Pouncing on a Transgressor

By Jill Smolowe

The first reports were sketchy, and they came from Washington, the scene of the political battle, rather than from Honduras, the scene of the real one. On Monday the White House leaked word that some 1,500 Nicaraguan troops had pushed across their northern border into Honduras to attack bases of the U.S.-backed contras who have been waging civil war against the Sandinista regime. At first there was skepticism. Not only did Nicaragua deny the report, but so did Honduras. But the next day a terse statement from the Honduran government confirmed that the Sandinista army had crossed the line and noted that the day had brought "new incursions" into Honduran territory.

President Reagan immediately granted Honduras $20 million in military assistance and ordered U.S. troops stationed near Tegucigalpa to start airlifting Honduran troops to the border. Fifty U.S. pilots and crew members, manning ten Hueys and four Chinook helicopters, began ferrying 600 Honduran soldiers to some ten miles from the embattled zone. Since the U.S. military presence in Honduras began building in 1980, it was the first direct involvement of U.S. troops in a Honduran military operation.

By the end of the week reports from the scene dispelled any doubt that the Nicaraguans had blatantly penetrated Honduran territory. Yet the size and significance of the invasion remained in dispute, and even some Administration officials conceded that it had been somewhat exaggerated, given that Sandinistas and contras regularly tangle along the border. Nevertheless, like Muammar Gaddafi's fitful missile attack on the U.S. fleet in the Gulf of Sidra, the Nicaraguan incursion provided a suitable pretext for showing U.S. military might in the region.

It also played into the Administration's efforts to win $100 million in military and humanitarian aid for the contras, which had been narrowly rejected in the House the week before. On Thursday evening the Senate approved the aid package by a vote of 53 to 47. While the raid did not alter any Senator's vote, it did quash attempts to expand upon House limits on how and when the money could be used. Although the margin was hardly the bipartisan mandate that Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole said he had hoped for, it was a concrete boost for Reagan in his attempt to gain approval from the House when the matter is reconsidered on April 15. Richard Lugar, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, called the action "a good, strong statement," adding that the vote would provide "a good basis for the House debate."

Democratic leaders who had fought the aid request could only sputter their annoyance with Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega Saavedra. It was the second time he had undercut a potential victory in Washington: four days after the House had rejected contra funding eleven months ago, he embarked on a well- publicized and ill-timed pilgrimage to Moscow. House Speaker Tip O'Neill, who engineered the most recent defeat of the contra aid package, termed the invasion a "tremendous blunder" and disgustedly called Ortega "a bumbling, incompetent Marxist-Leninist, a Communist." Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont quipped sarcastically that he "had heard a rumor that Daniel Ortega is secretly on the payroll of one of our intelligence agencies as a lobbyist for the Administration."

Republican leaders were delighted. "I think Ortega gave us a boost," chuckled Dole. During the debate that preceded the vote, Republicans pointed to the incursion to punctuate their concerns that the Sandinistas were bent on a bold expansionist course. "Blood is still flowing as we talk in the U.S. Senate," intoned Jesse Helms, the staunch North Carolina conservative. "It baffles me that we can even be debating 90-day delays (in the delivery of contra aid) when men striving to be free are being killed." Frank Murkowski, a Republican from Alaska, warned that the raid "underscores the dangers that the Nicaraguan conflict could spread throughout Central America."

Opponents of contra aid tried, with little success, to downplay the aggression. Jim Sasser, the Tennessean who spearheaded the Democratic challenge, charged the White House with trying "to magnify the whole incident. The Administration went to great lengths to get news of this so- called invasion out as broadly as possible." Christopher Dodd of Connecticut added, "The incident is obviously being used very effectively for political purposes here."

But the incursion spoke for itself. There had been talk of a bipartisan compromise that would temper the contra aid with a requirement that the Administration renew bilateral talks with the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. At midweek, however, Reagan signed a letter firmly stating, "Conditioning our aid to the Nicaraguan resistance on the initiation of direct bilateral talks, without first requiring that the Sandinistas talk to their own internal opposition, would seriously undercut our friends in the region and our foreign policy worldwide."

% For most of the week, Nicaraguan officials denied that Sandinista troops had crossed the border. In Managua, Joaquin Cuadra Lacayo, the army Chief of Staff, told reporters, "In the last several weeks we have mobilized many thousands of men to the border. But it is absolutely false that Nicaraguan troops have violated Honduran territory." But the Sandinistas undercut their own denials later. At a press conference on Friday, Ortega sought to justify but not deny the raid. "Honduras lost control of its sovereignty by having the mercenary forces there," he said, referring to the contras. "The border area is converted into a war zone. We have a legitimate right to defend our country." That statement made clear that Nicaragua regards any area where the contras are encamped inside Honduras as a justifiable target of aggression.

Uncharacteristically, the Nicaraguan government also admitted that the Popular Sandinista Army had losses. "The E.P.S. suffered 156 casualties, among them 40 dead, 116 wounded," read its communique. The contras put the Sandinista death toll at 200 and their own at 40.

The biggest loser last week, however, may have been Honduras. For years, officials in Tegucigalpa have maintained, as a matter of policy and pride, that Honduras does not allow U.S.-backed contras on its soil. It is a necessary fiction to shield Honduras from retaliation and allow its diplomats to help resolve regional conflicts. Thus it came as no surprise that Honduran officials initially denied the incursion, much as they have denied or downplayed the more than 100 crossborder attacks between contra and Sandinista troops in recent years. Lisandro Quezada, a spokesman for Honduran President Jose Azcona Hoyo, charged that U.S. reports of a large-scale invasion were "part of the publicity campaign of the Reagan Administration to get $100 million for the counterrevolutionaries ."

When President Azcona appealed to Washington for assistance to thwart the raid, he was informed that he would have to make his request public. As the second poorest nation in the hemisphere, one that relies heavily on U.S. economic aid, Honduras had little choice. But its discomfort was apparent. In the statement that confirmed the Sandinista presence, officials cautioned against "unjustified alarm or worry." After the letter was released, they continued to downplay the incident. "I feel that this incursion does not represent a major threat to the security of Honduras," said Foreign Minister Carlos Lopez Contreras.

On Wednesday, Major Jorge Arguello, carefully avoiding any mention of the contras, presented "evidence which demonstrates the warlike invasion" by the Sandinistas. Two captured Sandinista soldiers were paraded before reporters. Neither was permitted to speak beyond stating his name, unit and the circumstances of his capture. Both said they had been taken by Honduran soldiers. Officials in Washington, and even Honduran soldiers, admitted that the prisoners had been taken by the contras. "Hell, the Hondurans haven't been anywhere close to the fighting," said one U.S. Administration official. Honduran civilians, however, felt the heat of the battle. As peasants fled the bomb and rocket attacks, an international relief worker reported that in the town of Las Trojes, "frightened children were crying because of the noise."

The reasons for the Sandinistas' ill-timed incursion remain unclear. If they aimed to deliver a knockout blow to the contras before the Senate vote, they failed. Surrounded by some 6,000 contras, the Sandinista troops were forced to retreat. If they hoped to prove that the contras were an undisciplined army unworthy of U.S. aid, they missed their mark. While the contra victory may have resulted primarily from the Sandinistas' misjudgment of rebel strength, it left the impression that the rebels could hold their own. And if the Sandinistas' goal was to frighten Washington about the quagmire the U.S. could face by continuing its involvement with the Nicaraguan civil war, that may have been the biggest miscalculation of all.

With reporting by Harry Kelly/Tegucigalpa and John E.Yang/Washington