A NATO Balancing Act

By DAN GOODGAME

George Bush's political gifts include a keen sense of balance: when he finds himself out on a limb, he usually edges back to a less shaky perch. After finally realizing that his Administration's less than enthusiastic reaction to Mikhail Gorbachev's headline-catching arms-control gambits was alienating the NATO allies he will meet with this week in Brussels, the President decided a more positive response was required.

It showed up last week in a bath of warm rhetoric toward Gorbachev -- quite a turnabout from presidential spokesman Marlin Fitzwater's denunciation of the Soviet leader two weeks ago as a "drugstore cowboy" on arms control, long on talk and short on action. In an interview last week with European journalists, Bush insisted that his attitude toward Gorbachev's initiatives was "not begrudging."

Later the President spent hours personally inserting "positive" language into the graduation speech he delivered at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy in New London, Conn. The address was the fourth in a series summing up the conclusions of his Administration's vaunted review of major foreign policy issues. While in his three previous speeches he had voiced stern warnings against being taken in by Soviet peace talk, Bush now praised Gorbachev for "being forthcoming" in negotiations on conventional forces in Europe. He emphasized that "our policy is to seize every -- and I mean every -- opportunity to build a better, more stable relationship with the Soviet Union."

One such opportunity would be the Brussels meeting, and as Bush headed across the Atlantic, he considered springing an eye-catching arms-control proposal at the NATO summit that would not only steal some of Gorbachev's thunder but also, perhaps, help heal a deep rift within the Western alliance. In the words of one of its architects, it would be a "real attention getter": a reduction of up to 10% of the 340,000 U.S. troops in Europe, with corresponding cuts in NATO aircraft and helicopters, if the Soviets agree to reduce their conventional forces to the levels the West has proposed. He is also expected to relax sanctions on trade with the Soviets imposed by the U.S. after the Red Army invaded Afghanistan.

The need for a bold step had been gnawing at Bush for some time, but it really sank in when French President Francois Mitterrand visited the President's vacation home in Kennebunkport, Me., two weeks ago. Mitterrand warned, as have other NATO leaders and U.S. diplomats, that the Administration was riling European public opinion by reacting so negatively to the Soviet leader's arms-control offers.

Bush summoned his top advisers and told them he wanted changes, including more upbeat speeches and some arms proposals of his own. As National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft bluntly explained after Bush's Coast Guard speech, "The President felt he appeared too negative before, so he's trying to appear more positive now." Other White House officials added that Moscow had made "major concessions" in its latest offer to cut tanks and other conventional weapons. They pointed out, moreover, that the Soviets had done so "in a serious way, at the bargaining table" in Vienna, rather than in splashy public pronouncements.

A U.S. troop cutback would pose few military risks. In fact, in their latest offer in Vienna, the Soviets came close to accepting Western proposals for reducing their tanks and other conventional weapons. If those negotiations lead to an agreement on conventional arms, the way would be open to East-West talks on the most divisive issue within the Western alliance: the reduction of short-range nuclear missiles.

. Bush, along with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, is convinced that rushing into missile negotiations with the Soviets before a conventional-arms pact is struck would be a mistake. But West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl has been pressing for a quick start to missile talks to shore up his shaky domestic political position.

Bush's emerging arms-control strategy is designed to offer both a carrot and a stick to the West Germans. The carrot is a quicker start to missile- reduction talks, even though the U.S. will continue to insist on keeping some short-range nukes as an essential deterrent to Soviet attack. The stick is a threat to pull out even more U.S. troops from West Germany, which Kohl opposes. "What we have to do," says a State Department official, "is show the Germans that we have ideas for getting a conventional-arms agreement fairly quickly, so they could then get the talks they want on short-range nuclear weapons."

Whether or not NATO manages to heal the rift over short-range nuclear missiles, there has been remarkable progress on balancing Soviet and Western conventional forces -- and the President will now be able to take some credit for it. Balancing, after all, is one of the things George Bush does best.