Shredded Policies, Arrogant Attitudes

By Ed Magnuson

The long-awaited witness initially seemed as skittish as her name would suggest. Fawn Hall's right hand trembled when she was sworn in as the 18th and final witness in the first phase of the congressional hearings on the Iran- contra scandal. But when she coolly related an extraordinary tale of typing phony official documents, shredding classified papers and hiding others in her clothes to sneak them past White House guards, her face hardened. Whenever her motives or those of her boss, Lieut. Colonel Oliver North, were challenged, she flashed both anger and fear. "Sometimes you have to go above the written law," she blurted out. Then, apparently hearing the gasps in the audience, she retreated. "Maybe that's not correct; it's not a fair thing to say."

But she did say it. In just a few words, Fawn Hall crystallized the mentality of so many involved in the scandal. As House Majority Leader Thomas Foley put it, Hall's remark amounted to a "spontaneous evocation of the whole attitude of those involved: the ends justified the means."

The hearings have offered plentiful details about how weapons were surreptitiously shipped to the contras in Nicaragua and to Iran at a time when U.S. law and the Administration's proclaimed policy banned such arms traffic. The 110 hours of public testimony have highlighted certain themes as well: an appalling willingness to stretch and sometimes break laws, to deceive Congress, to conduct the Government's business in furtive ways. And once the secret was out, many of the participants attempted to cover their tracks.

The Iran-contra mess has been more complex and difficult for Americans to follow than the Watergate tragedy, but according to New Jersey Congressman Peter Rodino, the newer scandal illustrates a similar "arrogance of power." Rodino knows the subject better than most; he chaired the House Judiciary Committee that voted articles of impeachment against Richard Nixon. No similar threat imperils Ronald Reagan, and there are many differences between the two events. Still, as the hearings demonstrated, the Iran-contra misdeeds in some ways are more far-reaching in their implications, placing U.S. foreign policy in the hands of private citizens and arms merchants whose yearning for profits may have exceeded their patriotism. Seemingly accountable to no one, these operatives used their secrecy, in Foley's view, "not to thwart our adversaries but to thwart the legitimate institutions of our Government. It was a covert action by the U.S. against the U.S." Fawn Hall's insistence that "it was a policy of mine not to ask questions" echoed the attitudes of other witnesses. Even Cabinet officials showed little curiosity about the questionable activities of their subordinates or timidly shrugged off decisions with which they sharply disagreed. Secretary of State George Shultz, for example, termed North a "loose cannon" and told Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams to "monitor Ollie." But Abrams testified that he merely asked North if he was doing anything illegal. Like Hall, Abrams said, "I was careful not to ask Colonel North questions I did not need to know the answers to."

"I was part of the team," Hall declared proudly at one point, and many members of the team were blinded to the reality of what they had done. Torn between her innocent insistence that "I was purely a typist, sir," and her determination to "protect" her boss's clandestine dealings with both Iran and the contras, Hall seemed unable to recognize wrongdoing. Even after telling the committee how she had shredded documents, Hall insisted, "I don't use the word cover-up." Her euphemism was that "I was in a protective mode."

Hall's account greatly sharpened the picture of deceit that has slowly developed from the hearings. She explained how North had taped to his desk a list of six documents that linked him to supplying money and weapons to the contras. On Friday, Nov. 21, after the Iran arms sales had been revealed and North's intertwined help for the contras seemed likely to be discovered, he handed Hall four documents on which he had jotted changes. She then typed entirely new memos. Asked if she realized the significance of her doctoring, she snapped, "That was my job, and I wasn't reading or trying to find out what his motives were or what he was trying to hide."

A memo in which North urged the sinking or pirating of a Nicaraguan ship carrying arms to the Sandinistas became a bland suggestion that its cargo merely be publicized. Removed from another document was a reference to dunning "current donors" for "another $25-30 million" for contra "munitions" at a time when Congress did not know that Saudi Arabia was giving such military support. A paper that urged National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane to brief President Reagan on how the "delivery of lethal supplies" to the contras would continue despite a congressional ban emerged from Hall's racing typewriter with no reference to weapons.

Hall acknowledged to committee members that she had done less than a foolproof job. She typed the false memos on new stationery that was not available when the originals were made. The attached documents were removed from one memo, but she failed to delete a listing of the attachments on the memo itself. Then, before she could switch the phony papers with copies of the originals in her own files or get the new "originals" back to the nearby documents room, a more urgent chore arose.

As Hall told it, she saw her boss taking documents out of a safe and feeding them into the office shredder. She went to his aid, dropping "12, 15, 18 pages" at a time into the machine. Lieut. Colonel Robert Earl, a North aide, contributed his own secret messages. Ever helpful, she asked North whether she should destroy telephone logs and her copies of computer messages too. Yes, he said. But didn't she know what she was destroying? a committee lawyer asked. "I really didn't notice, sir," she replied frostily. "I was just purely doing my job."

Hall's work was not over. Confronted by Attorney General Edwin Meese on Sunday, Nov. 23, North admitted the scheme to divert funds from the Iranian arms sales to the contras. On the following Tuesday, Hall was startled to find NSC officials boxing up North's papers. To her horror, she realized that the false documents were still on her desk and were about to be discovered. In panic, she called North at a hotel and whispered for him to return to the office. "I was very emotional at the time," she told the committee. Hall frantically stuffed some of the papers into her boots. She ran upstairs in the two-floor suite to get Earl's help in pulling copies of computer messages from the files. He started to put them in his jacket. "No, you shouldn't have to do this," Hall recounted. "I'll do it." Then she slipped the papers between her back and her clothes.

North arrived with Attorney Thomas Green, who at the time claimed to be representing North, retired Air Force Major General Richard Secord and Albert Hakim, Secord's partner in the highly profitable enterprise that participated in both the Iran arms sales and the air-supply missions for the contras. Hall, North and Green then walked out of the office and past a security check. North's briefcase was examined. Hall's boots and clothes were not.

Once out of the Old Executive Office Building, Hall twice tried to give the papers to her boss. North signaled her to walk on. Green, she said, warned, "No, wait till we get inside the car." In Green's automobile, Hall pulled out the papers and gave them to North. According to Hall, Green asked her what she would say when asked about shredding documents. "We shred every day," she replied. "Good," said Green. As it turned out, that is just what Hall did say when a White House lawyer inquired about the destruction of evidence.

The part-time model displayed a steely quality before the committee, interrupting some questioners and reeling off a well-practiced "I don't recall." While cameras clicked, Hall sat pertly at the table, often whispering to her lawyer and punctuating her answers with a curt "sir" stapled at the end. When Maine's Republican Senator William Cohen said he did not think North was entitled to a grant of immunity in exchange for his testimony, Hall objected. "I think that Colonel North is first a U.S. citizen and he has the same rights that you yourself do, sir." Surprised, Cohen paused, then replied, "I understand that. I'm not entitled to immunity . . . I don't think anybody's entitled to immunity." Hall's retort: "We have our separate opinions, sir."

Indiana Democrat Lee Hamilton, chairman of the House select committee, eloquently summed up the lessons learned so far. "Our Government cannot function cloaked in secrecy," he said. "It cannot function unless officials tell the truth." Beyond that, Hamilton noted that "privatization of foreign policy is a prescription for confusion and failure." He found an absence of accountability throughout the sorry affair. "High officials cannot look the other way or distance themselves from key aspects of policy or the actions of those they supervise."

One of those high officials, Hamilton declared bluntly, was Ronald Reagan. The President has admitted some knowledge of the Iranian arms deals and money- raising efforts for the contras, but steadfastly denies that he knew anything about the diversion of weapons profits to the contras. But the crucial question of exactly what Reagan knew has not been answered in the hearings. When the scandal broke, he downplayed his role in soliciting support for the contras while the congressional ban against U.S. aid was in effect. After McFarlane testified that Reagan had talked with Saudi Arabia's King Fahd about contra assistance, the President acknowledged playing a larger part. Then, last week in Venice, he backtracked again, telling reporters, "I told you all the truth that first day after everything hit the fan . . . I did not solicit anyone ever to do that ((help the contras))."

How directly Reagan will be tied to the diversion plan will depend on the testimony of North and Rear Admiral John Poindexter, the former National Security Adviser. Poindexter is scheduled to appear on July 7 and North later in the month. The committees' investigators have been grilling Poindexter in secret sessions without any of the legislators present, an arrangement the chairmen apparently agreed to in order to prevent leaks. But there was an understanding that if Poindexter produced any bombshells, such as having briefed Reagan on the diversion, the chairmen would be promptly notified. So far, Poindexter's inquisitors have been silent -- an auspicious signal for the President.

To critics who complain that the hearings have needlessly weakened Reagan, Maine's Democratic Senator George Mitchell noted that it was the President "who asked the Congress to create a committee to explore these situations to get the truth to the American people." As last week's testimony demonstrated, the historic hearings have responded to that challenge. And it is only half time in the still unfolding drama that seems to have no heroes, only shredded policies and arrogant attitudes.

With reporting by Michael Duffy and Hays Gorey/Washington