Gold-Plated Weapons

The stunning costs of loading weapons systems with the latest in sophisticated technology, and the long production delays that result from this endless "improvement," might be tolerable if U.S. military forces in the end were equipped with the very finest weapons, or at least ones that could do the job. But all too often the gold-plated armaments bring embarrassingly small improvements in fighting capability. Sometimes, in fact, older, simpler and vastly cheaper weapons work as well or better. Military reformers cite numerous examples. Here are four:

B-52 vs. B-1B. Much of the debate about the B-1B intercontinental bomber revolves around price: Will the 100 new bombers that the Air Force wants to buy cost $200 million each, as the Pentagon figures, $285 million each, as a team of retired generals who studied Air Force procurement guesses, some figure in between or possibly something even higher? But there is another, at least equally troubling, question: Will the most expensive plane ever built--and the B-1Bs will be that by anyone's estimate--do a significantly better job of penetrating Soviet air defenses in case of nuclear war than the aging (20 years and up) but still quite serviceable B-52s that they will replace?

Too many of the test data are still secret for a definitive answer to be given, but some experts who have seen the results are gravely worried. They say the B-1B has poor acceleration and little maneuverability ("Worse than the B-52," charges one critic) and that its range is less than the 7,455 miles planned. One objection to the B-52s is that because of their age it is getting increasingly difficult to keep them ready for combat. But early data indicate that the B-1B, because of its complexity, also would face severe maintenance problems. The Air Force contends that the B-52 presents too broad a "cross section" for Soviet radar. Critics doubt that the B-1B design will fool Soviet radar either. Worse, they charge, the B-1B's own terrain-following radar, which it uses to navigate to the target, will send out what amounts to a beacon that enemy fighters and missiles can home in on. The doubters concede the B-1B's advanced avionics gear will do a better job of jamming Soviet radar, but add that the same avionics could be put aboard B-52s at a small cost. In sum, whatever edge the B-1B might have over the B-52 would be purchased at an exorbitant cost for a few years between 1985, when large-scale deliveries would begin, and the early 1990s, when an all-new Stealth bomber could be available.

The M113 vs. the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle. The M113 armored personnel carrier has been the U.S. Army's "battlefield taxi" since 1960. It hauls troops to the action, but they have to jump out and fight on foot. Army planners wanted the infantry to ride right into battle alongside tanks, so they designed the Bradley. The Army plans to buy 6,882 at a cost of $1,947,000 each, vs. about $80,000 for an M113.

The Bradley is a behemoth, so wide that it cannot readily fit into the standard C-141 military transport plane; it has to be partially disassembled. Its 5 1/2-in.-thick armor adds some protection, but on the battlefield, critics charge, the vehicle would be a death trap. Its width and excessive height (10 ft.) offer an inviting target to enemy gunners. At times it even has to be a stationary target: the Bradley must come to a complete stop to fire its antitank missile. Its 25-mm gun also has a problem: it is said to be highly inaccurate.

Hand-carried, cheap (average cost: $150) antitank rockets, which are now standard equipment for every infantry squad in the Warsaw Pact armies, rip through the Bradley's aluminum armor like a welder's torch. Unlike steel, the aluminum vaporizes and burns, adding immense heat to the explosion inside and producing a fireball. That is not a theoretical danger. The M113 also is made of aluminum, and M113s carrying Israeli troops went up in flames in Lebanon. During the invasion, Israeli troops rode on the exposed areas of the M113--not inside it. Since the Bradley is designed for actual combat, it is far more likely to be hit, and since its armor is twice as thick, there is twice as much aluminum to vaporize.

The crowning irony is that for all its imposing bulk, the Bradley is so cramped that only six soldiers can squeeze into it with the commander, driver and gunner. The M113 will carry eleven. The Bradley, sums up Paul Hoven of the Washington-based Project on Military Procurement, "is an infantry fighting vehicle with almost no room for the infantry."

A-7 vs. F/A-18. Though it can do double duty as a fighter, the main role of the Navy's F/A-18 Hornet is to replace the A-7 Corsair II in flying from carriers to bomb and strafe targets onshore. The Navy wants to order 1,366 of the new aircraft at a total cost of $41 billion, or $30 million each, triple the $9.9 million cost originally expected and also triple the cost of the latest version of the A7.

Alas, the flashy Hornet burned fuel so fast in test flights that its combat radius is now calculated at only 390 miles, about half the range of the A7. Either the Hornet would have to be refueled in flight or its carrier would have to sail closer to hostile shores than might be desirable. Test pilots have described the F/A-18's elaborate air-to-ground radar as "grossly inaccurate." Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Thayer flew one himself to check out reports of serious problems; when he landed, the nose wheel failed to come down and he had to adopt emergency procedures. Some experts now believe that the very concept of such a multipurpose plane is wrong. They point out that in Viet Nam, Navy pilots who specialized in either dogfights or bombing missions outperformed Air Force pilots who tried to do both.

Thayer is considering cutting back the Navy's order to 900 Hornets. But that would drive the cost of the individual aircraft still higher. Moreover, the Navy would probably want to substitute F-14 Tomcats, carrier-based fighters, for the unpurchased Hornets in their fighter role. Tomcats are even more expensive; they cost $44.3 million apiece.

Sidewinder vs. Sparrow. Both missiles have been carried by U.S. fighter planes since the 1960s. The Sidewinder is designed to down enemy planes within visual range, roughly eleven miles. A heat-seeking missile, it speeds toward its target at twice the speed of sound, and homes in on the tailpipe. Its current version costs $59,000. The Sparrow is bigger (500 Ibs. to 190 lbs.), nearly twice as fast, and is guided by radar so that it can be fired at targets as far as 31 miles away. It costs $169,000.

Which has proved deadlier in combat? The Sidewinder, easily. During the Viet Nam War, Sidewinders shot down their target 24% of the time, Sparrows only 8%. Improvements to both missiles do not seem to have changed their batting averages. Israeli officials have told Americans that Sidewinders killed far more of the 80-odd Arab jets downed over Lebanon last year than Sparrows did. One reason: most aerial duels are fought at less than the Sparrow's minimum effective range (which is secret). In a close-range dogfight, the Sparrow's great speed often causes it to zip right past an enemy plane taking evasive action before the missile's radar can zero in on the target. This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.