A New Math for Nuclear Weapons

The question: how to counter Andropov's not-so-zero offer

Can there be a set of numbers between zero and zero-zero? It sounds like the most abstruse speculation in mathematics. But the math in this case is the potentially lethal calculus of nuclear weaponry, and so the question is leading to a backstage brawl in Washington.

At issue is what stand the U.S. should take when negotiations on limiting nuclear weapons in Europe resume in Geneva Jan. 27. Moscow's negotiators presumably will then formally present an offer already proclaimed publicly by Soviet Leader Yuri Andropov: if the U.S. cancels plans to deploy 572 single-warhead Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe beginning in late 1983, the Kremlin will slash its own force of missiles targeted on Western Europe to make it equal to the number of launchers in the British and French forces. That would imply a reduction of 352 Soviet missiles. But only 72 of the 234 modern SS-20s trained on Europe would be included, and these could merely be moved into the Asian part of the U.S.S.R. and quickly brought back and retargeted on Western Europe in a crisis. The remaining 280 cuts would be single-warhead missiles that are obsolete and headed for the scrap heap anyway.

Andropov's plan has already been rejected by the U.S. and its allies as a deceptive response to Ronald Reagan's original proposal to eliminate all U.S. and Soviet missiles in the European theater. Initially known as the "zero option," this proposal has been rechristened in Washington the "zero-zero" plan. Said Reagan last week, with intense sarcasm: "The Soviets have met us halfway .. . they have proposed zero on our part."

Americans and West Europeans point out that the British and French forces are under independent national commands. In the event of a military showdown in Europe, these two nations might act in concert with Washington. But they could also rule out the use of nuclear force, in the hope of staying out of any conflict.

There is a sharp division of opinion in Washington as to how the U.S. negotiators in Geneva should be instructed to reply. The Pentagon counsels simply saying no and insisting on Reagan's zero-zero plan. Defense officials dismiss Andropov's bid as a mere propaganda ploy. They fear that if the U.S. makes a counterproposal, Moscow will ask European governments to delay installation of the American missiles while negotiations continue, then stall the talks endlessly, in effect blocking deployment of the Pershing IIs and cruises without yielding anything.

State Department officials are worried that the same thing might happen if the U.S. takes an unbending stance. In their view, the pressure of the European antinuclear movement will force governments that now want U.S. missiles to reject them unless Washington can show that it is making an all-out effort to achieve agreement with the Soviets.

Thus, the diplomats believe, the U.S. must indicate willingness to discuss something other than zero-zero and be ready with a counterproposal in case Moscow shows any give. Officials advocating a counterproposal say the U.S. should insist on two principles: 1) if the Kremlin retains any SS-20s targeted on Western Europe, it must agree to the installation there of an equivalent number of U.S. warheads (not just launching vehicles); 2) any SS-20s removed from this force must be completely dismantled.

Whether a U.S. compromise will be seriously discussed in the White House, let alone with the Soviets, is highly problematic. Its advocates must first sell their own boss, Secretary of State George Shultz. If he supports their recommendation and takes it to Reagan, he will probably wind up in a head-to-head struggle with Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, who is totally committed to zero-zero. The compromisers have one major ally: Chief Negotiator Paul Nitze, who is threatening to quit unless he is sent back to Geneva with less rigid negotiating instructions.

One way out for the White House would be to instruct Nitze to reject the Andropov offer but press for clarification, explanation and possible modifications. That, however, would only postpone the hard decision on whether or when to make a counterproposal.

Meanwhile, there are modest signs of progress in the separate START negotiations, also in Geneva, on reduction of the strategic nuclear weapons that the U.S. and Soviet Union have aimed at each other. Edward Rowny, the chief U.S. negotiator, said last week, "The odds are probably fifty-fifty" that agreement can be reached during 1983. Reagan said his bargainers "feel that the Soviets are really negotiating in good earnest, so we're a little optimistic." Andropov, in writing to an American journalist, sounded a friendly tone and suggested a summit meeting with Reagan, an idea the U.S. treated warily.

Whether any real cheer is warranted remains to be seen. Meanwhile, the White House chose former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft to head a new commission that will study ways to deploy the MX missile. Other members will include three former Secretaries of Defense and, reportedly, Alexander Haig, who quit as Reagan's Secretary of State only six months ago. The study will presumably lead the commission into a broad review of the composition and strategy of all U.S. nuclear forces, whether or not agreement can be reached with the Soviets on limiting them. This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.