America Abroad

By Strobe Talbott

The Bush Administration inherited a policy toward Kampuchea that increased the chances of a return to power by the Khmer Rouge, who killed nearly 2 ! million of their countrymen between 1975 and 1979. Now, with the Vietnamese preparing to pull out of that tortured country and the U.S. pondering whether to send new American arms to guerrillas in the countryside, the Administration could end up compounding both the danger for Kampuchea and the disgrace for the U.S.

Under Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter, the U.S. gave priority to evicting the Vietnamese troops, who invaded Kampuchea a decade ago. But to that end, Washington backed an unholy alliance of resistance forces, linking two non- Communist groups with the Khmer Rouge. Those genocidal ultra-Maoists are the best organized and best armed of the guerrillas, not to mention the most ruthless. So there has always been the possibility that they would come out on top after the Vietnamese withdrew.

On April 5, Viet Nam finally announced that it would pull its troops out of Kampuchea by the end of September, leaving behind a pro-Hanoi regime. The decision presented the Bush Administration with a chance to turn, unambiguously, to preventing the Khmer Rouge from moving into power. Instead, the Administration is now giving priority to bringing down the Communist regime that the Vietnamese installed in Phnom Penh -- though that regime seems to be rebuilding the country.

The Administration repeatedly, and no doubt sincerely, says it does not want the Khmer Rouge to "dominate" a new Kampuchea. But it endorses the idea of a four-part coalition government that would embrace and thereby, it is hoped, co-opt the Khmer Rouge. Speaking of the prospective coalition, Secretary of State James Baker told the Senate last month, "You're going to have the Khmer Rouge there . . . That's a fact of life." That is true only if the U.S. and the Khmer Rouge's principal patrons, China and Thailand, make it so.

What is, alas, all but inevitable is more civil war after the Vietnamese pull out. With their record, the Khmer Rouge can hardly be expected to submit to elections or to participate in a peaceful democracy. If they and the non- Communists remain aligned against the Phnom Penh leaders, the three- against-one combination will probably end in the defeat of the odd faction out; that will allow the Khmer Rouge to turn their guns on the other two.

President Bush could make the nightmare all the more likely if he decides -- as some of his aides and key Congressmen are urging -- to start sending U.S. arms to the non-Communist resistance forces. Under present circumstances, and under current U.S. policy, that "lethal assistance" would be directed against Phnom Penh, not the Khmer Rouge.

Despite Baker's apparent fatalism, the U.S. does have another choice. It could back a three-part coalition that includes the two non-Communist factions and the leaders in Phnom Penh but forcefully excludes the Khmer Rouge. Not unless and until the two non-Communist groups accept that realignment should Washington provide them with arms. The result would be a different three- against-one equation that might lead to the eventual disintegration of the Khmer Rouge. And that would be a far happier fact of life for Kampuchea -- as well as a consequence for U.S. policy of which Americans could, for a change, be proud.