A Call for "Hardheaded Detente"

By Strobe Talbott

Nixon urges Reagan to meet Andropov at the summit

Richard Nixon has observed what he calls the "dangerous deterioration" of U.S.-Soviet relations from the melancholy vantage point of someone who believes he could have prevented it if it had not been for "Watergate and all that." Under the banner of detente, he was the last President to conduct a coherent and largely successful policy for managing the rivalry between the superpowers. During his six years in office, Soviet mischief making in the Third World was more restrained than it has been since. The Soviet leaders opened the door a crack in permitting emigration, only virtually to close it later. They signed agreements that imposed rudimentary but still useful rules on the arms race.

While detente may have been oversold in its heyday, in hindsight it looks undervalued, especially when compared with the naivete and vacillations of Jimmy Carter or with the worldwide anti-Soviet "crusade" proclaimed by Ronald Reagan last summer. In an interview with TIME in New York City last week, Nixon made clear that he thinks it is time for the Reagan Administration to change both the tone and substance of its dealings with Moscow.

"I wish I could think of another name for it," he says, "but let's just call it hardheaded detente. It's critical for our national security. You can't hold an alliance, or a country, together just with fear. Fear alone won't allow a free nation to sustain the support necessary for high defense budgets and an intelligent foreign policy that avoids the ingredient pitfalls of isolationism and protectionism.

Our leaders have got to provide what is the missing ingredient at the moment, and that is hope. There's got to be some hope that relations can get better and that equitable deals can be made. We've got to get over our disillusionment with detente and put aside the idea that the Soviets will always get two of everything for our one and the notion that the Soviet Union is an outlaw nation and must be so treated."

Nixon is quick to add that he has no use for "false hopes" and "sentimentality" toward the U.S.S.R. "You can't apply the golden rule of the Bible to the Soviets," he says. "The golden rule of Soviet-American relations should be 'Do unto others as they do unto you.' They can't go around the world seeking advantages against us and not expect us to respond. They can't acquire a monopoly in the most threatening sort of missiles, first-strike weapons, without expecting us to build the MX."

"But we've also got to make them understand that we're not out to get them. I know there's a school of thought that if we can fence them in with sanctions, their whole rotten system will come tumbling down. There's a school of thought that hard-line policies on our part will induce change for the better on their part. I wish that were the case, but it's just not going to happen. The Soviets have proved over the years that they can always squeeze their people enough to keep up their military strength."

Nixon is careful to avoid outright criticism of Reagan, partly because he thinks it would only aggravate the President's stubborn streak and partly because Reagan was always loyal and supportive toward me when I was in office." In effect, however, Nixon is refuting a view prevalent in the Reagan Administration that the U.S. might some day be able to bring the Soviet Union to its knees with economic blockades and military pressure. He believes the troubles afflicting the Soviet system make this the time not to isolate the Soviet leadership, but to engage it "at the highest level on a wide gamut of issues." He thinks the death of his erstwhile partner in summitry, Leonid Brezhnev, and the rise of Yuri Andropov have opened "a window of opportunity" for the Reagan Administration.

"From everything I know," he says, "Andropov is a smarter, more imaginative breed of Soviet leader. While he's a ruthless, dedicated Communist, he's realistic enough to know that the Soviet Union is in desperate shape internally and that it's suffering from acute international indigestion. It has taken big bites out of Afghanistan and other countries, but it hasn't been able to digest them. It's paying the cost of conquest in Poland, Cuba and Viet Nam. The system has been an abject failure at home and has no appeal abroad.

"Whether he goes for quick fixes and gimmicks or more genuine reforms and progress, Andropov needs to get his relationship with the U.S. on some steadier, safer basis. He needs a deal that will reduce international tensions and enable him to keep his military expenditures within bearable limits."

The deal Nixon thinks is possible is both broader and vaguer than yet another arms-control agreement like the SALT accords he signed ten years ago or the START agreement now under negotiation in Geneva.

"Arms control is part of it," he says, "but more important are political agreements that will reduce the danger of nuclear arms ever being used and serve as incentives for civilized conduct. I'm thinking about economic cooperation, wider contacts, confidence-building measures and personal meetings between the top leaders. That may seem like froth, but it's crucial in determining the overall texture of the relationship. The fact that we can't settle everything doesn't mean we shouldn't try to settle some things.

The very fact of a high-level meeting would give momentum to negotiations on the issues that we haven't been able to solve.

"Besides, you can't have the two most powerful leaders in the world failing to know each other.

Right now we're frozen into the ice so tightly that we may get to the point where only a bomb can blast us out. A conflict in China or the Middle East or any place could lead to the ultimate disaster. We've got to avoid that."

Nixon thinks Reagan made a mistake by not attending Brezhnev's funeral and meeting Andropov there. Now he is urging that Reagan first convene a "no-holds-barred summit" with the Japanese and West European allies next year "so that we're as unified and firm as possible." After that, Nixon says, there should be a "meaningful, across-the-board set of negotiations with the Soviets about all aspects of our relationship," starting with a Reagan-Andropov summit. Among other things, Nixon says, "I want 270 million Soviets to see President Reagan on TV--to see he is not a monster, but a very decent, attractive leader." Concludes Nixon: "During these past two years Reagan has, whether we like it or not, changed America. Now he has an opportunity to change the world." --By Strobe Talbott

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