Battling to Control the P.L.O.

By Marguerite Johnson

Despite Arafat's troubles, few are willing to write him off

The Palestine Liberation Organization has always been an anomaly, deriving its strength from a position of inherent weakness. From 1976 to 1982 it was the single strongest influence on the Arab world, a threat not only to Israel, its declared enemy, but to every Arab government that did not offer it support. Not since Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser has a Middle Eastern leader embodied Arab nationalist aspirations as did P.L.O. Chairman Yasser Arafat. He had no country of his own to run, but in the eyes of many Palestinians he enjoyed greater legitimacy than most of the Arab world's leaders.

Although Arafat was battling the most serious crisis of his tumultuous life last week, few experts were prepared to write his political obituary. The chairman had emerged from the ashes of too many other debacles, including the 1970 expulsion of his commandos from Jordan and the evacuation of 6,000 to 8,000 P.L.O. fighters from Beirut last year. "He has been down before," said Amnon Cohen of Jerusalem's Hebrew University. "Until I see a photo that he's dead, I won't be absolutely sure that he's finished." Still, with or without Arafat at its helm, the P.L.O. will be a very different organization after the bloodletting around Tripoli.

The most immediate change is that much of what is left of the P.L.O.'s military forces in Syria and Lebanon, including the Palestine Liberation Army, will come even more under the control of Syria. Three of the eight separate organizations that form the commando groups of the P.L.O., including Saiqa and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, are already loyal to Syria. If Rebel Leader Abu Mousa is able to defeat Arafat with Syrian backing, he will make a bid for control of Al Fatah, the Arafat-founded group that accounts for some 80% of the P.L.O.'s strength.

Yet much of Arafat's power was not military but political. As the premier spokesman on the highly charged issue of Palestine, Arafat had threatened, cajoled and argued his way into every council in the Arab world, most of the chancelleries of Western Europe, the United Nations and even the Vatican. While his troops fought a losing battle in Tripoli, Arafat still commanded the loyalty of some 110 P.L.O. representatives around the world,The organization's political wing, most experts agreed, will not go along with the moves of Syrian President Hafez Assad. That, paradoxically, could push moderates in the P.L.O., including many residents of the West Bank and perhaps Arafat, to seek closer ties with Jordan's King Hussein.

There is also, however, the chance that without Arafat's personal unifying leadership the P.L.O. will shatter into many parts, some of which may, for want of any alternative, resort to terrorism. "That would be worse for us all," noted a State Department official.

Even in the best of times, P.L.O. unity was something of a mirage. Arafat's achievement was to weld disparate and frequently feuding factions running the gamut from right to left, Islamic to Marxist, into a cohesive force. But a showdown became inevitable after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon last year.

Arafat's biggest mistake was to vacillate at a time when he was in a position to make a courageous decision that could have borne fruit for the 1.2 million Palestinians living in Israeli-occupied territories. He seemed to perceive the opportunity when, at an Arab summit in Fez last year, he came as close as he ever had to endorsing Israel's right to exist. In April he entered into negotiations with King Hussein on President Reagan's plan to link the West Bank and Gaza to Jordan. Although Israel had rejected the plan outright, there was just a possibility that if Hussein and Arafat could reach agreement, the U.S. would be able to press Israel to begin talks with Hussein.

Arafat all but agreed to give Hussein the go-ahead to negotiate on behalf of the West Bank's Palestinians, but at the last minute failed to obtain the backing of his own organization and pulled out. In retrospect, some analysts believe that Arafat would have been no worse off had he given Hussein the mandate, even if it might have split his movement. Says former Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, who has long maintained close ties to Arafat: "Because he was so intent on maintaining the unity of the P.L.O., he never stated clearly enough what his real aims were. For every politician there comes a time when he must decide whether to sacrifice a political concept to unity or risk a split." Arafat elected what seemed to be the safer course, but for Assad it was already too late. The Syrian President read the Arafat-Hussein maneuverings, even though they came to naught, as an attempt to usurp a right he has always claimed for himself, namely to be the Palestinians' strongest supporter.

Assad had ruthlessly undercut Arafat twice before. In 1970, when Assad was Defense Minister, he prevented the Syrian air force from coming to the aid of Arafat's commandos in Jordan. During the 1975-76 civil war in Lebanon, Assad ordered his army to help Christian militiamen obliterate the Palestinian refugee camp of Tel Zaatar in Beirut, killing 3,000 Palestinians. When Assad failed to have Arafat deposed at a P.L.O. central committee meeting in August (Arafat actually received a nearly unanimous vote of confidence), Assad decided to resort to force.

The Syrian President may have dealt a mortal blow to Arafat's leadership, but his brutal Realpolitik was not supported by any Arab government except Libya's. From Jordan and Egypt to Saudi Arabia and the gulf states, Arab governments were still voicing support for Arafat.

As a result, few people were rushing to write Arafat off. Said a Western analyst in Beirut: "Assad has the guns, but Arafat has the hearts and minds of the Palestinians." That is his weapon, and it may yet, in some unforeseen way, rescue him once again. --By Marguerite Johnson. Reported by David Halevy/Jerusalem and William Stewart/ Beirut, with other bureaus

With reporting by David Halevy, William Stewart This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.