Peace Keeping Gets Tough

By William E. Smith

As Druze shelling continues, U.S. and French troops shoot back

In a brilliant, late-summer sky above the eastern Mediterranean, F-14 jet fighters from the U.S. carrier Eisenhower roared over Beirut and headed toward the mountains of Lebanon. Only a few hours earlier, Super Etendard strike fighters from the French aircraft carrier Foch had conducted similar exercises. Officially, both the American and French warplanes were on reconnaissance flights. In reality, they were sounding a warning to Druze militiamen in the Chouf Mountains of Lebanon: from that day forward, the planes could be ordered to strike and destroy any artillery that continued to fire at troops of the four-country multinational force. The American, French, Italian and British troops had come as "peace keepers," to shore up the beleaguered government of President Amin Gemayel. Slowly and inexorably, however, they were being drawn into a maelstrom in which Lebanon's perennially warring factions continue to battle each other for political power.

In the week following the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Beirut area and the Chouf to new positions along the Awali River, some 17 miles south of the capital, two more U.S. Marines and two more French soldiers were killed by artillery fire, presumably from Druze positions in the hills above Beirut. That brought the death toll among the multinational force to five Americans and 16 Frenchmen.

Soon after the U.S. and France had issued their warnings to the fighters in the mountains, Druze Leader Walid Jumblatt's political group, the Progressive Socialist Party, declared that its forces had decided not to shell military positions in which the Lebanese Army and the multinational force had a joint presence. That seemed to be good news, since it applied to a large number of military locations throughout the capital and could have freed Beirut from the constant threat of shelling from the mountains. That night, in fact, the city was peaceful for the first time in almost a week. But next day the shelling resumed, once again striking positions around Beirut International Airport and outlying sections of the city. In response, a U.S. warship fired directly into the mountains, toward a Druze artillery position.

There was never much doubt that the Chouf, heartland of Lebanon's 250,000 Druze, who are members of a breakaway Islamic sect, would fall under control of the Druze militia, although the mountains are specked with Christian as well as Druze villages (see following story). The Druze militia has 30,000 fighters and, if pressed, could field thousands of irregulars. The Lebanese Forces, a Christian militia dominated by the Phalangists, have an estimated 5,000 to 8,000 fighters in the Chouf. This number could also be considerably increased, though at the moment many Christian families are sending their teen-age sons to Cyprus to hide them from Phalangist recruiting gangs.

That leaves the Lebanese Army, whose strength stands at 32,000 men, many of whom are needed for duties in the Beirut area and elsewhere. For several months, the army commander, Major General Ibrahim Tannous, has reportedly been advising Gemayel that the army could not be sent into the Chouf without an agreement involving all or most of Lebanon's principal political factions. Despite the impressive strides the army has made in the past year, Tannous felt, it was not strong enough to undertake so strenuous an assignment.

The long-expected Israeli withdrawal from the Chouf on Sept. 4 set the stage for new fighting between the Druze and the Christian militias. The pullout actually started a few hours early because, as Israeli Chief of Staff Moshe Levy told TIME Correspondent David Halevy, "we hoped to mislead those who were planning to attack our troops." The Israeli convoys drove down from the mountains under a crescent moon, the long line of their headlights resembling, as one spectator put it, "an enormous glowworm making its way through the night." Before dawn, the stream of military vehicles crowded the coastal highway as it proceeded to the new Israeli line beyond the Awali River. There, as he toasted the Jewish New Year a few nights later, Levy told his troops, "This is your new home. It seems that we will be stationed here for some time."

The withdrawal had been conducted neatly and efficiently, but it left chaos in its wake. Thereafter, the hills above Beirut thundered almost continuously with artillery fire. At times, the weapons were pointed downward toward heavily populated sections of Beirut, where people spent their days glued to radios and their nights in fitful sleep. Most of the firing, however, was directed at mountain towns and villages from which the majority of civilians had already fled. A Christian radio station claimed that 64 civilians were "massacred" by Druze fighters in the Christian village of Al Birah, a charge the Druze denied. Said a West European diplomat in Beirut: "These militias are good at killing any innocents who get in their way, but they do not have much talent for coordinated or prolonged maneuvers. Unfortunately, the Druze and the Christians are just strong enough to keep up a fight that could tear the country apart, even if neither side is able to win a clear-cut victory."

The first important engagement between the militias was at Bhamdun, a predominantly Greek Orthodox town spanning the Beirut-Damascus highway. The once bustling summer resort lies farther into the mountains than does Aley, the largely Druze town already in Druze military hands. As the week began, Bhamdun lay between Aley and the main body of Druze militiamen. The Lebanese Forces, which had as many as 1,000 Christian militiamen in the immediate area, evidently thought they could hold Bhamdun. But the Druze, with their superior firepower, moved in aggressively. The town quickly fell.

When TIME Correspondent Barry Hillenbrand visited the area a day later, he found Bhamdun a shambles and deserted, except for Druze soldiers. Roofs had collapsed, window frames were stained black by fires, and smoke curled from several stone villas. Near by, in the Druze town of Sofar, militiamen carried rocket launchers and ammunition to a white Toyota pickup truck from a small stone church that was serving as a supply depot.

At his headquarters in Hammana, Druze Leader Jumblatt told Hillenbrand that the multinational force was "no longer keeping the peace" and should "go away." Jumblatt acknowledged that the Syrians were providing support to his militia. He vowed that there would be no cease-fire until all Lebanese Army troops and Christian militiamen had been withdrawn from the Chouf.

The fall of Bhamdun panicked the Christian political leaders, who demanded that Gemayel do something to stem the tide of Muslim and Druze military power. In response, the Gemayel government asked that French and U.S. planes make a show of force, and so they did. In the meantime, the Lebanese government launched a propaganda campaign asserting that the Druze forces in the mountains were receiving the active military support of both Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization. There is no question that Syria is providing arms and ammunition to the Druze, in the hope of undermining the Gemayel government. But in the view of most Western observers in Beirut, few Syrian or Palestinian soldiers are involved in the actual fighting.

Throughout the week, the position of the multinational force was becoming increasingly precarious. U.S. Marines at Beirut airport spent most of Monday night in their bunkers after rockets and artillery shells began to land on the encampment. Dawn was scarcely an hour away when a rocket crashed into a bunker in Alpha Company's position to the east of the airport runway, killing Corporal Pedro Valle Ramos of San Juan, P.R., and Lance Corporal Randy Clark of Minong, Wis. The following day, an artillery shell struck the French military headquarters in West Beirut, killing Lieut. Colonel Louis Sahler and his driver and wounding six other French soldiers. At about the same time, a booby-trapped car exploded elsewhere in West Beirut, near the headquarters of the leftist Muslim Murabitun militia. At least ten people were killed.

Like the French, the U.S. Marines held to the principle of "measured response" at a time when there was nothing measured or restrained about the fighting. On Tuesday, a quarter of an hour after the deaths of the two Marine corporals, the Marines fired two illumination flares at the suspected sources of the hostile fire. On Wednesday night, after ten rounds landed in the Marines' compound, they fired six 155-mm howitzer shells at a target in the hills. On Thursday, as the shelling continued, the Americans responded with artillery fire and with four shells from a 5-in. gun aboard the Bowen, a U.S. frigate stationed off the Lebanese coast. The naval fire was aimed at a Druze artillery base near the mountain village of Shimlan, to the southeast of the airport.

The present dilemma of the multinational force is partly the result of the Gemayel government's difficulties and failures over the past year. Not until midsummer did Gemayel make any serious effort to forge a political agreement with the various Lebanese factions, partly because he was not sure how far his own Christian Phalangist Party and its militia would follow him. The Sunni Muslims, with whom the Maronite Christians have traditionally shared a preponderance of power in Lebanon, were unhappy with Gemayel's lack of urgency in dealing with the country's plight. But Lebanon's most disadvantaged groups, notably the Shi'ite Muslims and the Druze, were particularly incensed. Two weeks ago, the Shi'ite Amal militia staged what amounted to an armed revolt in West Beirut, even though Shi'ite Leader Nabih Berri is a relative moderate who has no love for the Syrians. Druze Leader Jumblatt, with powerful help from Syrian President Hafez Assad, in turn attempted to drive the Christian militia out of the Chouf and demand a greater share of power for his people.

What happens next? U.S. Special Envoy Robert McFarlane spent two hours with Syria's Assad in Damascus last week, discussing the possibility of a cease-fire in Lebanon and the entry of Lebanese Army units into the Chouf. But he also proposed some sort of conference to discuss the formation of a Lebanese government of national unity. Such a coalition would have to include leaders of the Druze and the Shi'ites. Another proposal called for an agreement setting forth communal boundaries that the various militias would pledge not to violate.

Whether the Gemayel government can survive in its present form is very much at issue. Last week a former Lebanese Cabinet minister who wanted to remain unnamed reflected at length on the present dilemma. It is conceivable, he said, that the current unrest is a prelude to an agreement that will allow both the Syrians and Israelis to withdraw from Lebanon, if they will agree to do so. It is also possible, he continued, that the country is leading toward the establishment of separate cantons for each of the warring factions. In that case, the fighting between Druze and Maronites will end with an agreement over communal borders. If that is so, he went on, there will also be fighting in the north to set the limits of Maronite and Sunni Muslim territory.

But it is also possible, said the former minister, that the new national army under General Tannous may be emerging as the force that could save the country. According to this argument, the army is the one institution that might command the confidence of both Christians and Muslims, but only if it is not operating under a government dominated by Maronites. Says the former minister: "The more vulnerable the Maronites feel, the more Cabinet and government posts they demand for themselves. The whole system is so unjust that it is no longer tenable. Yet Gemayel can continue only if he perpetuates the system. Lebanon has reached a cross roads." The former official emphasized that he did not believe a coup was imminent but that an army takeover was be coming a distinct possibility.

For the Reagan Administration, the strategy remains to support the Gemayel government and urge the young Lebanese President to try harder to broaden his political base. The White House has been reluctant to subject the American military presence in Lebanon to congressional approval, as provided for by the 1973 War Powers Act. But the Administration, worried about the continuing loss of American lives and the inevitable political consequences, now feels that some form of congressional assent might be helpful. For that reason, the White House is considering seeking a joint congressional resolution supporting the role of the Marines in Lebanon. The Administration is correct in its argument that to withdraw the multinational force now would be to jeopardize not only Gemayel's leadership but Lebanon's survival as a nation. When he telephoned Colonel Timothy Geraghty, the U.S. Marine commander in Beirut, last week, President Reagan promised to provide "whatever it takes" to stop the shelling of the Marine positions. The problem is that, as the factional strife in Lebanon grows ever more complicated nobody knows exactly what that promise will entail.

--By William E. Smith.

Reported by William Stewart and Roberto Suro/Beirut

With reporting by William Stewart, Roberto Suro This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.