Middle East Saying No to Arafat

By Scott MacLeod

Barely visible behind a lectern in Tel Aviv's Yad Eliyahu basketball arena, the diminutive Yitzhak Shamir struggled to make his voice heard. His Likud bloc must agree to share power with Labor, he pleaded, "to be united against the danger of a Palestinian state." But even that potent argument elicited little but jeers from hundreds of angry members of the right-wing Likud bloc's central committee. Cheers rang out only when Ariel Sharon, the big and assertive leader of the party's hard-liners, called for a narrow coalition without left-leaning Labor. "People in Labor say we must talk to the P.L.O.," he shouted. "That is not our stance." The raucous crowd screamed back its approval.

But shortly after 3 a.m. last Wednesday, party members grudgingly capitulated to Shamir's proposal to form another national-unity government with the Labor Party. Shamir had vowed to give up his mandate to form a government if he lost. Later the same day, Labor's central committee, also divided over the wisdom of the party's casting its lot with Likud, ratified the coalition proposal. Seven weeks of wrangling followed inconclusive elections on Nov. 1, but the U.S. decision to open a dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization precipitated Israel's warring leaders into a second consecutive government of opposing ideologies. The two parties converged on one overriding fundamental: no dealing with the P.L.O.

The new government may be called national unity, but it will lean distinctly to the right. Both parties agreed to strict limits on the steps Israel would take toward peace. In a nine-page coalition contract, Likud and Labor flatly rejected recent proposals in P.L.O. chairman Yasser Arafat's peace campaign, saying the Israeli government "will not negotiate with the P.L.O." Instead, the pact reiterated Likud's long-standing call for direct talks with Israel's Arab neighbors, such as Jordan, and adopted Labor's offer to include non- P.L.O. Palestinians who live in the occupied territories. "We must do everything to say to America, to the Soviet Union, to Europe, to the Arabs, that in this difficult hour the people of Israel are united and forming one government," declared the new Prime Minister.

Shamir is the clear winner in Israel's battle to control a new and more complicated diplomatic environment. To cement his authority, Shamir refused to repeat the 1984 unity agreement under which each party in turn held the Prime Minister's chair. Reinforcing the government's shift to the right is the appointment of Likud's Moshe Arens, the hawkish former Ambassador to Washington, to replace Labor leader Shimon Peres as Foreign Minister in Shamir's 26-member Cabinet. Peres, under strong pressure from his party to ensure a government bailout of the troubled Histadrut labor federation and the kibbutz movement, the twin pillars of Labor support, opted instead for the finance portfolio. Peres insists he will continue to speak out on foreign policy issues as leader of the Labor Party. But it will be Shamir and Arens who finally give Israel one official voice on diplomatic matters.

That means the U.S. is likely to hear nothing other than Shamir's intransigent line. The Prime Minister fervently believes a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be just the first victory in a P.L.O. war to devour all of Israel. Thus he has found reasons to resist virtually all plans for peace talks, since they inevitably call for a trade of Israeli- occupied land for peace. Shamir's prime objective is to prevent the Palestinian initiative from advancing further and keep the door closed to the risk of negotiations.

Yet Israeli leaders are acutely aware the P.L.O. is winning the propaganda war. Said Foreign Ministry spokesman Alon Liel: "Israel has to come up with ideas in order to reverse the momentum." To that end, Israel is not likely to crack down harder on the Palestinian uprising in the territories as long as the level of violence rises no higher. Already under pressure from Western allies, Israel does not want to infuriate them further with draconian measures. That may be one reason Shamir has kept Labor's Yitzhak Rabin as Defense Minister, thwarting Sharon's intense campaign for the post. The ambitious Sharon, Shamir's archrival for control of Likud, has long boasted privately that he could end the intifadeh in a week.

Also losing out were the four religious parties, which won 18 Knesset seats. Shamir's initial plan of forming a government with them rather than Labor disintegrated amid the new diplomatic pressures and strong opposition from American Jews to the four parties' demands for stricter religious observance.

In Washington, U.S. officials expressed relief that the Labor Party may continue to exert a moderating influence in the Israeli government. They feel that despite Israel's clear rejection of Arafat's initiative, peace negotiations may eventually begin if the P.L.O. can back up its talk of compromise with deeds. The U.S. plan, subject to adjustment after George Bush becomes President on Jan. 20, calls first for collecting proof that Arafat is keeping his pledge to halt P.L.O. terrorism. The U.S. hopes that after about six months this period of restraint will convince the Israelis that Arafat is sincere in recognizing Israel's right to exist and that he can be bargained with. At that point, the U.S. Administration will have to find enough political will and diplomatic muscle to persuade a reluctant Israel to enter into negotiations. For 40 years Israel has preferred to say no to the U.S. as little as possible. But the two allies could face an unprecedented showdown unless the Bush team can figure out how to lure Israel into negotiations without a major rupture.

The U.S. is also urging Israel, so far without any success, to ease its iron-fist handling of the year-old intifadeh and grant limited autonomy to the 1.7 million Palestinians living under occupation. "They need to do things to make the Palestinians feel more human, more in control of their lives," says a U.S. official. Meanwhile, the uprising has reached a stalemate: the intifadeh can't defeat Israel's occupation, but Israel can't stop the rebellion.

The P.L.O. chairman does not have a notably easier agenda. As Arafat met & with a host of world leaders, including Pope John Paul II, his aides said he was concerned that terrorism could doom his peace efforts, particularly if that initiative failed to produce results. In Damascus, Arafat's actions were condemned by two Syrian-backed Palestinian renegade leaders, Ahmed Jabril and Colonel Said Musa. Both have been accused by the U.S. of masterminding terrorist attacks.

Arafat has set an ambitious target: an independent Palestinian state by 1991. To speed diplomacy along, he plans to have P.L.O. officials unveil new proposals when they hold their second meeting with Robert Pelletreau, the U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia. One is an international conference on terrorism that would enable Arafat to dramatize his promises. Another overture, an acutely sensitive one, might be an offer to help prevent terrorist acts by exchanging intelligence information with the U.S. Meanwhile, Arafat wants to reach early agreement with King Hussein on the outline of a U.S.-backed Palestinian- Jordanian confederation.

But given Israel's position, Arafat is not likely to need such a detailed blueprint anytime soon. Few in Israel are ready -- yet -- to accept the seismic shift in attitude that has occurred, especially in the U.S. Government. The Bush Administration will be looking for a new mood in Jerusalem as well as a new government. But Shamir is unlikely to soften: Israel now appears to have a government that prefers territory to peace. And the overwhelming majority of his countrymen back Shamir in saying no to the P.L.O.

With reporting by Dean Fischer/Cairo and Robert Slater/Jerusalem