Alliance A Decision Not To Decide

By Bruce van Voorst/Brussels

Soviet tanks were on the move in Eastern Europe last week -- and on the minds of the Western defense ministers who were in Brussels to discuss NATO's next dilemma: whether and when to modernize the alliance's remaining nuclear weapons. Some of the armored divisions rumbling through East Germany and Hungary were heading for assembly stations in preparation to go home, making good on Mikhail Gorbachev's promise last December to remove 50,000 troops, 5,000 tanks and other conventional arms from Eastern Europe.

The unilateral withdrawal is just the sort of act that prompts critics to accuse NATO of being too sluggish and too cautious in responding to Gorbachev's initiatives. Moreover, the spectacle of departing troops, which Moscow intends to conduct with considerable public fanfare, plays effectively to a European public ever more willing to see the bright side of Gorbachev's promises.

The beleaguered government of West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl is most vulnerable to these pressures. To stave off graver trouble for Kohl, who faces an uphill battle for re-election in December 1990, the U.S. and Britain reluctantly agreed to put off until 1991 any decision about the future of the short-range (80 miles) Lance nuclear missile. Public opinion in West Germany solidly opposes replacing the U.S.-made Lance with a newer missile capable of hitting targets 280 miles away. "It's doubtful the Kohl government could survive next year's elections if it is associated with a decision to deploy a new generation of short-range nuclear systems," observed a senior British official. And Kohl would probably likely be succeeded by an even stronger antinuclear government led by left-of-center Social Democrats and Greens.

Both the U.S. and Britain are eager to proceed with modernization of NATO's diminished nuclear arsenal. But neither wants to force a confrontation that would hurt Kohl. So the communique signed by the ministers was a masterpiece of double-talk, reaffirming NATO's determination to maintain an up-to-date nuclear capability but setting no date for deploying the new missile. The ambiguous Brussels agreement was enough, however, to permit American Defense Secretary Dick Cheney to proceed with a two-year budget request for $150 million for research and development of a new weapon.

The postponement of a deployment decision only serves to highlight what is increasingly apparent: Lance is a symbol of a much broader trend toward the complete denuclearization of NATO. Gorbachev set the stage for debating this several weeks ago, when he proposed opening talks on reducing the remaining short-range nuclear arsenals in Europe. The U.S. adamantly opposes the timing, arguing that conventional arms talks, which have just begun, must be wrapped up first. But the West German government is under enormous pressure to persuade the Americans to agree to start bargaining immediately for "equal but lower" levels of short-range nuclear weapons. Some leading West Germans are even pushing for eventual elimination of all short-range nuclear arms in NATO's forward zones, something the U.S. categorically rejects on the ground that without them, conflicts might break out more easily. The Bonn government is so eager to overcome U.S. opposition to these talks that it has dispatched Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg to Washington to plead Germany's cause. The U.S. would rather Stoltenberg stayed home, since the Administration does not intend to change its mind.

The political rumble from Gorbachev's tanks will be even more audible once the withdrawal begins. The Soviets are cranking up media coverage, complete with waving children and flowers tucked in the muzzles of tank cannons. But NATO cannot simply ignore the powerful allure of Gorbachev's challenge, despite its own dissensions. The defense ministers have dodged confrontation for now, but the ominous antinuclear trend will be less easily glossed over when the top leaders return to Brussels for next month's summit.