Deeper into Lebanon

By William E. Smith

The Administration acts to strengthen, and justify, the Marines'position

In Washington, as in Lebanon, it was a week of false hopes. Day after day, the reports from Beirut suggested that the fighting in Lebanon's Chouf Mountains was just about over, thereby reducing the threat to the lives of the 1,200 U.S. Marines dug in around Beirut International Airport. But the ground combat and the artillery fire persisted as the fledgling Lebanese Army fought Syrian-backed Druze forces for control of the strategic hill town of Suq al Gharb. The Marines, after savoring a brief lull in artillery fire directed at the airport, were forced back into their bunkers when mortar rounds began falling near them. And as they hunkered down, a political battle erupted in Washington between Congress and the President over the thorny issue of who has final authority to keep U.S. forces deployed in a foreign combat zone.

For most of the week, the Administration was heartened by repeated predictions from the Middle East that the peacemaking efforts of U.S. Special Envoy Robert McFarlane were about to pay off in the form of a ceasefire. By week's end it seemed clear, however, that the mission's chances for success were slim, largely because Syrian President Hafez Assad was determined either to bring down the Lebanese government of President Amin Gemayel or bend it to Syria's will.

Throughout the week, the Administration demonstrated the seriousness of its commitment to help solve the crisis in Lebanon. The number of U.S. naval vessels standing off the Lebanese coast reached twelve with the arrival from the Indian Ocean of a three-ship amphibious force. Aboard were 2,000 more Marines, who would be available for duty onshore if necessary. Those vessels, which include the nuclear-powered carrier Eisenhower, will be joined some time this week by the battleship New Jersey, whose 16-in. guns could flatten unfriendly artillery positions up to 23 miles inland.

Then, in a specific effort to improve both the security and the morale of U.S. troops on the ground in Lebanon, the Administration announced that the Marines had been authorized to call for air strikes and naval gunfire from the U.S. fleet, not only for themselves but also for the French, Italian and British contingents of the multinational peace-keeping force and, if necessary, for the beleaguered Lebanese Army.

In the U.S., even as the nation mourned the deaths of four Marines over the past three weeks, questions increased concerning the extent of the U.S. military role in Lebanon. Senators and Congressmen debated whether the Administration should not be obliged under the present circumstances to make itself, and its Middle East policy, more accountable to Congress by invoking the provisions of the 1973 War Powers Act (see box).

Just back from vacations at home, many members of Congress were fearful that the U.S. was becoming too deeply involved in Lebanon. Some also were concerned that the deployment of Marines in that country would set an unwelcome precedent for the use of troops in Central America, and they decided to call the President on the issue.

Despite such worries, a large number of Congressmen and Senators of both parties happen to agree with Reagan that the Marines should be in Lebanon, at least for the moment. For political reasons, the President would welcome some formal congressional support for his policies, but not at the price of losing the right to keep the Marines in Lebanon as long as he judges it to be necessary. House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill Jr. of Massachusetts offered a resolution that would authorize Reagan to maintain the Marines in Lebanon for 18 more months, after which he would have to ask Congress for an extension. When the Administration replied that this would be too strict, and some Democrats in the House complained that it was too generous, O'Neill announced that he was withdrawing the resolution in order to "regroup."

In the Senate, Minority Leader Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia argued that in light of the "changed circumstances" in Lebanon, meaning the outbreak of fighting, "full congressional participation is now required." Republican Charles Mathias of Maryland proposed authorizing Marine deployment for six months. "There is no question of whether U.S. troops are engaged in hostilities," he declared. "The facts speak for themselves."

Apart from the War Powers Act, the questions raised by the conflict in Lebanon were complex enough by themselves. They were made more so by the fact that the nation is already in the early stages of a presidential election campaign. The President sent the Marines to Lebanon in the first place to assist in the withdrawal of the Palestinian guerrillas from West Beirut and to help maintain the peace while the new Lebanese government gradually took charge. Much has happened since then, including the failure of the Syrians and the Israelis to withdraw from Lebanon, and the outbreak of fighting among the various Lebanese factions. But the original purpose of the Marines' mission remains approximately the same: to help a central Lebanese government hold together one of the most fractious of nations.

Administration officials remain convinced that they have enough congressional support to continue with the present policies. Indeed, they see no alternative to those policies under existing circumstances. To withdraw U.S. troops would signal a full-scale retreat by the U.S. not only from Lebanon but from the Middle East. Gemayel's government would certainly fall, Lebanon might very well disintegrate, and the way would be paved for Syrian and eventually perhaps Soviet domination of the region. On the other hand, to increase the U.S. troop commitment in Lebanon, even if Congress went along with such a move, would heighten the risk that the U.S. would get caught in the middle of an unpopular and probably unwinnable civil war. Like almost everyone else, the Administration has been disappointed in Gemayel's performance as President and has prodded him to try harder and faster to achieve a national consensus. Gemayel is hated by the Syrians, distrusted by the Israelis and opposed even by some of the Phalangists, whose primary loyalty is to his father Pierre. But Amin remains the President and the man whom the U.S. must work with. So the Reagan Administration's strategy remains, to maintain a military commitment in Lebanon while seeking a diplomatic solution, first to the fighting and then to the continued presence of foreign forces in that country.

In his frantic negotiations, Special Envoy McFarlane has been trying to bring about a political coalition between the Christian-dominated Gemayel government and its Druze and Muslim opponents. Specifically, the plan calls for a ceasefire, to be guaranteed by a committee made up of representatives from the Lebanese Army and the Christian and Druze communities. The plan also calls for a "national dialogue" leading to greater participation of the Druze and the Shi'ite Muslims in the central government. The plan was enthusiastically endorsed by Saudi Arabia, which sent an emissary, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, to Syria and Lebanon last week to solicit their support.

The Lebanese were greatly cheered when the prince arrived, figuring that a cease-fire might be at hand. That night they stayed close to their radios and television sets awaiting news of an agreement. Instead, they heard only further details about the fighting at Suq al Gharb. Prince Bandar had met with Gemayel and other Lebanese officials but failed to reach a settlement. Then he flew on to Cyprus and Damascus, then back to Saudi Arabia, leaving the Lebanese more depressed than ever.

The chief sticking point in the draft proposal concerned the future status of the Lebanese Army. The Druze leadership under Walid Jumblatt declared last week that the Druze were not seeking a separate state or canton for themselves, but a more equitable power-sharing arrangement under a unified Lebanese government. That s a reasonable aim, since political power in Lebanon has traditionally been divided principally between Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims, with only a small share for the Druze, the Shiite Muslims and the Greek Orthodox Christians, among others. The Druze also demanded that the Lebanese Army withdraw from Suq al Gharb so that the Druze might check on the welfare of their own people at Kafr Matta, the scene of an alleged massacre of Druze villagers by Christian militia forces.

The Syrians and the Druze also demanded assurances that the Gemayel government would not use its army in future domestic conflicts, but that request was obviously unreasonable. In refusing it, Gemayel pointed out that any government must put its armed forces wherever they are needed. He might have added that the Lebanese Army has turned out to be more successful as a national institution than anybody had expected, and in fact is just about the only thing that the Gemayel government has going for it.

The behavior of the Syrians in the negotiations convinced U.S. diplomats that the Assad government was not interested in a fair compromise. Said a discouraged U.S. diplomat: "The Syrians are making demands designed, in effect, to steal the legitimacy of the Lebanese government." Their real aim, in the U.S. view, is to hasten Gemayel's demise and replace him with a government that Syria can control.

Failing that, the Syrians will pdo their best to reduce the small portion of Lebanon that Gemayel actually controls. At the moment, his government's franchise extends scarcely beyond the city limits of Beirut, and even in some sections of the capital its control is shaky.

The Syrians appeared last week to be making much progress toward achieving their ends. Intense fighting continued at Suq al Gharb, which lies only nine miles east of the capital and has a commanding position overlooking both the city and the airport, and at other villages in the Aley area, as Druze forces stepped up their efforts to drive the Lebanese Army out of the hills. Resisting the Druze pressure, the Gemayel government insisted that the Druze forces were being heavily reinforced by troops from Syria and a rebel faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Many Lebanese, especially the Christians, have long been fearful that somehow the Palestinian guerrillas, in one guise or another, would find a way to slip back into West Beirut, and suddenly they appeared to be attempting to do exactly that.

Though the Lebanese claims were presumably exaggerated for propaganda reasons, Western diplomats believe that Syria has allowed between 1,000 and 1,500 Palestinians, many of them loyal to Syrian-based Palestinian Rebel Leader Said Mousa, to join the fighting. P.L.O. Chairman Yasser Arafat arrived unexpectedly in the northern Lebanese port city of Tripoli late last week, perhaps because of his concern over the growing involvement of various Palestinian factions.

As for the Lebanese charges of Syrian meddling, it is true that the Damascus government has been providing the Druze with arms, ammunition, food and medicine for some time. In addition, the Syrians have supplied them with at least one artillery battalion equipped with twelve to 16 artillery pieces and eight or ten Soviet-made T-54 and T-55 tanks. Though the worst of the fighting last week was in the hills, clashes also persisted in areas south of Beirut, especially between Damur and Jiyah, where Druze and Christian militiamen struggled for control of positions close to the main Beirut-Sidon highway.

On Friday morning the Lebanese air force went into combat for the first time in at least ten years. By the time the Lebanese pilots had completed a series of raids on Druze positions in the mountains, one of the six planes in the air force had been shot down, while two others had been hit by Druze or Syrian fire and made emergency landings in Cyprus. The pilots, to their credit, had been operating under difficult conditions, using a highway strip to the north of Beirut for takeoffs and landings. The pilot of the downed plane was rescued by a U.S. naval vessel.

With negotiations stalled and the fighting unchecked, Administration officials freely acknowledged their disappointment at the ineffectiveness of the Gemayel government and the obduracy of the Syrians. Reflecting on the McFarlane mission, a State Department official said: "We are pretty much at the end game." Yet the Administration knows that to remove the Marines now could only make the situation in Lebanon worse, so the present policy is likely to continue.

In the traditionally resilient and resourceful Lebanese capital, longtime Western residents observed a degree of discouragement greater than any in recent memory. Electricity and water were rationed, and streets were almost deserted by midafternoon. As stray rockets exploded near by, a bank manager tried to explain the prevailing mood of indifference. "You know," he said, "we are way behind in calculating the interest on savings accounts. Normally we would have a lobby full of angry people. But now there is no one. So many have left the country, and the ones who have stayed don't seem to care." --By WilliamE. Smith.

Reported by Johanna McGeary/Washington and William Stewart/Beirut

With reporting by Johanna McGeary, William Stewart This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.