Fears of War Along the Border

By James Kelly

A covert U.S. operation slowly spins out of control

The rumors are everywhere: a whisper in a cafe here, a banner headline in a newspaper there. Throughout Nicaragua and Honduras, there is fearful talk of a war breaking out between the two neighbors. In Nicaragua, the Sandinista government has declared five provinces bordering Honduras "military emergency zones." The regime is advising citizens to stockpile rice and other foods, while the papers in the Nicaraguan capital of Managua are filled with stories about alleged CIA plots. In Honduras, airfields are being built close to the border and soldiers gather in bars in the capital city of Tegucigalpa to talk strategy. The mood was perhaps best captured by a priest during Mass at the Church of St. Nicholas of Tolentino in Managua. "Please, God," he intoned, "do not let an invasion happen."

Nicaragua's war jitters are being fueled by the country's increasingly edgy, leftist Sandinista regime. Managua, however, has received a boost from a U.S. covert operation that began modestly enough as an effort to cut off the arms flowing through Nicaragua to leftist guerrillas in El Salvador, but that now appears to have grown into an attempt to topple the Sandinista government. As a result, the border between Honduras and Nicaragua has suddenly become a tinderbox where a few skirmishes could easily erupt into a full-scale shooting war. Even if war does not break out, critics contend, not only have the U.S. activities strengthened the resolve of the Sandinistas in Managua but the operations now threaten to destabilize Honduras itself.

Though the Sandinistas overthrew Dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle and seized control of Nicaragua in July 1979, it was not until Ronald Reagan took office in January 1981 that relations between the two countries seriously deteriorated. The Administration began charging that the Sandinistas, backed by Cuba and the Soviet Union, were funneling arms to leftist guerrillas in El Salvador, often shipping the weapons across the southern heel of Honduras. In December 1981, Reagan gave the go-ahead for a series of covert operations to snip the supply line and intimidate the Sandinistas. Included were financial aid for opposition groups within Nicaragua and military assistance to the various contras (counterrevolutionaries) who conduct raids into Nicaragua from bases in Honduras. For a "covert" operation, the U.S. effort was curiously, perhaps deliberately, open. News of Reagan's decision began to leak out in Washington last March. In Honduras, the American agents were easily spotted because of their jeans, plaid shirts and short haircuts.

Until the U.S. came along, the contras could hardly be considered a threat to Managua. In the years following Somoza's downfall, small bands of former National Guardsmen operated along the Honduran border, making hit-and-run attacks inside Nicaragua. The Somocistas, as they were known, were demoralized and poorly organized. The U.S. set about forcing the various factions to unite under a central command, while the CIA began recruiting students, farmers and other civilians to beef up the force. Then, early this year, the Fuerza Democratica Nicaragiiense (F.D.N.) was established to serve as a respectable political front group for the contras. Though the Guardsmen supposedly do not hold leadership positions in the F.D.N., they do, in fact, run some military operations.

The exact extent of U.S. involvement with the contras remains unclear. One option paper presented by the CIA to the National Security Council in November 1981 projected expenditures of $19.95 million to support a 500-man force. It is unknown what was eventually approved, but the strength of the contras has grown impressively in recent months. A U.S. intelligence source in Honduras estimates that there are now about 200 CIA personnel in Honduras, four times as many as previously reported. Biweekly flights from Panama bring in rifles, machine guns, mortars and grenade launchers. The contras themselves have grown in number, from about 500 in 1980 to as many as 4,500 now. Until last month, they operated from ten camps set up on the Honduras side of the border. But after the Sandinistas pinpointed the bases, they were moved to other locations, usually just a few miles away.

The Sandinistas have helped the insurgency with their heavyhanded campaigns against the Miskito Indians and campesinos (peasant farmers). Suspecting separatist sentiments among the country's 100,000 Miskitos, most of whom live in the northeast region, Managua ordered the Indian towns burned and the villagers interned, but the measures only drove more Miskitos over to the contras. The campesinos are disgruntled by the Sandinistas' attempts to force them into communal farming; as a result, many of the 1,500 F.D.N. troops operating in the north-central section of Nicaragua are peasant farmers. Once recruited, they undergo a five-week CIA training course in Honduras. The instruction emphasizes ambush maneuvers but also includes marksmanship, compass work and radio operations. The campesinos return to Nicaragua in groups of 40 (including both men and women) under the supervision of five former Guardsmen.

In addition, the Reagan Administration enlisted the aid of Argentina to act as a sort of bagman for the operation. U.S. funds first were sent to the Argentines, who in turn funneled them to the contras. Argentina also sent 200 military advisers to Honduras, but it reduced its contingent to a skeleton crew during the Falklands war last spring. Meanwhile, Washington established its own links with the Honduran military. Honduran soldiers were sent to training camps in Panama run by the U.S. Army's Southern Command Group (SOUTHCOM) and standard field equipment was provided.

But at some point, according to a U.S. intelligence source in Honduras, the U.S. started to lose its grip on the entire effort and its goals. The F.D.N., for one thing, is interested not just in intimidating the Sandinistas but in starting a real war against Nicaragua. "We will start to pick up the tempo before December," predicted an F.D.N. official. "We will be in Managua by spring."

War or no war, the operation has already had unfortunate side effects on Honduras' fragile democracy. After years of military rule, the Hondurans elected Roberto Suazo Cordova last January as their first civilian President since 1971. The troubles in neighboring countries have given Chief of the Armed Forces Gustavo Alvarez Martinez an excuse to extend his authority. He has won changes in the constitution that broaden his power, and is using the threat of a Sandinista invasion to bolster his military forces and consolidate his power within the country.

In spite of all its efforts, Washington, ironically enough, may be backing the wrong contras. "They are making the biggest possible mistake," observed a leading opposition figure of the Sandinistas in Managua. "The Nicaraguan people are first anti-Somocista, and only secondly anti-Communist." It is commonly believed that for the contras to succeed, a considerable number of Sandinista soldiers would have to enlist in the cause. One of the few men who could make that happen is Eden Pastora Gomez, 46, a popular hero of the Sandinista revolution who grew disenchanted with the revolution and fled Nicaragua in July 1981. Pastora has since surfaced in Costa Rica, and the CIA would apparently tike to enlist his aid. But Pastora adamantly refuses to sign up. He shuns the F.D.N., which he sees simply as a front for the CIA and the Somocistas. Alvarez Martinez, for his part, wants nothing to do with the onetime Sandinista, whom he considers a Communist.

Meanwhile the fear of war remains. If there is a shooting war between the two countries, Honduras will be at a decided disadvantage against the larger and better equipped Nicaraguan army. In that case, the U.S. could be tempted to intervene more openly. For Washington, that prospect underscores the perils of becoming too deeply involved in the region's complex and volatile affairs.

--By Janes Kelly.

Reported by Christopher Redman/Washington and James Willwerth/Tegucigalpa

With reporting by Christopher Redman/Washington, James Willwerth/Tegucigalpa

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