Watching From Offshore

By Christopher Ogden

In a different kind of week, the three U.S. warships that sailed up the Huangpu River last Friday and docked in the waters off Shanghai would have been the talk of the town. After all, this was only the second time since 1949 that the U.S. Navy had visited China. But the city's attention was riveted on the Bund, the broad avenue along the river where 100,000 protesters marched. Thus the ships neatly symbolized the peripheral role that Washington played throughout last week. With the explosion of people power, the State Department could do little but advise Beijing to use caution, and it had only a few desultory comments about the historic handshake between Mikhail Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping. Finding American officials who were even slightly uneasy about the freshly minted Sino-Soviet friendship was almost impossible. Was George Bush worried? "No problem," said the President. "A healthy development," said Secretary of State James Baker. Only Vice President Dan Quayle displayed a hint of wariness. Yes, he said, last week's comradeship was good news, but he added a sensible qualifier: "Provided that any new relationship harms neither our own interests nor those of our friends."

Any initiative that reduces global tensions deserves a cheer or two. If warmer relations between Beijing and Moscow lead to reduced military competition, to political liberalization and to economic reforms that integrate both nations into the global marketplace, make that three cheers. Indeed, given the domestic changes launched in 1979 by Deng and in 1985 by Gorbachev and the relationship the U.S. now enjoys with both countries, a return to the threatening dogmas of the Stalin and Mao eras is difficult to envision.

But reconciliation between the two Communist giants may offer more trouble than Washington has acknowledged. That once pre-eminent danger -- monolithic Communism -- may be gone, but that does not preclude new and improved threats. Detente in the East will allow Moscow to cut some of its 45 divisions stationed along the Chinese border. That's good, but not if it relieves pressure on the Kremlin to reduce troops in Eastern Europe. For Cambodia, the relaxation has accelerated the pullback of Soviet-supported Vietnamese soldiers. That's good, but not if it eases the return to influence of the Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge.

The most serious difficulties for the U.S. are likely to arise in Japan and Korea. If the Sino-Soviet thaw endures, Moscow and Beijing will promote closer North-South relations on the Korean peninsula with an eye toward reducing the 40,000 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea. That's good, but not if it leads to intimidation of the South's burgeoning democracy. Japan, unsure about its new global political role, will almost certainly be next to receive the full brunt of the Gorbachev charm offensive. That's bad only if it dilutes the Washington-Tokyo relationship and forces the U.S. into a less central role in Asia.

So despite the reassurances, the political summit may prove to be anything but "no problem." What really deserved welcome was less the talks inside the Great Hall of the People than the protests outside, in Tiananmen Square. Crackdown or not, the protests were the "healthy development."