Monday, Dec. 20, 1982
Some Unsuitable Workmanship
Some Unsuitable Workmanship Flaws that canceled the space walks during Columbia's flight
When I think generically of pressure suits, I think, ugh, nasty little coffins. I'd be pleased never to get inside one again. --Michael Collins in Carrying the Fire
As pilot of the command ship during Apollo ll's 1969 historic flight to the moon, Astronaut Mike Collins had perhaps less reason than his lunar-walking buddies to fret about the clumsy, complex garments that protected them from the harsh vacuum of space. But some of today's astronauts are seriously worried about just how precarious s space suits can be. In a report as bluntly critical as any issued by NASA since its post-mortem on the disastrous 1967 launch-pad fire that killed three astronauts, the space agency has found alarmingly sloppy oversights on a key aspect of the shuttle program: the multimillion-dollar space suits that NASA hopes will let astronauts leave the shuttle's protective confines and work directly in orbit. Any failures in the suits, which in effect are mini-space capsules, could threaten the astronauts' lives.
The formal inquiry follows the cancellation of two scheduled space walks during last month's fifth flight of Columbia. They were to be the first EVAS (for extravehicular activity) by American astronauts since Skylab crew members exited into space in 1973 to make external repairs on their orbital laboratory. Mission controllers called off the latest walks after a vital oxygen-and-coolant circulating fan in Astronaut Joe Allen's backpack wheezed and sputtered, and the pressure in Astronaut Bill Lenoir's suit failed to reach acceptable levels.
Determined to get the suits in working order for the maiden voyage of the new orbiter Challenger in January, the chief of the shuttle program, Air Force Lieut. General James Abrahamson, ordered a panel headed by NASA Engineer Richard Colonna to examine the suits, literally stitch by stitch. Its provisional finding: "Egregious oversights"--to use the words of one of the investigators--by the prime contractor, the Hamilton Standard division of United Technologies Corp., and by a key subcontractor, Carleton Controls Corp., a subsidiary of Moog Inc. By implication, the report also faulted the space agency.
The panel traced the troubles with the fan in Allen's suit to the seepage of moisture (probably from breath and perspiration) into a tiny control device. No larger than two pinheads, the sensor regulates the electrical pulses to the fan's motor. Although the investigators still have not found out why water should have penetrated the device's epoxy covering, they have made clear that its porosity should have been uncovered long before the $2.3 million suits ever went into orbit. There was, however, no doubt what went wrong with Lenoir's suit. Despite all efforts during the flight, the suit would not reach the required pressure, 4.3 Ibs. per sq. in. (Although this is only a third of the earth's normal atmospheric pressure, it is adequate because the astronauts are breathing pure oxygen rather than the oxygen-nitrogen mix that they would get at sea level.)
The reason for the pressure problem turned out to be, in one official's words, "horrifyingly simple." Two plastic pins, about as large as two matchsticks and not much more expensive, were missing from the pressure regulator. These allowed a locking ring to open, thereby creating a leak. Incredibly, a Carleton employee, who has since been barred from further NASA work, as well as his supervisor, signed an inspection sheet affirming the pins were in place.
But by far the panel's most distressing discovery was a stray steel chip, perhaps a burr from a screw, in an exhaust vent of the suit's oxygen supply system. If the fragment had been in the pure oxygen area and caused a spark (by hitting a wall, for example), it might have touched off a catastrophic flash fire, killing Lenoir and possibly ripping a fatal hole in Columbia's sides as well. In fact, a suit did catch fire in a test at Houston two years ago; fortunately no one was wearing it. It was so incinerated that not enough was left to pin down the cause.
NASA investigators minimized the possibility of a fire hazard, and company spokesmen emphasized that there was no flaw in the basic design of the suits. But among the astronauts who will wear them on future missions, the inspection failures have triggered understandable concern. Said one of them: "That was a shoddy, dangerous failure in quality control."
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