Reagan Makes His Moves

By GEORGE J. CHURCH

The decision was so startling that aides warned it could not be kept secret for even a few more hours. If Ronald Reagan did not want the capital to be awash in puzzling leaks and wild rumors, he would have to break the news openly at his very next public appearance. That happened to be a totally incongruous event, a welcoming address to 200 women leaders of Christian evangelical groups visiting Washington. After the usual innocuous pleasantries, the President told the churchwomen that he had reviewed the qualifications of "more than two dozen fine potential nominees" to succeed James G. Watt as Secretary of the Interior and settled on a man whose name was not on that list: National Security Adviser William Clark.

It was such an unusual switch, from a primary role in foreign affairs to a secondary one in domestic policy, that Washington buzzed for days with speculation about Reagan's and Clark's motives, slighting the more consequential question: Who would replace Clark as the chief White House adviser on foreign and military policy? From the beginning, the obvious candidate was Clark's top deputy, Robert McFarlane, a seasoned and pragmatic professional in national security affairs. But as always when a powerful post is up for grabs, there were other contenders. Officials who feared that "Bud" McFarlane would not be a forceful advocate for hard-line views vigorously promoted Jeane Kirkpatrick, Reagan's intellectual, ideological and sometimes abrasive Ambassador to the United Nations.

Pondering the matter over the weekend at Camp David, Reagan reached his decision. He told aides that he planned to appoint McFarlane. But he intended to delay the formal announcement until early this week, giving him time to confer with Kirkpatrick, who is known to be weary with her U.N. job. The President was set to offer her a post in Washington, possibly a newly created one, in which she would have ready access to the Oval Office and the opportunity to advise on a wide range of foreign policy questions.

Such an arrangement would be novel, but nowhere near as intriguing as the transfer of Clark that prompted it. In the first few hours after that move, even the most savvy officials could not believe their ears. A senior White House staff member who informed colleagues about the change just before Reagan publicly announced it encountered such incredulity that he had to insist, "I'm not joking, it's the truth." Legislative Aide Kenneth Duberstein, phoning Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker with the news, argued for three minutes before he could convince Baker that it was not an elaborate put-on.

The reason for the shock: the National Security Adviser's job is potentially one of the most powerful in the nation and indeed the world. The Interior Secretary's task of managing the Federal Government's vast landholdings, for all the explosive controversy that Watt brought to it, has considerably less than globe-girdling impact; it is of interest primarily to the Western states.

Ordinarily, no Government official moves down to a lesser-ranking post voluntarily. Yet Reagan had given no hint of displeasure with Clark's performance. In fact, Judge Clark had seemed to have pervasive influence over foreign policy. And who other than the President could possibly have enough muscle to push Clark out of a position in which he had been in stalled precisely because he was a longtime, trusted intimate of Reagan's from the days when he served as chief of staff to the then Governor of California?

As it turned out, nobody. Nor did Reagan appear to make the switch with an eye to campaign strategy, even though it did serve the purpose of realigning his Administration in the same week that he gave a go-ahead for the formation of a re-election committee, which is tantamount to a declaration of candidacy. For all its potential impact on issues ranging from expansion of national parks to control of nuclear weapons, Clark's transfer was apparently dictated by considerations not of policy or even politics but of personal preference. Clark had been worn down by the strain of his national security position and wanted out, to the point of twice talking about going home to California or at least leaving the White House basement. Reagan wished to accommodate his prized troubleshooter, yet keep him in Government. Interior was the only high-level vacancy.

There is some dispute about just how the idea came up, and the only people who really know are Reagan and Clark. But on one point all accounts agree: Clark was just plain tired. A California rancher, lawyer and judge, Clark came to Washington originally as No. 2 man at the State Department, with no knowledge of foreign policy. To keep abreast of fast-moving foreign affairs, he had to enter his offices at State and later in the White House before 7 a.m. and plow through papers until late in the evening, six or even seven days a week.

More important, Clark suffered from emotional burnout. He has a considerable talent for bureaucratic infighting; he helped to engineer the resignations of his predecessor as National Security Adviser, Richard Allen, and later of his old boss, Secretary of State Alexander Haig. He sidetracked Haig's unassertive successor, George Shultz, on some issues. Deputy White House Chief of Staff Michael Deaver, another intimate of the President's who had been close to Clark since they were Reagan aides in California, was so put off by Clark's habit of short-circuiting the White House staff system that he and Clark have gone through several periods over the past year when they were barely on speaking terms.

On issues, Clark succeeded in imposing Reagan's visceral hard-line stamp on some policies, notably stern opposition to leftist revolution in Central America. Maladroit in dealing with Congress, Clark led Reagan to a stinging defeat last spring when he counseled the President to insist on a bigger increase in military spending than even the Republican-controlled Senate would accept. But Clark succeeded in bringing some order to what had been a disorganized National Security Council staff and involving Reagan in foreign policy decisions that the President had tended to slight while concentrating on domestic affairs. That accomplished, Clark considered his work done.

Meanwhile, Watt's offhand verbal zingers had offended so many domestic constituencies that a fortnight ago it became obvious that he could not stay on in the Cabinet. In a telephone conversation on Saturday, Oct. 8, the day before Watt's resignation, Reagan and Clark lightheartedly discussed the advantages Watt's replacement at Interior would enjoy: the opportunity to do a great deal of horseback riding in fresh air, for example. Apparently, both thought they were jesting. The leading candidate to succeed Watt was former Republican Senator Clifford Hansen of Wyoming.

By last Wednesday, however, Hansen had turned down the job for health reasons, and Clark decided that he actually wanted Watt's post. He approached Presidential Counsellor Edwin Meese, another ally from Reagan's California staff. Meese advised Clark to speak directly to Reagan. Clark met with the President Thursday morning, in such secrecy that Shultz later lunched with him and returned to the State Department unaware that any change was in the works. At 3 p.m., right after the lunch, Reagan telephoned Clark to say the job was his if he really wanted it. Clark accepted. Reagan's announcement to the churchwomen followed within three hours.

In sum, Clark decided to try for a job that Reagan, on the advice of several aides and probably also Nancy, was simultaneously attempting to nudge him into. The reason was partly that the switch would serve Reagan's political interests, but even more, says one adviser, that "the President believes he is doing Clark a favor." In either case, the consequences for Administration policy--and re-election politics--will be the same. They are likely to be far more evident in foreign than in domestic affairs.

Interior is scarcely a rest-and-recreation post, as Watt's tenure abundantly proved. But at least the policies that Clark will carry out are fairly well set; their common theme is a tilt away from what conservatives felt had become an exaggerated concern for protection of the environment and toward accelerated commercial development of Government land. Reagan had been looking for a Secretary whose appointment would assure Western right-wingers, an important part of the President's political power base, that those policies would continue without being enmeshed in the controversies set off by Watt's loose-lipped remarks. There is a political liability too: environmentalists angrily attacked Clark's appointment, correctly reading it as a sign that nothing much would change.

In overseas affairs, however, Clark's transfer is anything but a guarantee of continuity in policy. That has never been the Administration's strong point anyway; the Reagan years have been marked by frequent switches of both policy and personnel. Allies and adversaries who already have had to deal with two Secretaries of State will now have to accustom themselves to Reagan's third National Security Adviser.

McFarlane is a former Marine lieutenant colonel who has served in various posts at the State Department and on the National Security Council staff for the past ten years, under both Republican and Democratic Administrations, and has a talent for getting along with both diplomats and Congressmen. He came back to the NSC from State early in 1982 to serve as Clark's chief deputy.

Technically he still holds that post, but for the past three months he has been working primarily as U.S. special envoy to the Middle East, trying to patch together some kind of settlement of the chaotic civil war in Lebanon. By coincidence, McFarlane arrived back in Washington last week and lunched with Clark and Shultz as Reagan was about to announce Clark's transfer. McFarlane had been summoned home for a review of Middle East policy, which took on added importance last week with disclosure of an Administration plan to equip two Jordanian brigades as a pro-Western strike force ready to act in emergencies in the Persian Gulf region.

Kirkpatrick's candidacy was pushed primarily by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and CIA Director William Casey, two notable Administration hawks who had found Clark to be a reliable ally. Kirkpatrick's confrontational style at the U.N. and herinsistence on U.S. support of "authoritarian" but anti-Communist governments, especially in Central America, have made her a far more vivid and controversial figure than McFarlane.

Reagan values her advice, wanted to advance her and McFarlane while accommodating Clark, and came up with a try-to-please-everybody solution typical of him. How McFarlane and Kirkpatrick will mesh if they do in fact both wind up in more important jobs is an open question. Indeed, the problem of who should be National Security Adviser, in theory at least, was still open enough at week's end to enable some dark horses to be exercised in the fashion Washington touts so enjoy. Three names brought out for that were Brent Scowcroft, who was National Security Adviser to President Ford, Frank Carlucci, a former Deputy Secretary of Defense, and former New York Senator James Buckley, like Kirkpatrick a staunch conservative.

Clark's pending departure from the NSC altered some important equations in the White House. Right-wingers instantly deduced that Clark's transfer will cost them more influence over foreign policy than they will preserve in domestic policy at Interior. Richard Viguerie, a veteran fund raiser for hawkish causes, grumbled that the move "gets a strong conservative anti-Communist out of the foreign policy making process and allows the moderates and liberals in the White House and State Department to assume total control." His view is both biased and wildly overstated, but contains a measure of truth.

None of the people on the short list of candidates for National Security Adviser enjoys Clark's easy intimacy with Reagan. Hardly anyone else in the Administration does. In the long run, only the extremely assertive Kirkpatrick could conceivably have become a strong rival to Shultz for the President's ear. The choice of McFarlane is likely to strengthen Shultz's moderate, pragmatic influence; no matter his considerable merit, he is not the President's confidant.

Shultz has already been making a comeback from midsummer, when he seemed to be in eclipse. For example, he took a front-and-center role in organizing and expressing U.S. and world outrage at the Soviets' shooting down of the Korean jetliner. His renewed prominence has been quietly encouraged by some White House aides--including, oddly enough, Clark--who know that the Administration cannot afford to lose another Secretary of State before the 1984 election.

The impact of Clark's shift may be most noticeable in arms-control policy. Clark generally sided with those officials who place more emphasis on building up U.S. nuclear might than on reaching agreement with the Soviets. His absence will probably strengthen the clout of the so-called arms controllers at State, who favor stronger efforts to limit or reduce nuclear weapons on both sides.

The arms controllers will be especially cheered by the appointment of McFarlane, who is an expert in the field. He is neither a dove nor a mushy compromiser. He is, however, a realist who would join Shultz in seeking to explore any opportunity for an acceptable compromise that might come up in two sets of negotiations with the Soviets in Geneva, one dealing with theater-range nuclear weapons in Europe, the other with intercontinental missiles and warheads. That is, of course, if the Soviets show any real flexibility--a gigantic if, given the chill in U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations.

McFarlane probably would also be more effective in winning support for Administration foreign and military policy in Congress, a job that the Judge bungled badly. For example, Clark angered even Administration supporters on Capitol Hill by not consulting them in advance about the extensive naval and military maneuvers the U.S. is now conducting around Marxist Nicaragua (he did not inform Shultz about the timing either, to the Secretary of State's consternation).

McFarlane is so highly regarded in Congress that some influential legislators were paradoxically unhappy about his appointment as Middle East envoy. Though they had no qualms about his negotiating ability, the congressional powers thought McFarlane was more valuable helping Clark to run the NSC. They presumably will be equally happy to have him back in the top slot at the NSC.

The appointment of a. new National Security Adviser is likely to strengthen U.S. relations with West European allies. The improvement could not have come at a more opportune time: the European governments are about to accept the deployment of NATO missiles on their soil over a storm of angry protest from the international peace movement. The Europeans distrusted Clark from the beginning because of his role in easing out Haig, who was a devoted believer in the "Atlanticist" school of diplomacy, which holds U.S. solidarity with Western Europe to be vitally important. The allies' skepticism deepened as they perceived Clark to be encouraging Reagan in adopting a reflexively anti-Soviet hard line, and the President's announcement of Clark's leave taking was greeted with private relief along Washington's Embassy Row. "It was a nice surprise," said one European diplomat.

The Europeans view McFarlane, in the words of one Ambassador, as "a professional who knows the issues and is receptive to realistic solutions." They would have been less pleased by the appointment of Kirkpatrick. Her credentials as an Atlanticist were made suspect by her unsuccessful advocacy of U.S. neutrality in the war between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands.

All these potential gains from the transfer of Clark out of a job in which he had become exhausted, however, must be weighed against another consideration: the Administration has never managed to put together a smoothly working apparatus for making foreign policy decisions, and so far the multiple changes of personnel have not produced one that can run for more than a few months without a glitch. It remains to be seen whether the installation of McFarlane at the NSC and a new job for Kirkpatrick, if that should indeed be what Reagan decides, can achieve the desired combination of consistency and flexibility.

There is a chance, though, and it comes at a critical moment. U.S. foreign policy in many respects is in trouble. Relations with Moscow are in a deep and angry frost; the situation in Central America remains precarious; the Middle East as always teeters on the brink of explosion, and for all McFarlane's efforts, U.S. negotiating options seem even slimmer than usual. Yet there are signs of Administration movement toward a more centrist and adaptive approach to foreign policy. In recent weeks the White House compromised with Congress to win bipartisan support for the continued presence of U.S. Marines in Lebanon and revised its bargaining position on strategic nuclear weapons in order to preserve funding for the MX missile. Reagan also agreed to exchange visits with Premier Zhao Ziyang of Communist China.

A fresh eye at the NSC could speed some further changes, for which the pressure in any case is strong. Like any other President preparing for a re-election campaign, Reagan is eager to dangle some kind of foreign policy success before the voters. The impact of a presidential campaign on foreign policy traditionally is baneful: it often causes'every decision to be viewed not on its merits but on how it will affect blocs of voters. But if the campaign prods Reagan and his advisers into a more balanced position, the result just might be a more successful foreign policy.

With reporting by Laurence I. Barrett, Douglas Brew This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.