Soviets In San Diego?

By Ed Magnuson

The idea was once considered too idealistic for serious consideration, but last week it was placed on a negotiating table in Geneva. The U.S. proposed that U.S. inspectors be stationed just outside missile-producing plants in the Soviet Union to keep an eye on what was moving to and from the factories. In return, Soviet monitors could roam the fences of such U.S. defense plants as General Dynamics in San Diego and McDonnell Douglas in Titusville, Fla.

The far-reaching proposal was designed to guarantee that any treaty that might be achieved on mobile intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe would not be violated. As the bargaining quickened on what was basically President Reagan's 1981 "zero option," under which neither NATO nor the Warsaw Pact countries would base such missiles in Europe, the U.S. negotiators tabled and quickly announced the stiff verification procedures.

Both sides at the Iceland summit accepted in principle a plan that would % require the U.S. to remove the 316 Pershing II and cruise missiles that were deployed by NATO allies beginning in 1983; the Soviets would be required to remove the missiles that NATO's controversial deployment was designed to counter: 270 SS-20s that are targeted on Western Europe. The Soviets could keep 100 SS-20 warheads in Asia, and the U.S. could keep 100 similar warheads on its own territory.

But how can each side know that the other has moved or dismantled these weapons? The U.S. plan includes these steps: 1) inspectors from both sides would visit the missile sites and count the number of weapons deployed; 2) when the weapons had to be moved or dismantled, inspectors would be allowed to observe these actions; 3) permanent observers from each nation would be permitted to monitor sites where the remaining 100 missiles were kept; 4) similar observation posts would be created at the perimeter of the plants where missiles are produced; 5) each side could call for a limited number of inspections of any site on short notice if a credibility question arose.

U.S. defense contractors seemed in no position to object to having Soviet observers watching them. Said one industry spokesman: "We'll do whatever our customer proposes." Observed Richard Perle, the outgoing Assistant Secretary of Defense: "I would think that Boeing would be more concerned about an inspector from McDonnell Douglas than from the Soviet Union. I don't think this is going to prove a serious obstacle."

As for the Soviets, they have agreed only to the general concept of on-site inspections. Soviet negotiators seemed more concerned about U.S. insistence that their shorter-range missiles also be restricted. The Soviets have 130 of these weapons, with ranges of 300 to 600 miles, in Europe; NATO has none. Soviet Arms Official Victor Karpov said Moscow would consider holding talks on the shorter-range missiles proceeding simultaneously with the INF bargaining. But he did not want the two topics linked as a package. U.S. negotiators see the two issues as intertwined.

Despite the sticky issues remaining, Karpov predicted that an INF agreement could be achieved "within six months." Secretary of State George Shultz, who will meet Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze next month, saw a possibility of even greater progress. He said that if the verification problems of an INF treaty could be solved, the same solution might apply to an agreement on long-range strategic nuclear weapons.

With reporting by Bruce van Voorst/Washington