An Interview with President Reagan

"There is no way you can avenge such a thing"

Ronald Reagan's mood Friday morning was as somber as the black suit he wore. Soon he and Nancy Reagan would attend a memorial service at the National Cathedral for those who died in the attack on Flight 007. Before leaving the Oval Office, the President met with TIME White House Correspondent Laurence I. Barrett. Reagan told his feelings on hearing of the tragedy, explained why he had avoided a policy of reprisal against the Soviet Union and reflected on future dealings with Moscow. Highlights of the interview:

Q. What was your first impulse when you learned that the Soviets had shot down the Korean airliner?

A. Even though I've never been naive about the Soviet Union or its philosophy, it was still difficult to believe that anyone would do that, [but] there was the evidence. It was shock. It was revulsion. It was horror. It was anger.

Q. And your first impulse as to what you should do about it?

A. Obviously you are tempted to think about vengeance, but there is no way you can avenge such a thing. It is very difficult to find anything you can do that matches the enormity of what they have done . . . you find that there is a great limit on what you can do. You can do some things for short-term public relations advantage and show your own feelings about this. But what you have to look for is what you can do, first of all, to get restitution for the families of the victims, and what you can do to see that this never happens again.

Q. That's your answer to those who say you should have acted in a much tougher fashion?

A. Yes. I've noticed that many of the people sounding off at great length now, being very vocal about this, in many instances they don't suggest what [specific] things I could do. [Or] they suggest things that are so obvious that they were the first things we thought of and ruled out for equally obvious reasons.

Q. Such as canceling the newly signed grain agreement?

A. Yes. We've had experience with that before, and it didn't work. It not only didn't work, but if there was any penalty, it was against our own people more than against them. They've proven that grain is accessible to them any place else. So there were things of that kind which we considered very seriously but ruled out. There were a number of other things that show your displeasure, but they could respond with retaliation of the same kind.

Q. You never seriously considered suspending INF and START?

A. No. These are things that we are seeking because this is a dangerous world and [the Soviets] constitute the bulk of that danger in the world. An act of this kind reveals how easily there could be an accidental start to conflict. It is important that we work as hard as we can to reduce the threat hanging over the world which is contained in the present imbalance of weaponry--their superiority in that weaponry.

Q. Since your speech, the Soviet Union has responded with invective, asserting that it had a right to do what it did and blaming the U.S. for what happened. What do you do?

A. Well, their very attitude in doing it, then their attitude in lying and in trying to assess blame some place else for their inhumane act, is just further proof of the difference that exists between their outlook, their philosophy, and what we have. [This distinction] emphasizes the importance of continuing to seek peace, but doing it with a recognition of that difference. There are too many people who heretofore have seen the Soviets as a mirror image of ourselves . . . Well, I believe that there must be many people today who now have a different view and who recognize that while you can't just break off and ignore them, you have to deal with them with the knowledge of how they think and what they are.

Q. Before the shootdown, there had been a number of conciliatory gestures between Washington and Moscow and a lot of speculation that these could lead to a Reagan-Andropov summit in 1984. In the light of the most recent events, do you see any chances for a summit in the foreseeable future?

A. I'll never rule that out. If I can be convinced in my mind that a summit can be beneficial to our security, to the free world, then such a summit should take place.

Q. At the time of your election, you said you believed in the linkage concept, that "there has to be a linkage between arms control and other areas of difference." Yet both in the Polish crisis and the present situation there has been no linkage. What made you change your mind?

A. I didn't change my view, but once you are in this position you find that you can have channels on those other subjects. In other words, while arms negotiations are going on, you are moving on those other subjects. And the Soviet government is well aware of your position. And while some have suggested that it is kind of an attempt to thaw the relationship, it is done in the context of what I've always said about them--what I recognize is their approach to international matters. So it isn't a case of thinking, oh, maybe if we talk nice enough, they'll be nice too. It's one of dealing in practicalities.

Q. Issue by issue?

A. Yes.

Q. Don't you get very pessimistic about the chances of any economic or diplomatic measures the West could take that would make Moscow change its behavior?

A. Well, this is one of the reasons why strength is so important for us . . . It is a case of viewing them as having an imperialistic approach to the world and our demonstrating to them that the price would be terribly high if they try to do it by force, too high for them ever to succeed. This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.