Why Sanctions Have Not Worked

When Washington first imposed a trade embargo on Cuba in October 1960, it hoped to force Havana to abandon Marxism. Today, nearly 25 years later, the Cuban government is still Marxist, and it is one of Moscow's closest allies. The example is mentioned by Carmelo Mesa-Lago, director of the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Pittsburgh, as evidence that trade sanctions are at best only temporarily damaging. In the long run, he believes, the embargo against Nicaragua "will not work. History shows it did not work in the case of Cuba."

The longest-standing and strictest American trade restrictions are those against North Korea, which has been under a U.S. embargo since 1950. Sanctions against Viet Nam go back to 1954, and those against Kampuchea to 1975. These countries and Cuba face an American denial of all trade, travel and finance. Various U.S. economic restrictions have been imposed on other countries, including Libya, Iran, Iraq, South Yemen, Syria and South Africa.

But time and again, the restricted countries have managed to keep their economies intact despite the embargoes. Although the United Nations has supported restrictions on the sale of weapons to South Africa since 1977, that country seems to have suffered few adverse effects. Cuba turned to Moscow and now sends the bulk of its sugar, the country's leading export, to the Soviet Union and the East bloc.

Embargoes frequently fail because other countries provide markets and supplies. Japan, Canada and Spain have become Cuba's major non-Communist trading partners. When President Carter imposed sanctions on grain sales to the Soviet Union following the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Moscow simply found new suppliers, principally Argentina. The U.S. had tried to prevent the sale of oil- and gas-pipeline equipment to the Soviets to express its disapproval of Soviet involvement when martial law was imposed in Poland in late 1981, but Washington backed off when its European allies raised angry protests. The U.S. also imposed a variety of sanctions against Poland itself in 1982. Some of these remain, such as suspension of most-favored-nation trading status, but others were lifted after Poland granted amnesty to political prisoners; there was also evidence that the Polish people were hurt more than their government by the sanctions.

The situation most similar to Nicaragua's is that of Fidel Castro's Cuba. Some U.S. officials argue that the Cuban embargo continues to be effective because it hampers Havana's ability to earn hard currency and thus raises the Soviet Union's costs of supporting the island country. Because about 85% of Cuba's trade is with the Soviets and its East bloc allies, transportation costs are high. The U.S. embargo has also forced the Cubans to devote much of their light and heavy industry to manufacturing spare parts for their U.S.-built transportation systems and factories. Indeed, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Langhorne A. Motley, who announced his resignation last week, declares, "I think that anybody who looks at Cuban affairs can say that there has been a significant effect on Cuba as a result of the U.S. embargo." It is counted as a small cost that cigar-smoking Americans have had to do without--or illegally obtain--Cuba's prized handmade cigars, which have become Castro's personal symbol.

There are some differences between Nicaragua and Cuba, to be sure. Nicaragua (pop. 3 million) is smaller than Cuba (pop. 10 million) and has fewer resources and is a less developed economy. Unlike Cuba, Nicaragua still has a large private sector (at least 60% of its economy), which is likely to be severely hurt by the U.S. embargo. That is one reason, warns Mesa-Lago, why sanctions may serve to rally some Nicaraguans around the very government that Washington finds so repugnant.