Time For a Decision

By Marguerite Johnson

Arafat and Hussein try for a meeting of minds

Sometimes allies, sometimes foes, always rivals, the Middle East's two most seasoned survivors were locked in a pas de deux whose final act could decide not only their own political futures but the prospects for a broader peace in the volatile and troubled region. After six months of adroit maneuvering to explore their options and bolster their respective positions, climaxing in a surge of diplomatic activity last week, Jordan's King Hussein and Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat met in Amman over the weekend to decide how to respond to the peace initiative presented by President Reagan last September.

At stake was not only the President's plan, which State Department officials concede has a "short shelf life," but whether any meaningful progress can be made toward Palestinian autonomy in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip before Israel builds so many Jewish settlements as to virtually annex the territories. The Reagan proposal called for self-government by the 720,000 Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan. Since Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin summarily rejected the plan, the U.S. has placed its hopes on King Hussein. If he would announce his intention to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians, Washington reasons, Israel could be persuaded to participate. But Hussein is unlikely to make such a commitment without Arafat's explicit backing.

There were few grounds for optimism last week. Lebanese, Israeli and U.S. negotiators held their 26th meeting to discuss the conditions under which Israel would withdraw its 35,000 troops from Lebanon. They made no substantial progress, and on Thursday U.S. Special Envoy Philip Habib flew back to Washington for consultations. Administration officials charged privately that Israel was stalling in order to thwart any prospect for broader peace talks. Apparently frustrated by Israeli intransigence, and perhaps to give King Hussein some timely encouragement, President Reagan said last week that the U.S. would continue to hold up delivery of 75 F-16 jet fighters to Israel until that country has withdrawn its troops from Lebanon.

As further evidence of how fragile the situation in Lebanon remains, Israeli and Syrian forces engaged in sporadic artillery duels in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley, where both sides have been bolstering their forces. The Soviets have sent substantial reinforcements to Syria, whose army is now in better shape than it was a year ago. Prime Minister Begin denied a charge by Moscow that Israel was planning a "piratic raid" on Syria. Said he: "All these threats have a totally artificial basis."

Yet the week's biggest uncertainty centered on Arafat's travels. After visiting Morocco, the P.L.O. leader was expected in Amman on March 27 to meet with Hussein. But instead Arafat flew to Saudi Arabia and then to Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait and Syria. Arafat's aim was to shore up Arab support before making any commitment to King Hussein. Arafat did not see Syrian President Hafez Assad, who is strongly opposed to Jordanian participation in peace talks, but he did deliver a fiery speech to a large throng of supporters in Damascus. The next day Arafat arrived in the Jordanian capital in a silver Mercedes after a three-hour drive from Damascus.

It was now King Hussein's turn to keep Arafat waiting. He spent Friday touring agricultural developments in the Jordan Valley with Oman's Sultan Qaboos bin Said. On Saturday, finally, Hussein received Arafat at the King's hilltop palace, Al Nadwa, overlooking downtown Amman. After lunch with their top advisers, they met for the first of several discussions alone. On leaving, Arafat said only that the meeting had been "positive," but on Sunday, reflecting the shifting nature of their talks, he spoke pessimistically about chances of reaching an agreement with the King.

Arafat's dilemma was real enough. The U.S. has implicitly asked him to cede leadership of the Palestinian movement, at least temporarily, to the King of Jordan. Moderate Palestinians, especially residents of the West Bank, have tried to convince Arafat that the strategy is worth trying, since it might be the only one that could give the Palestinians what they most want: control over their land. But Arafat has also come under pressure from hard-line P.L.O. factions who oppose negotiations under U.S. auspices. At a meeting in Algiers last February of the Palestine National Council, the de facto P.L.O. parliament, Arafat had hoped to obtain backing for joint P.L.O.-Jordanian initiatives. But although Arafat won a minor victory in blocking outright rejection of the Reagan plan, the P.L.O. would not surrender its representation of the Palestinians. Says a U.S. diplomat in Washington: "It confirmed Arafat's leadership but left him, and us, uncertain about how much room he has to maneuver."

Hussein's dilemma is no less agonizing. He cannot agree to enter peace talks without having the support of both Arafat and Jordan's Arab allies, notably Saudi Arabia's King Fahd. Jordan is dependent on Saudi Arabia and the gulf states for more than $1 billion a year in economic assistance. Hussein, moreover, would be personally even more vulnerable than assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was after he signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979. Says a European diplomat in Amman: "Jordan is not Egypt. It could not sustain the burdens of isolation."

At the same time, there are strong incentives for Hussein to act.

West Bank Palestinians support the idea of having Hussein negotiate on their behalf. In addition, Hussein, who was alarmed by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon last summer, has long been afraid that he could become the next target of Begin's territorial ambitions.

He particularly resents the claim being made with increasing frequency in Israel, notably by former Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, that the Palestinians already have a state in Jordan. Implicit, though never stated, in that argument is the idea that King Hussein should turn power over to the Palestinians, who represent some 65% of the kingdom's population. Says a Jordanian politician close to the palace: "If we do not force the Israelis to negotiate about the West Bank now, they will force us to negotiate over the East Bank later." Hussein also fears that unless broader peace talks are initiated soon, American attention will be diverted to the 1984 presidential campaign. That would reduce the chances of any progress at least until 1985, by which time the Israelis would be nearing their goal of having 100,000 Jewish settlers in the West Bank.

Most disappointing to Hussein has been the failure of the U.S. to demonstrate that it has much influence over the policies of the Begin government. Habib was still in Jerusalem two weeks ago when the Israeli Cabinet decided to build eight new settlements, some in heavily populated Arab areas. But the most glaring symbol of American lack of clout is Lebanon, where the U.S. has struggled without result to get a withdrawal agreement satisfactory to Israel. Said a Jordanian politician: "If the U.S. cannot push the Israelis out of Lebanon, why should anyone believe it can get them out of the West Bank?"

No one, to be sure, was more frustrated about that than Administration officials, who charge that Israel has played one delaying game after another in the talks. Israel's main demand is for arrangements that will guarantee security along its bor der with Lebanon. It has given up a request for a permanent 750-man Israeli presence in the country, but instead wants the 1,200-man militia of Major Saad Haddad, a renegade Lebanese army officer who has acted as an Israeli surrogate in southern Lebanon, to form a special unit in the Lebanese army assigned to the border area. Israel is also asking for the right to enter Lebanon at any time to conduct searches and make arrests. The U.S. and Lebanon have rejected both ideas as a mockery of Lebanese sovereignty. Some U.S. officials believe that Israel will stall on the Lebanon negotiations as long as there is a chance Hussein will join any peace talks. If Hussein refuses, they would then be able to blame the failure of the Reagan initiative on Jordan.

In a meeting with President Reagan last December, Hussein was assured that if he expressed his willingness to join the peace process, the U.S. would obtain a freeze on settlements in the occupied territories and a complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon before the King sat down to talk: Washington had advised Hussein of the contents of the Reagan plan before it was announced. After it became public, the King began a series of consultations with Arafat, and the two men went so far as to consider a joint negotiating team in which non-P.L.O. Palestinians would participate alongside Jordan. But the lack of progress on an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon began to erode Hussein's chances. By the time of the Palestine National Council meeting in February, Arafat had to fend off attacks from hardliners. Says a senior P.L.O. official: "If there had been a withdrawal agreement on paper in February, the outcome would have been very different."

Although the results of the Hussein-Arafat meeting were inconclusive at week's end, there were indications that the two leaders were striving for a compromise formula that would try to bridge the Reagan initiative and the plan approved by 20 leaders at the Arab summit in Fez, Morocco, last September. The Fez plan called for the creation of an independent Palestinian state, with East Jerusalem as its capital, whereas the Reagan proposal espouses only Palestinian self-rule under Jordanian auspices.

Both men were believed to be seeking a way to further prospects for peace negotiations of some kind and to build on the positive elements in the Reagan initiative. But to avoid the risks of going it alone, they will probably coordinate their actions with other Arab states. Plans were already being made for an Arab summit meeting in mid-April. For the U.S. and Israel, the big question was whether the two men would take a step that no Arab leader outside of Egypt has taken before: unambiguous recognition of Israel's right to exist. It is doubtful that any initiative short of that could convince Israel that the time to talk has come.

--By Marguerite Johnson. Reported by Johanna McGeary/Washington and Roberto Suro/Amman

With reporting by Johanna McGeary/Washington, Roberto Suro/Amman This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.