Dialing Down the Rhetoric

By George Russell

The President shows some flexibility on START

"Let us put our differences behind us. Let us demonstrate measured flexibility in our approach, while remaining strong in our determination to reach our objective of arms reduction, stability and security. Let us be leaders in the cause of peace."

So said President Reagan last week as he launched a new campaign to dispel the hard-line image of his Administration on the thorny, arcane and all-important issue of strategic nuclear arms control. Speaking in the Rose Garden, Reagan announced changes in U.S. nuclear bargaining positions that offered, as he put it, "the prospect of new progress" in the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), which reconvened last week in Geneva. Said he: "These actions reflect a bipartisan consensus on arms control, and new flexibility in the negotiations--steps to be viewed seriously by the Soviets and all others who have a stake in world peace."

The President's conciliatory theme was echoed by the Administration's chief strategic nuclear arms negotiator, Ambassador Edward Rowny, when he returned to the Geneva START talks after a nine-week absence. Said Rowny: "If the Soviet delegation is prepared to meet us halfway, there will indeed be progress." Later in the day, Rowny met for three hours with the U.S.S.R.'s deputy chief arms negotiator, Aleksei A. Oboukhov, who was subbing for Chief Soviet Negotiator Victor Karpov, absent and "slightly ill."

Shifts had indeed taken place in the U.S. negotiating position at Geneva. But on the whole, they were more a matter of tone and style, even though there were hints of future flexibility. In fact, the President's announcement* was largely aimed at maintaining support on Capitol Hill for the Administration's other nuclear weapons objectives, notably development of the MX missile. The latest START initiative, said a U.S. official, was designed to make "the most of the least possible change."

The only immediate substantive change, in fact, was abandonment of U.S. insistence on a mutual limit of 850 "strategic launchers" (land-and sea-based long-range missiles). According to Reagan, the U.S. will now "adjust" the cap to an unspecified higher number. Administration and congressional sources expect the new limit to be between 1,150 and 1,250.

As the President admitted, the 850 figure had never been deemed that important by U.S. arms negotiators. It also stood in the way of a concession that Reagan made to Congress in order to win support for the MX: moving toward a nuclear deterrent based on larger numbers of smaller missiles, each carrying only a single nuclear warhead, which would make them a less tempting target for a first strike. This was a major recommendation of the bipartisan Scowcroft Commission, which Reagan reappointed last week as an advisory panel on arms control to serve until January 1984. The President further emphasized that he had given Rowny the go-ahead to explore "all appropriate avenues" for meeting the new U.S. arms-limitation goals. Reagan also spoke about the eventual incorporation into START of the notion of "build-down," an idea that is fast becoming popular in Congress, involving the guaranteed destruction of a certain number of weapons whenever a new one is deployed.

While showing flexibility on launchers, Reagan left intact the two other START ceilings that he announced 13 months ago. He is still firmly committed to a 5,000 limit on the number of strategic ballistic-missile warheads. At the moment, the U.S. has 7,146 land-and sea-based strategic warheads, while the Soviets have approximately 7,500, meaning that both sides would have to reduce their weaponry by a more or less equal amount. Reagan's other ceiling, a cap of 2,500 on the number of land-based missile warheads, is not on the table as far as the Soviets are concerned. It would require them to scrap 57% of their 5,900 land-based missile warheads. The U.S., by contrast, currently deploys only 2,146 land-based missile warheads, and thus would be able to increase its ICBM " warhead inventory by 16%.

In addition, the U.S. is calling for other constraints on large missiles carrying four to ten warheads. The Soviets would have to dismantle 578 of their 788 missiles in this category. The U.S. deploys only smaller missiles with a maximum of three warheads.

Nonetheless, in a radio interview the day after his Rose Garden speech, President Reagan held out the possibility of flexibility on the provisions of START that the Soviets consider most one-sided in favor of the U.S. Said Reagan: "I doubt very much that there will be much of a problem about the mix of weapons." The White House has been hinting at much the same thing in special, secret briefings for key members of Congress. In those sessions, the Administration has indicated that a favorable Soviet response to Reagan's major public change in the START package, the lifting of the 850-launcher limit, might lead to other adjustments in the U.S. position later on.

When the Soviets first reacted to Reagan's speech, through the official news agency, TASS, it was with the customary assertions that the U.S. aims at "gaining military superiority and pressing the Soviet Union into unilateral disarmament." The Soviet response, however, did not reject the new proposals outright. Indeed, some Western diplomats in Moscow feel that the Soviets may be grudgingly prepared to make a deal, if not on START, at least on the issue of limiting intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe.

On Capitol Hill, Democratic Congressman Albert Gore Jr. of Tennessee hailed the President's conciliatory speech as "an important change." Gore heads an influential group of lawmakers who have made their backing for the MX conditional upon, among other things, a moderation of the Administration's arms-control line. Said Gore: "The odds are that we'll continue our support." Republican Senator William Cohen of Maine, however, warned that support for the MX in Congress is still "eggshell thin." Cohen predicted that in coming weeks the House would appropriate $4.5 billion for building 100 of the controversial missiles. But unless the Reagan strategy for START produces some results by the fall, Cohen said, the MX could face a Waterloo.

-- By George Russell. Reported by Strobe Talbottand Evan Thomas/Washington

*It came virtually on the eve of the 20th anniversary of John F. Kennedy's announcement that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were about to conclude a limited nu-clear-test-ban treaty. That document was signed after only ten days of talks.

With reporting by Strobe Talbott, Evan Thomas This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.