The Missiles of Europe

By Jacob V. Lamar Jr

In the jargon of nuclear strategists, the linkage of West European security to the U.S. nuclear arsenal has always been known as coupling. American bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons were first flown to Europe in 1948 as a gesture of resolve during the Berlin blockade. It was not long before the Soviet Union began building up its own Euromissile arsenal, which eventually surpassed that of the West. In 1979 NATO decided to modernize its intermediate-range nuclear forces by procuring 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles (now all in place) and 464 low-flying cruise missiles (160 of which are already installed). When deployment began in 1983, the Soviets walked out of the Geneva arms negotiations for 16 months. Coupling took on a political significance that transcended even its military one.

Indeed, the symbolic and political nature of the Euromissile issue has made it possible for both sides to edge toward a proposed compromise that will reduce INF arsenals to "token" forces of 100 warheads each. Such an agreement could provide a centerpiece for a full-fledged summit in the U.S. if Reagan and Gorbachev can iron out the remaining issues this weekend. Among them: the Soviets want only a short-term agreement in order to avoid being locked into a deal if modernization of the French and British independent arsenals commences in the next decade; the Americans want strict verification procedures, as well as limits on the mobile SS-20s that the Soviets have deployed in Asia.

Despite great expectations, some fear that an INF deal could undermine NATO's credibility, since the missiles have become a symbol of U.S. commitment to the alliance's defense. "There are bound to be some accusations that we cried wolf," says one European official. But a European defense expert argues that reduction would not equal a policy shift. "The decision in 1979 to modernize was a two-track decision," he says. "One of the tracks was deployment, the other was arms control. We were always ready to trade those systems."

In addition, the Soviets still have a substantial advantage in conventional-troop strength in Europe. After 13 years of bargaining in Vienna over Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, there are signs of progress, but the imbalance is not soon to be rectified. Thus NATO must still rely on medium- and short-range nuclear missiles to deter a Soviet attack.

Talk of an agreement on medium-range missiles has raised questions about Soviet deployments of shorter-range weapons in Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Some NATO allies, particularly West Germany, are urging that these missiles be included in the Reagan-Gorbachev talks. U.S. officials are concerned that negotiations on Soviet short-range missiles might lead to a demand for removal of U.S. nuclear- armed aircraft in Europe that are capable of striking the Soviet Union.

Verification remains a major stumbling block. On NBC's Meet the Press last week, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger spoke of the need for on-site inspection of weapons-production facilities. "When you get in something serious in the way of agreement," he said, "you have to have the ability to go on each other's soil, to look in factories and look at gun sites."

All in all, an INF agreement like the one being proposed would leave NATO in a much stronger position than when it undertook INF modernization in 1979. Both sides would have roughly comparable medium-range forces. It could also pave the way for more serious bargaining on long-range strategic missiles and defensive systems. Yet progress on these fronts, like the final resolution of an INF deal, will require a real impetus, involving further acts of political will from the two leaders meeting in Iceland this weekend.

With reporting by Christopher Redman/Paris and Bruce van Voorst/ Washington