Point and Counterpoint

By John Kohan

Andropov formalizes an offer, but the U.S. and its allies say no

Every one of the 5,000 seats in the Kremlin's huge, modernistic Palace of Congresses was filled as Communist Party General Secretary Yuri Andropov and his eleven colleagues on the ruling Politburo filed on stage last week. The new Soviet leader moved slowly to his place beneath a monumental bust of Lenin, turning to acknowledge Communist leaders who had come from as far as Cuba and Viet Nam to mark the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Soviet Union. Dressed in a smartly tailored blue suit and maroon tie, Andropov looked well-rested and healthier than he had five weeks earlier at the funeral of his predecessor, Leonid Brezhnev. But his sober demeanor suggested that he had reserved an important message for his first major televised speech to the nation.

As he delivered his address in calm, measured tones, it soon became clear that his words were truly directed to an audience outside the Soviet Union. He publicly confirmed an offer that Soviet negotiators at the Geneva talks on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe had only been hinting at in their informal discussions with U.S. diplomats. The Soviet Union, Andropov said, would be willing to "reduce hundreds of missiles" aimed at Western Europe if the NATO alliance reversed its decision to deploy 572 Pershing II and cruise missiles in five West European countries starting late next year. According to Andropov, the Soviets would keep in Europe "only as many missiles as are kept there by Britain and France, and not a single one more." He did not cite any figures, but arms experts interpreted the proposal as an offer to dismantle an estimated 280 SS-4 and SS-5 missiles and reduce the arsenal of SS-20s in Europe to 162, the number of ballistic missiles deployed by France and Britain.

The alliance rejected the Andropov offer with near unanimity, though some members interpreted the speech as a possible signal that Moscow was ready to bargain. Within hours, U.S. State Department Spokesman John Hughes termed the proposal "unacceptable." It would, he said, leave the U.S. without a way "to deter the threat" of any remaining Soviet missiles targeted on Western Europe. In November 1981, Reagan had called on Moscow to dismantle all its intermediate-range arsenal in both Europe and Asia in return for a NATO promise not to deploy new nuclear missiles.

France and Britain were especially irritated by the Soviet attempt to include their nuclear forces in a broader NATO deal. Asked French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson: "What does Mr. Andropov want, that we integrate ourselves into the Atlantic Alliance, that our missiles come under American control?" Although the British are less categorical than the French in their refusal to allow their nuclear force to be the subject of negotiations, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher dismissed Andropov's offer as inadequate to "keep the essential balance which is required for our security."

Still, for all the public displays of Western unity, there was no doubt that Andropov had come up with a skillful countermove. The audience that most interested him was not Washington, Paris or London, but the large number of Europeans, especially West Germans, who are expected to put increasing pressure on NATO governments this year to back off from their deployment decision.

Western military analysts found many faults with the Andropov proposal, as beguiling as it might seem on the surface. They pointed out that Britain's 64 submarine-launched missiles and France's 18 land-based and 80 sea-based weapons were part of independent national defense forces and could not be counted on to protect West Germany or any other NATO member. The French and British missiles are not the equivalent of the SS-20, in either accuracy or number of warheads. Nor did the Andropov plan specify whether Moscow intended to dismantle any SS-20s or simply move them out of European Russia. SS-20s could be returned from locations in the east to within striking distance of Western Europe in a matter of weeks. The range of the SS-20: 3,100 miles.

Andropov's offer was accompanied by a thinly veiled threat. Said he: "It would be a good thing if thought were given to the grave consequences that the stationing of new U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe would have for all further efforts to limit arms control." Later in the week, Leonid Zamyatin, spokesman for the Communist Party Central Committee, hinted that if NATO deployed the Pershing II and cruise missiles, the Soviets could walk out of the INF negotiations. Said he: "What would there be to talk about?"

Andropov also repeated proposals made by Brezhnev. The Soviet Union, he said, was prepared to cut the number of its intercontinental missile-delivery systems by more than 25% if the U.S. agreed to do the same. Andropov specifically warned Washington against using the MX intercontinental ballistic missile as a bargaining chip in arms negotiations, one of the arguments Reagan has used for deploying the MX. According to Andropov, the Soviet Union would counter any such challenge by building similar missiles and was already testing its own version of the long-range cruise missile.

Washington was pleased last week by the show of unity within the alliance, but U.S. officials remained worried that the Soviet Union would try to use public opinion to win what it cannot get at the bargaining table in Geneva. The Andropov proposal has a superficial logic to it. If Reagan sticks to his position, known as the "zero option," he runs the risk of confirming a suspicion held by many Americans and West Europeans: that he is not seriously interested in arms reduction. Administration moderates have urged Reagan to show more flexibility at the negotiating table, but hard-liners insist that he should make no concessions to the Soviets. The question the President must soon resolve is whether he can afford to ignore the counteroffer that Andropov has now made. --By John Kohan. Reported by Erik Amfitheatrof/Moscow

With reporting by Erik Amfitheatrof This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.