named Gorbachev is the most popular man in Europe.

Let us take a close look at this new international superstar. As a Communist he is publicly dedicated not to renouncing Marxism, like millions of demonstrators in Eastern Europe, but to rejuvenating it. He is a proud Russian nationalist. He likes power, knows how to use it and wants to keep it. His political reforms, glasnost, are totally inadequate compared with a free society. But compared with what the Soviet people had before, the changes are breathtaking. His economic reforms, perestroika, have been an abject failure. For example, in the ten years of Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms, the per capita income of the Chinese people has doubled. In the five years of Gorbachev's rule, the per capita income of the Russian people has gone down. But while Gorbachev has only marginally changed the Soviet Union, he has profoundly changed the world, simply by saying what many in the West want to hear after generations of Soviet intransigence.

Rather than just applauding what he has done, let us examine why. When Gorbachev came to power he found he was presiding over a military superpower and a Third World economic power. His clients in Cuba, Viet Nam, Ethiopia, Angola and Nicaragua required huge subsidies. Afghanistan was costing lives as well as money. In Eastern Europe the explosive forces of dissent were building dangerously. The stagnant Soviet economy was falling further and further behind the West. Gorbachev's only option was to reform at home and retrench abroad.

* For two years, he temporized, trying to get a bad system to work better by eliminating drunkenness, corruption and inefficiency. This policy failed, so he adopted bolder reforms. His purpose was not to abandon Communism but to save it. Ironically, by doing so he has become the darling of Western intellectuals and pundits.

As we would with any other master politician, we should look at Gorbachev's deeds as well as his words. One example is Soviet military power. He still spends 20% of his gross national product on defense, compared with 6% in the U.S. He has modernized all three legs of the Soviet strategic nuclear triad. Soviet superiority in tanks, chemical weapons and combat aircraft has been maintained and in some cases increased. The Soviet Union's military might is greater now than when Gorbachev came to power. Even if he has been sounding to some hopeful ears like a dove, his bristling talons still make him look like a hawk.

Many observers say he inspired the changes under way in Eastern Europe. Some even say he encouraged them. Most ignore that it was Western ideals, combined with the failure of Communist ideals he still defends and opposition to Soviet domination he represents, which brought millions into the streets. It is true that he could have repressed the demonstrations, but it might not have worked and would have inevitably derailed his brilliant diplomatic blitzkrieg aimed at psychologically disarming the West. Instead, he is now getting credit for developments he could not contain.

Should we help Gorbachev? If so, how?

A leading foreign policy analyst concluded bluntly, "We should help those in the Soviet Union who are doing the right thing." But is Gorbachev really a convert to those ideals we consider the "right things" -- political pluralism, individual rights and a free-market economy? Whoever believes that will believe Santa Claus is bringing my grandchildren the $150 Nintendo sets I am buying them for Christmas.

Gorbachev has changed, but it is a change of the head, not the heart. At a time when he is using his head, we should not lose ours. In providing help for Gorbachev, we should adhere to a fundamental principle. If his ultimate goal is to make life better for the Soviet people, we should help him. But we should not help him if his ultimate goal is to make life more difficult for the West by using Western subsidies to build an economically and militarily stronger Soviet Union with the same aggressive foreign policy.

His economic reforms will not work unless they are radically expanded. As Andrei Sakharov put it, "In the absence of radical reforms in the Soviet system, credits and technological aid will only prop up an ailing system and delay the advent of democracy."

What will work? Only policies the West takes for granted but that could weaken Gorbachev's grip on power -- lifting price controls, encouraging more entrepreneurism, decentralizing economic decision making.

If the reforms do go far enough to work, it is still not in our interest to help Gorbachev unless his foreign policy becomes less aggressive. Even as he issues calls for "new thinking," Soviet power is being applied against American interests in Afghanistan and El Salvador and for propping up anti- American regimes in Cuba, Nicaragua, North Korea and Libya. When Gorbachev asks the U.S. to help pay for perestroika, we should insist he pay for it himself by cutting his budgets for defense and foreign adventures.

Is Gorbachev "for real"? Let us look again at the editorial page of the New York Times: "One week ago Russia came of age. She allowed her people all the fun and trappings of a real election -- voting not publicly by show of hands but in private in red-curtained booths behind closed doors." Most people would assume that editorial had been written about Gorbachev's Russia in 1989. In fact, it was written about Stalin's Russia in the 1930s. Gorbachev is certainly not a Stalinist, but he is also just as certainly not a Jeffersonian democrat. We should examine his motives just as coldly as he is examining ours.

I do not question his sincerity. He is profoundly sincere in wanting to rescue the Soviet system from a terminal illness. He has been bold and courageous in pursuing that goal. We should help him -- but only if his reforms go far enough to have a chance to succeed and if, as a result, the Soviet Union becomes less repressive at home and less aggressive abroad.