Chiefs in Search of a Chief

When Admiral William Crowe took over as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Oct. 1, he acquired a fancy title and a sometimes frustrating job. The 1947 law that established the four-member JCS gave it little authority. In theory, the members were supposed to lead a unified military structure. In reality, the four who serve as operating heads of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines often consider their first priority to be protecting the interests of their re- spective services. The fifth chief, the Chairman, has no power to arbitrate disputes; he can act only as spokesman for the group, which offers advice to the President and Secretary of Defense. By custom, major JCS recommendations must be unanimous.

The idea was to shape a unified military strategy and a coherent set of budget priorities by forcing compromises among the individual services. But the nation has got only "watered-down" and "mushy" recommendations, in the words of Barry Goldwater, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. In strategic planning, the concern of each Chief has often been to secure a piece of the action for his own service. A prime example is the 1983 invasion , of Grenada, which turned from a Navy-Marines show into an operation also involving Army Ranger battalions and Air Force transports and gunships. Their inclusion, the Pentagon's own after-battle studies show, merely sowed confusion. In budgetary planning, the JCS has rarely made hard decisions as to whether money might be best spent on ships, tanks or fighter planes; usually the Chiefs have simply stapled together the wish lists of all four services. Former Defense Secretary Harold Brown has called the advice he got from the Chiefs "worse than nothing."

The House favors reforming the system by greatly strengthening the role of the Chairman. A bill recommended by a House Armed Services subcommittee would designate him the "principal military adviser" to the President, authorized to make recommendations that any or all of the individual services might oppose. The Chairman also would gain a permanent seat on the National Security Council and supervisory authority over the ten generals and admirals who command forces in the field. (Each leads a unified command--all U.S. land, naval and air forces in the Pacific, for example--or a specified command of one service. They now get their orders directly from the Secretary of Defense or the President.)

In each of the past three years, the full House passed legislation that would have increased the power of the JCS Chairman, only to have it rejected by the Senate. Oddly, though, it is the Senate that may now consider the most radical reform. A 600-page Senate staff study about to be released recommends abolishing the JCS altogether and replacing the body with a panel of senior military officers, drawn from the ranks of generals and admirals with extensive experience as leaders of the unified command groups. Any reform is likely to be fought by the individual services and some legislators and Administration officials who fear "a Prussian-style general staff." But Admiral Crowe seems ideally suited to overcoming such obstacles. Originally a submariner, he earned a Ph.D. in politics from Princeton, and his posts have been as much diplomatic as military. He is the first JCS Chairman in 32 years to come from a unified command (the Pacific theater). Crowe has expressed no opinion on JCS reform. But at his confirmation hearings he remarked, "My father used to say that your mind is like a parachute; if it does not open when you need it, it won't do much good. I have an open mind."