Reagan Makes a New Offer

By Amy Wilentz

"I want you to listen carefully," said Chief U.S. Negotiator Max Kampelman with a wide smile, "and I want you to listen with your constructive ear." Victor Karpov, his Soviet counterpart, smiled back, though somewhat less amiably. There was little likelihood of Karpov's attention wandering. He knew that Kampelman was about to unveil a sweeping new American proposal in response to the arms-control plan that the Soviets had tabled with much fanfare five weeks ago.

As the third round of the seven-month-old arms-control talks came to a close last week, Karpov had been preparing for a farewell session with his American counterparts before flying back to Moscow for an important meeting in advance of this month's superpower summit. Then suddenly his plans changed. A long cable with new instructions had arrived at the U.S. delegation's headquarters through special, secure channels, and Kampelman requested that the talks be extended to consider the latest U.S. offer. After consulting Moscow, Karpov agreed. So for 55 minutes on Friday morning, he listened intently as Kampelman and his colleagues read from a 16-page document summarizing the U.S. proposal.

On the surface, the two sides suddenly seemed to be edging toward genuine compromise. Both talked of dramatic cuts in nuclear arsenals and a limit of 6,000 on the number of nuclear "charges," the new arms-control argot for warheads and bombs. Both offered freezes and reductions on missiles in Europe. But on closer scrutiny, the underlying differences remained so significant that it was still hard to tell if both sides were motivated by a sincere desire for an arms-control agreement as well as by their continuing quest for propaganda advantage. The two nations still disagree, for example, on how to define the warheads to be included in the limit of 6,000 nuclear charges. And even if both could agree on reducing offensive weapons, the Soviets are still insisting on a trade-off: cuts in missiles in return for a ban on Star Wars. That point was as sticky as ever. President Reagan, again last week affirmed his determination to proceed with research and testing of his Strategic Defense Initiative. Behind the scenes in Geneva, Soviet officials had hinted at a possible walkout if there was no movement on SDI.

The surprising new U.S. offer reflected the intensity with which both sides are maneuvering in advance of the long-awaited first summit between Reagan and Soviet Communist Party Chairman Mikhail Gorbachev, set for Nov. 19 and 20. The President authorized the latest proposal just a week after he had tried, in his speech to the U.N., to shift the focus of world attention to issues like regional conflicts. He also gave an interview to five Soviet journalists--the first such session since John Kennedy spoke with an Izvestiya editor in 1961 --sat for questions from the BBC and held a hastily arranged televised briefing at the White House to announce his new arms initiative. For their part, the Soviets showed signs of new flexibility about their own proposals, suggested they might halt work on a controversial radar facility and offered an exit visa to Yelena Bonner, the ailing wife of Soviet Dissident Andrei Sakharov.

The reason for such stepped-up activity is simple: deadlines are approaching. Secretary of State George Shultz is scheduled to arrive in Moscow this week to put the final touches on preparations for the summit. The British and other NATO allies have flinched at Reagan's attempts to play down expectations for progress on arms control, and there are indications that Gorbachev has ordered his negotiators to pull out all stops in seeking a general statement of principles or perhaps an interim accord on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) based in Europe. One American official remarked that it all reminded him "of what Dr. Johnson said about the prospect of being hanged in a fortnight: 'It concentrates the mind wonderfully.' "

In his televised briefing, Reagan noted that the Soviet proposal delivered to him in September by Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze "had certain positive seeds which we wish to nurture." The President refused to discuss the details of his new response, but said, "I would characterize our arms- control position as deep cuts, no first-strike advantage, defensive research . . . and no cheating." One of the seeds picked up from the Soviets was setting the limit on nuclear charges at 6,000. Yet the U.S. proposal applies the 6,000 figure only to warheads on strategic missiles (submarine ballistic missiles and land-based ICBMs) and on cruise missiles launched from planes. % The Soviets would like to lump gravity bombs and short-range attack- missile warheads into that category; the U.S. has a significant lead in these weapons.

In addition, the U.S. proposes important subceilings: only 4,500 nuclear charges would be permitted on ballistic missiles; the other 1,500 could be deployed as air-launched cruise missiles, which the Soviet Union would like to ban outright. The 1,500 limit is noteworthy, since the U.S. has a clear edge in air-launched cruise missiles, and the Air Force has plans to buy more than 3,000 of the weapons. Of the 4,500 ballistic-missile charges, only 3,000 would be allowed on ICBMs, with the rest to be deployed at sea. The U.S. considers the big land-based missiles to be the most dangerous because their accurate multiple warheads can be used to launch a devastating first strike. The Soviets currently have a 3-to-1 advantage in ICBM warheads.

The U.S. proposal would freeze Soviet and American launchers in Europe at the levels reached by the end of this year. For the U.S., that includes 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles in West Germany and 32 cruise missile launchers in Italy, Belgium and Britain. The Soviets have approximately 270 SS-20 ballistic missiles aimed at Western Europe, each with the capacity for three warheads. Once the freeze is in place, the Soviets would have to scale their warheads down to the U.S. level.

Another controversial issue addressed by the latest U.S. plan is throw weight, a measure of the power of missiles to thrust warheads and guidance gear during an attack. The Soviets now have about 5.7 million kg of ballistic- missile throw weight, compared with the U.S.'s 2 million. The U.S. plan calls for substantial direct cuts in maximum throw weight in order to reduce the opportunity for "breakout," the ability of one side suddenly to increase its offensive capabilities.

In its new proposals, the U.S. also seeks to ban future "heavy missiles," such as any successor to the Soviets' mammoth ten-warhead SS-18. The U.S. MX would not be affected. A provision put in place by Assistant Defense Secretary Richard Perle to toughen up the U.S. offer would proscribe mobile ICBMs, such as the Soviets' SS-24s and SS-25s and the proposed U.S. Midgetman. The Pentagon has never been keen to build the Midgetman, which was mainly pushed by Congress and other nuclear strategists; the ban is considered a concession to Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and Perle, who have consistently taken a hard line on arms-control talks.

The U.S. showed no willingness to bargain away its Star Wars program. In his interview with the BBC, the President elaborated on his notion that SDI developments could be shared with the Soviets, on the theory that the world would be more secure if both sides had a shield against nuclear weapons. In his news briefing, he stressed that the new U.S. proposals still include what he called "defensive research." The challenge will be to define a level of SDI research and testing--the U.S. now refers to "experimentation"--that the Soviets would accept.

The U.S. proposal came in response not only to the U.S.S.R.'s September initiative, but to subsequent Soviet refinements that have emerged from a series of private talks between U.S. and Soviet negotiators in Geneva. In these "postplenary" discussions, Soviet negotiators have indicated that their original proposal can be interpreted in a way that is more acceptable to the U.S. As one U.S. official put it, "The thing is still somewhere between a sow's ear and a silk purse, although it's a tad less bristly now than it was a couple of weeks ago."

One major step the Soviets have taken in the past three weeks is to indicate that a quick interim agreement could be reached on INF weapons without resolving Star Wars or other issues. Karpov has given his imprimatur to a plan that deals specifically with medium-range missiles in Europe; until last week the Soviets have never conceded the right of NATO and the U.S. to deploy American weapons in Europe. The latest informal Soviet offer would allow the U.S. to base between 100 and 120 cruise missiles in Europe (nearly the number already there) to be accompanied by a reduction in Soviet SS-20 warheads within range of Europe. The entire U.S. Pershing II contingent in West Germany would have to be removed, however. In return, the Soviets would also freeze their Asian SS-20 force, partially allaying American fears that Moscow's Euromissiles would merely be shipped off to Asia--where they would threaten Japan, Korea and China--and could easily be returned to Europe in case of a crisis.

Though it sounds forthright, the SS-20 warhead reduction proposed by the Soviets is actually quite tricky. The Kremlin would like to retain a number of SS-20 warheads in range of Western Europe that would be equal to the number of warheads on the remaining 120 or so American missiles, plus those warheads atop France's and Britain's own ballisticmissile arsenals. Those countries, along with the U.S., insist that these are independent national arsenals that are not a part of the superpower balance. Another problem: the British and the French are in the process of adding warhead capacity to their current stock of missiles.

Karpov and his colleagues also hinted at some new flexibility on strategic weapons. Only a month ago they were insisting that no new weapons be added to either nation's strategic arsenal. But now the Soviets have indicated that they might agree to one additional new weapon in each leg of the strategic triad (land-based, seabased and airborne), which would allow the U.S. to proceed with its modernization program.

The Soviets have also indicated that they might now accept a written limit on throw weight. In addition, they offered last week to stop construction on a giant phased-array radar in Krasnoyarsk, Siberia. This facility has been cited by Reagan's defense team as a major Soviet arms-control violation because such installations are permitted only along borders under the terms of the 1972 ABM treaty. In return for halting work on the nearly completed radar, the Soviets demanded that the U.S. stop upgrading two advance-warning radar complexes in England and Greenland, neither of which falls under the provisions of the ABM treaty. Said Under Secretary of Defense Fred Ikle, one of the Pentagon's hard- liners: "They're offering to trade what is clearly a violation for two radars that are fully permitted under the treaty."

Perhaps in response to Reagan's recent admonishments on human-rights abuses, Moscow made its offer to allow Bonner, 62, an exit visa to seek medical treatment in the West. She and her husband Sakharov, a distinguished physicist, are kept in "internal exile" in Gorky, an industrial city 250 miles from Moscow. In a telegram received by a friend on Friday, Bonner indicated that she would probably not leave until the end of the month-- after the summit is over.

When the U.S. formally received the details of the latest Soviet offer, the Administration found itself faced with two questions: a tactical one of whether to make a response before the summit, and a substantive one about what any response should contain. As usual, the Administration split into naysayers, led by Weinberger, Perle and others at the Pentagon, and dealmakers, with Secretary of State George Shultz, other State Department officials, Arms Control Adviser Paul Nitze and National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane at the fore.

/ In some ways, the substantive debate was the easier one. "Two weeks ago," said one participant, "we knew what the American position could be." This may have been partly owing to the feeling among Perle and other Pentagon hard- liners that no deal was possible because of the Soviet insistence on curtailing Star Wars. Advocates of an agreement had hoped that Moscow would find some way to paper over the issue, at least for the moment, by accepting an American affirmation that it would continue to adhere to the ABM treaty. But Perle and others damaged that possibility by pressing within the administration for an interpretation of the ABM treaty that would not forbid development of space-based defense systems.

Perle and other hard-liners remained insistent, during the arms-control strategy sessions chaired by McFarlane, that various provisions be added to make the proposals more favorable to the U.S. military. Even with the plan all but finished, Weinberger dug in his heels. At a top-level planning group meeting two weeks ago, headed by Reagan, the Defense Secretary said that the proposals would compromise U.S. military security. McFarlane challenged him to cite specifics. Weinberger could not come up with a single item. Admiral William Crowe, the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, offered no support to the Secretary.

Reagan took all this in, say his aides, and indicated that he felt there was an opportunity to take the Soviets up on some of their offers. Weinberger retreated from his substantive attacks, instead questioning the timing. Shortly thereafter, Weinberger and Perle went off to Brussels for a NATO meeting. There the Secretary presented a tough and well-documented lecture, using a pointer and photographs, about alleged Soviet violations of existing arms-control agreements. He received qualified support for the American claims from the U.S. allies and helped negotiate an agreement between the U.S. and Britain on joint participation in SDI.

While Weinberger was still in Brussels, Reagan convened the National Security Council Planning Group last Tuesday to reach a final decision. Deputy Defense Secretary William Taft, sitting in for his boss, repeated the Pentagon case that there was no need at the moment for a new proposal, and that the terms had to be more favorable to the U.S. But Chief of Naval Operations James Watkins, representing the JCS, said the Joint Chiefs did not find the plan detrimental to U.S. military interests. Having put the numbers through the & wringer, he said, the military brass found them acceptable.

Shultz was also arguing forcefully for a new plan. There was, he told his boss, the "right political dynamic" to make the offer now. "I cannot go to Moscow without this," he reportedly said, "or you will be the one to look bad." When Reagan finally gave his approval the new instructions were quickly sent by cable to Geneva, and the outlines of the offer were incorporated in a letter from Reagan that Ambassador Arthur Hartman delivered in Moscow. As one State Department official put it, "Once it was out in two capitals, the Pentagon would not be able to reverse it."

After 64 full-dress negotiating sessions in Geneva since March, and with the summit just weeks away, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have now moved dramatically closer to defining areas of compromise on offensive weapons. "There is a very good prospect," said McFarlane last Friday, "that from Geneva there can come not a signed, sealed, delivered agreement, but a commitment on both sides to reductions and to a process of dialogue with regard to defensive systems that would truly be a watershed." In order to continue such a dialogue, Shultz will try to set up another summit for next year while he is in Moscow this week. His attempt may fail, because Moscow has stressed that there must first be some specific progress at the summit, before an ongoing process can be instituted.

Yet real progress on arms control still seems to hinge on the one issue where both sides remain adamant: SDI. The threat of an American strategic defense system probably had a lot to do with Moscow's readiness to return to the bargaining table and discuss the deep missile cuts it had hitherto rejected out of hand. Some in the Administration still harbor hopes that Star Wars might be the ultimate bargaining chip. Without some flexibility on SDI down the road, it could instead become the ultimate stumbling block, the issue that causes the Soviets to act on their hints that they might, once again, walk away from the bargaining table.

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With reporting by Laurence I. Barrett/Washington and Strobe Talbott/Geneva