The Verdict Is Guilty

By William E. Smith

An Israeli commission apportions the blame for the Beirut massacre

After the Phalangists had left the camps, Red Cross personnel, many journalists and other persons entered, and it then became apparent that in the camps, and particularly in Shatila, civilians, including women and children, had been massacred. It was clear from the spectacle that presented itself that a considerable number of the killed had not been cut down in combat but had been murdered, and that no few acts of barbarism had also been perpetrated.

In this kind of careful, deliberate prose, Israel's official commission of inquiry described the dreadful events of the three days last September when Israelis allowed Lebanese Phalangist soldiers to enter the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut, where the Christian militiamen proceeded to murder between 700 and 800 Arabs. After four months of testimony and deliberation, the Israeli commission last week delivered its report on the Beirut massacre, and it proved to be a stinging indictment of Defense Minister Ariel Sharon and several military officials, concluding that they shared an "indirect" responsibility for what happened in the Beirut camps. The report assigned only a "certain degree" of blame to Prime Minister Menachem Begin, but it recommended that Sharon either resign or be dismissed. It was also highly critical of three top commanders and a military intelligence official who were involved in the Israeli occupation of West Beirut.

The report, described by the Jerusalem Post as a "political earthquake," set off shock waves throughout Israel and indeed throughout the world. It was hailed in the U.S. and Western Europe as a remarkable example of self-criticism by a democratic society. Said the New York Times: "How rare the nation that seeks salvation by revealing such shame." In France, Interior Minister Gaston Defferre remarked, "This report is the honor of Israel. It gives the world a new lesson in democracy." The Italian Communist paper L'Unita called the report "a turning point for Israel," while Italian Journalist Arrigo Levi wrote in La Stampa of Turin: "It would be difficult to find any other nation at war that would let itself be subject to such an open and hard self-criticism."

The U.S. cautiously avoided any public comment on the report. Said President Reagan: "I just don't think we should be commenting or injecting ourselves into that internal problem." Nonetheless, some Administration officials privately expressed hopes that the commission's findings could, by reducing Sharon's influence, lead to a lessening of the increasingly pernicious tension that has recently permeated U.S.-Israeli relations (see following story).

The Begin government's response to the report was more circumspect. In the days that followed the release of the report at 9 a.m. Tuesday, the Cabinet met for three stormy sessions. Each time, Sharon refused to resign and Begin refused to dismiss him. Finally, after a grueling 6 1/2-hour session Thursday evening at which the Cabinet voted 16 to 1 to accept the commission's findings, with only Sharon himself dissenting, he called Begin to say he would vacate the post. As it turned out, however, the Cabinet voted on Sunday to keep him in the government as a Minister Without Portfolio. Begin will serve as Defense Minister for a while, after which the job may go to Moshe Arens, 57, a hard-line Begin ally now serving as Israel's Ambassador to the U.S.

As tension mounted in Israel after the report's release, the political atmosphere grew progressively uglier. Demonstrations took place day after day by supporters and opponents of the Begin government. On Thursday night, outside the Prime Minister's office in Jerusalem, where the Cabinet was in session, a hand grenade exploded in the midst of a group of Peace Now antiwar demonstrators, killing one person and injuring nine others, including the son of Interior Minister Yosef Burg. It was the first time that an Israeli had been killed as a result of the continuing internal political debate, and it shocked the nation. Decrying the violence, Israel's President Yitzhak Navon declared somberly, "Whoever threw the hand grenade tonight should know: we all have hand grenades."

At the center of the storm was the commission report, a 115-page document painstakingly prepared by a three-member panel headed by Supreme Court President Yitzhak Kahan (see box). Prime Minister Begin reluctantly appointed the commission in late September after an unprecedented wave of protest within Israel, culminating in a mass rally of 400,000 people in Tel Aviv, an extraordinary demonstration for so small (pop. 4.1 million) a country. Begin had previously grumbled, "Goyim kill goyim, and they come to hang the Jews." But under the rising pressure, he named the commission, which was charged with ascertaining "all the facts and factors connected with the atrocity." In the weeks that followed, the commission heard testimony from 58 witnesses and received written statements from 163 others. Assessing the accumulating evidence, the commission formally advised nine Israeli government and military leaders, including Begin and Sharon, that they were "liable to be harmed" by the findings. Serious political activity was now all but suspended in Israel as government and opposition alike awaited the commission's conclusions. Complained one Cabinet member: "It's like a sentence hanging over our heads."

When released last week, the report turned out to be far tougher than most Israelis had expected. "There is virtual hysteria," said Knesset Member David Magen, who belongs to Begin's Herut Party. The report and its consequences dominated the news in Israel all week as the Cabinet met again and again in an effort to decide on a course of action. Three Cabinet members, including Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir, flew home from overseas trips in order to take part in the discussions. Would Sharon quit or be fired? Would Begin himself resign? Would he seek Knesset support for holding early elections, even though this would be opposed by some of the small parties that belong to his Likud coalition? Or would the Prime Minister simply try to ride out the crisis?

In its findings, the commission drew an essential distinction between direct and indirect responsibility for the massacre (see ESSAY). It asserted flatly that the atrocities in the refugee camps were perpetrated by members of the Lebanese Phalangist forces, not by Israeli soldiers. The report described rumors that Israeli soldiers had been in the camps during the massacre as "completely groundless," and it denied that Israeli forces had any prior knowledge that a massacre would occur. It continued: "At the same time, it is clear . . . that the decision on the entry of the Phalangists into the refugee camps was taken without consideration of the danger . . . that the Phalangists would commit massacres and pogroms against the inhabitants of the camps . . . Similarly, it is clear that when the reports began to arrive about the actions of the Phalangists in the camps, no proper heed was taken of these reports. The correct conclusions were not drawn from them, and no energetic and immediate actions were taken to restrain the Phalangists and put a stop to their actions."

In reconstructing the events of those shocking days, the commission noted that on Wednesday, Sept. 15, the day after the assassination of Lebanon's President-elect Bashir Gemayel, Israeli Defense Forces moved into predominantly Muslim West Beirut. That same morning, Israeli Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan told Phalangist commanders, with whom the Israelis had long had friendly ties, that Phalangist forces would be the ones that would enter the Palestinian refugee camps in West Beirut. Also that morning, Sharon arrived in Beirut, conferred with his commanders and paid a condolence call on the Gemayel family. Meanwhile, Major General Amir Drori, who headed Israel's northern command, was "not at ease" with the plan to send the Phalangists into the camps. He tried to persuade the commanders of the relatively weak Lebanese army to undertake the assignment. The army leaders, fearful that they would appear to be acting in collusion with the Israeli forces that had so recently occupied West Beirut, said no.

On Thursday, Sept. 17, the report continued, final arrangements were made for a Phalangist intelligence unit, headed by Elias Hobeika, intelligence chief of the Phalangist forces, to enter the camps, and at about 6 p.m. the entry occurred. That night and throughout the following day, reports reached a number of Israeli officers and enlisted men of trouble within the camps, but top Israeli military men ignored or underplayed these warnings. The report concluded that as late as 4 p.m. Friday, when he met with Phalangist commanders, Chief of Staff Eitan told them they should "continue the action, mopping up the empty camps" until 5 a.m. Saturday, by which time they must leave the camps because of "American pressure." It was not until Friday evening that Eitan reported to Sharon, according to the Defense Minister, that the Phalangists had "gone too far," and Begin himself, as he testified in November, did not learn of the massacre until he tuned in the BBC toward evening on Saturday.

As it turned out, the Phalangists did not leave by 5 a.m. Saturday. They remained and continued their murderous harassment in the vicinity of Gaza Hospital, finally departing at 8 a.m., only after receiving a further warning from the Israeli divisional commander in charge of the troops in the area, Brigadier General Amos Yaron. What they left behind was death and outrage.

Who shared in the "indirect" responsibility for the deaths? Prune Minister Begin, said the commission, was "not a party to the decision to have Phalangists move into the camps." Nonetheless, it continued, he had displayed an "indifference" to the whole affair, and "for two days after the Prune Minister heard about the Phalangists' entry, he showed absolutely no interest in their actions in the camps." The commission concluded that Begin's "lack of involvement in the entire matter casts on him a certain degree of responsibility," but it did not recommend that he be obliged to step down as Prime Minister.

Similarly, the commission found that Foreign Minister Shamir had "erred" in failing to do anything about a telephone call he received Friday, Sept. 17, from Communications Minister Mordechai Zipori warning him of a report that the Phalangists were slaughtering Palestinians in the camps. But it did not recommend that any action be taken against him.

For Sharon, the commission reserved its strongest condemnation, declaring: "It was the duty of the Defense Minister to take into account all the reasonable considerations for and against having the Phalangists enter the camps, and not to disregard entirely the serious consideration mitigating against such an action, namely that the Phalangists were liable to commit atrocities and that it was necessary to forestall this possibility as a humanitarian obligation and also to prevent the political damage it would entail. From the Defense Minister himself, we know that this consideration did not concern him in the least." It should have, concluded the report: "In our view, the Defense Minister made a grave mistake when he ignored the danger of acts of revenge and bloodshed by the Phalangists against the population in the refugee camps. These blunders constitute nonfulfillment of a duty with which [he] was charged." In consequence, Sharon should "draw the appropriate personal conclusions," i.e., resign or be fired by the Prime Minister.

The commission was only marginally less harsh in dealing with three of the four senior military officers involved. It arrived at "grave conclusions" regarding "acts and omissions" by Chief of Staff Eitan, 54, a veteran of all the Israeli wars, who was known for his battlefield valor and coolness under fire. In its description of events, the commission noted that after the assassination of Gemayel, Eitan had predicted in a Cabinet session on Thursday, Sept. 16, that the Phalangists would engage in "an eruption [of revenge] . . . the likes of which has never been seen" and that he had added, "I can already see in their eyes what they are waiting for." Nonetheless, said the commission, Eitan failed to advise Sharon strongly against sending the Phalangists into the camps and thus must be viewed as a "partner" to the decision. Later, it noted, Eitan failed to raise the subject of the Phalangists' behavior at the meeting with Phalangist leaders, and allowed the operation to continue a day longer. His behavior added up to "dereliction of duty," the commission concluded. But since Eitan is due to retire as Chief of Staff in April, the commission recommended no punitive action against him.

Another key figure in the case was General Yaron, 42, the divisional commander, who had a position on the roof of the forward command post during the Phalangists' operation. At about 7 p.m. Thursday, only an hour after the Phalangists had entered the area, one of Yaron's aides, a Lieut. Elul, overheard a conversation on the Phalangists' radio. He heard a Phalangist officer inside the camp report that he had a group of 50 women and children in his charge, and ask what he should do with them. According to Elul, the Phalangist officer in charge of the operation, Hobeika, replied: "This is the last time you're going to ask me a question like that. You know exactly what to do." At that, said the report, "raucous laughter broke out among the Phalangist personnel on the roof."

Elul understood that the Phalangists were talking about the murder of women and children, and told Yaron what he had overheard. Yaron went over to Hobeika and spoke with him quietly for five minutes, but Elul could not hear what was said. An hour later, a Phalangist liaison officer reported to Israeli officers, including Yaron, that the Phalangists had killed large numbers of people inside the camp.

Despite this and other indications of mass murder, Yaron failed to report the information to his superior, General Drori, that night or the following day. Afterward, when everyone knew about the massacre, Yaron told colleagues that "the whole [military] system showed insensitivity." He added, "I did badly, I admit it." The commission agreed. It recommended that Yaron should not serve as a field commander for at least three years.

The commission also took a fairly strong position against Major General Yehoshua Saguy, 49, the director of Israeli military intelligence. Saguy had not trusted the Phalangists and did not want to cooperate with them. But he had been overruled by Sharon, who had preferred to take the advice of the Mossad, the Israeli civil intelligence agency, which had previous dealings of long standing with the Phalangists. Saguy testified that he was not informed beforehand that the Phalangists would be allowed to enter the camps. When he learned what had happened, he did nothing. As he told the commission, "So what could I say? 'Why did you send [them] in without asking me?' Or should I act insulted? No, I simply stepped aside in this matter, that's all." The commission concluded that he had displayed "indifference and a conspicuous lack of concern" about the whole affair, and recommended that he be relieved of his post.

On the other hand, the commission decided that no action should be taken against the head of Mossad (whose identity is never disclosed), since he had served as the agency's director for only four days at the time of the massacre. The commission also recommended that no action be taken against General Drori, who had made some effort to get the Phalangists out of the camps, even though he had failed to "continue with these actions."

One section of the report, known as Appendix B, was not published at all, mainly for security reasons. That section contains the names of several intelligence agents referred to elsewhere in the report. TIME has learned that it also contains further details about Sharon's visit to the Gemayel family on the day after Bashir Gemayel's assassination. Sharon reportedly told the Gemayels that the Israeli army would be moving into West Beirut and that he expected the Christian forces to go into the Palestinian refugee camps. Sharon also reportedly discussed with the Gemayels the need for the Phalangists to take revenge for the assassination of Bashir, but the details of the conversation are not known.

In what is perhaps the most eloquent passage in the report, the commission declared that it could not accept the argument, advanced implicitly by some members of the Begin government, that Israel had no responsibility for deeds perpetrated outside its borders by members of the Christian community against Palestinians. Said the commission: "It should not be forgotten that the Jews in various lands of exile, and also in the land of Israel when it was under foreign rule, suffered greatly from pogroms perpetrated by various hooligans; and the danger of disturbances against Jews in various lands, it seems evident, has not yet passed. The Jewish public's stand has always been that the responsibility for such deeds falls not only on those who rioted and committed the atrocities, but also on those who were responsible for safety and public order, who could have prevented the disturbances and did not fulfill their obligations in this respect."

From the Arab world there was scarcely a word of praise for the commission's strong report. The Kuwait Times reminded Reagan that he had said last fall that "no punishment is enough" for those responsible for the massacre and declared: "Call for the punishment now, Mr. Reagan. The witness is yours." The Jordan Times said the purpose of the report was "to protect the Israeli version of justice and self-righteousness, which has cost us dearly in almost every respect." In Cairo, an editor described the report as an attempt "to find scapegoats to save the Israeli defense establishment." In Riyadh, a Saudi Arabian official, obviously pleased, remarked privately, "Somewhat surprising, isn't it? Of course it didn't go far enough. There should have been an international tribunal."

It was unfortunate that the Arab reaction so demeaned their case. Arabs were at a loss to respond cogently to the results of the Israeli inquiry precisely because no government in the Arab world would dream of subjecting itself to the scrutiny of an independent commission. Nor would any be likely to survive such an investigation. In Beirut the Lebanese government's own investigation into the massacre is unlikely to mete out punishment (see box), even though the identities of many of those responsible for the murders must surely be known. Noting Lebanese Prime Minister Chafik al Wazzan's comment that the Israeli commission's report had "at least uncovered to the world who was really responsible," the Washington Post caustically observed: "How conveniently he seems to forget who pulled the trigger." In fact, said the Post, the Arab leaders like Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat who complained that the Israeli inquiry had not been sufficiently tough or far-reaching were themselves guilty of chutzpah, the Yiddish word for gall.

The commission's investigation was probably as thorough and painstaking as it could have been under the circumstances, and as expected, it produced a crisis for the Begin government. At first, it seemed likely that the departure of Ariel Sharon could be arranged quickly. Labor Party Leader Shimon Peres told Knesset colleagues that the report was "unambiguous and clear," while the tiny Communist Party wasted no time in offering a no-confidence motion. Amnon Rubinstein, head of the left-wing Shinui Party, said it would be "absurd" for the government to remain in power. But within the Likud coalition, many of Begin's supporters, including leaders of the ultraorthodox Agudat Israel and the Tehiya Party, urged Begin and Sharon not to resign. At a two-hour Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, Finance Minister Yoram Aridor asked Sharon whether he intended to resign. Retorted Sharon: "It's not up to me. The Prime Minister will have to do it." Begin then declared: "I will not fire a minister in this Cabinet."

An hour before the Wednesday meeting, Begin conferred briefly with U.S. Special Envoy Philip Habib, who had returned once more to try to help arrange a foreign-troop withdrawal from Lebanon. By now it was clear that Sharon was trying to tough it out. He left the Cabinet meeting to preside over a huge cocktail party in Tel Aviv for the visiting Defense Minister of Zaire, a country that Israel is presently wooing. As he entered the Tel Aviv Hilton, Sharon was greeted by shouts of "Arik, we are with you. We want Sharon!" Among the 500 guests were scores of Sharon loyalists who had been invited at the last moment to give rousing evidence of the minister's continuing popularity.

A perplexed Begin remarked to aides Wednesday morning, "We've known worse crises." Nonetheless, the Prime Minister looked tired and bothered. A colleague explained: "He is in a dilemma. He respects the judges and the judicial system. Yet he doesn't want to fire Sharon. He doesn't want to be the man to do it." When asked why Begin found this so difficult, the minister replied: "He respects a good soldier. And to him, Arik Sharon is a good soldier." Another explanation is that Begin the politician did not want to alienate Sharon or his constituency any more than was absolutely necessary.

Meanwhile, much of the military establishment was furious over the extent to which it had been blamed for the debacle in Beirut. Eitan had originally planned to resign early last week, but he changed his mind when he realized Sharon was stalling. So Eitan stayed on, hoping to persuade the Cabinet to appoint the candidate of his choice, Major General Avigdor Ben-Gal, as the new Chief of Staff. Officers of the military intelligence branch, Aman, were particularly bitter, believing that they were being asked to pay the price of the Mossad's mistakes in dealing with the Phalangists. As one ranking Aman officer put it, "No matter what happens, we take the blame." Few military men were moved by Sharon's attempt to come to the defense of the generals who had been criticized in the report by publicly praising them. They noted that he has not spoken with either Eitan or Saguy for months. Said a general who commanded a division in Lebanon last year: "It doesn't mean much that he is now playing the game of the army's great protector."

The showdown came at the Thursday night Cabinet meeting. Outside, a demonstration by Sharon supporters, shouting "Arik Sharon, king of Israel," was followed by the Peace Now demonstration, and then by the fatal hand-grenade explosion. Inside, the Cabinet members were engaged in furious debate. At one point, when Sharon expressed his opposition to the report, Attorney General Yitzhak Zamir snapped: "You're still not a legal expert." Another time, when he failed to gain the support he needed for a delaying tactic, Sharon shouted: "What do you want to do, chop off my head? O.K., chop it off! Do you think the [army] officers are hostages?" Interrupted Begin: "Why do you talk like that?" Another minister chimed in: "Don't talk that way. Lower your voice."

When the vote on whether to accept the commission's report was finally taken, Sharon did not have the support of a single colleague. Begin was one of the 16 who voted for adoption of the massacre report. Trying to be kind, Begin told Sharon: "You still have some time to think. Today we only took a general decision, and it's good to think things over."

Later the Prime Minister embraced Sharon, saying, "You are young. You still have much to do." The Defense Minister responded, "We will remain friends." Sharon subsequently reinforced the impression that he would go into retirement by saying that there was much work to be done on his farm in central Israel.

Next day, however, it was learned that some kind of compromise had been worked out in the Cabinet. Soon after Sharon called Begin to say that he would be bidding goodbye to his friends in the Defense Ministry and the army on Monday, an aide to the Prime Minister disclosed that Sharon would probably remain in the Cabinet. Sharon then corroborated the report, explaining: "There was a reshuffle of portfolios, and that's the end of the problem. I am still in the Cabinet. Begin did not fire me." There were reports that, as a Minister Without Portfolio, he would serve as Begin's chief security adviser and as a member of the security committee and the committee dealing with the Lebanese negotiations. If that happens, Sharon may remain an influential if embittered member of Begin's inner circle. He told associates late last week that he felt he had been let down by both Begin and Shamir. He said he was "disappointed in the Old Man" for not helping him more strenuously, but he was furious with the Foreign Minister for not returning from Europe more quickly to render support.

Begin is expected to hold the Defense portfolio himself for about a month, after which it is likely to go to Arens. A tough and occasionally abrasive diplomat, Arens is also an aeronautical engineer who keeps on his embassy desk the models of planes he has helped design, including the Kfir jet fighter. Born in Lithuania in 1925, he emigrated to the U.S. at the beginning of World War II. Later he served two years in the U.S. Army and studied aeronautical engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In 1948 he emigrated to Israel, where he joined the Irgun Zvai Leumi and met Menachem Begin. In 1980, while he was serving as a right-wing legislator who had opposed the peace treaty with Egypt, Arens turned down the chance to become Ezer Weizman's successor as Defense Minister, apparently because he did not want to be in charge of the dismantling of Israeli settlements in the Sinai.

On Friday, at about the time Ariel Sharon was telling an audience in Tel Aviv that "the mark of Cain" had been planted on his forehead by the week's events, several thousand Israelis attended the funeral, in the port city of Haifa, of Emil Eliyahu Greenzweig, 33, the victim of the grenade attack of the previous evening. Professor Elkana Yehuda spoke of Greenzweig, who had recently received a master's degree in philosophy and mathematics from Hebrew University, as "a symbol of love and tolerance." Yehuda expressed his hope that the current national debate would not lead to "the destruction of the Third Temple," a term that Israelis sometimes use for their 35-year-old state. Later, when Chief Rabbi Shlomo Goren told the gathering, "Our hands did not shed this blood," a Haifa man, Meir Gabai, shouted at him, "You shed this blood!" and others in the crowd called out, "Begin is responsible!" At that point, Olga Greenzweig, the victim's mother, got up and asked that everyone stop the shouting. She also asked the Chief Rabbi to please stop. Emil Greenzweig, a reserve paratroop officer who had fought in the 1967 war, the 1969-70 war of attrition, the 1973 war and the war in Lebanon, was then buried near the grave of his father.

If the withdrawal from Lebanon were under way, it might be said that last week's soul searching marked an ending of sorts to the most unpopular war in Israel's history. But this is not true. The troop-withdrawal talks remain deadlocked, and relations with the U.S. are as strained as they have ever been. Nor is it clear whether the mere transfer from one Cabinet post to another of Ariel Sharon is an appropriate response to the recommendations of a commission that was investigating a terrible crime. Presumably Menachem Begin has been somewhat weakened by the report and by the events of the past eight months. But so far he has managed to hold his government together.

With the support of Israel's growing population of Sephardic Jews, who favor his aggressive policies, Begin remains the odds-on candidate to win the next elections, whenever they may be. He could retire, of course, but driven as he is by the obsession that the West Bank must forever be part of the land of Israel, he is reluctant to trust the "divine promise" to other hands. The commission's report may have precipitated a "political earthquake" in Israel, but the extent of the aftershocks will not be known for a long time.

--By William E. Smith. Reported by Harry Kelly and Robert Slater/Jerusalem

With reporting by Harry Kelly, Robert Slater This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.