The Final Day

By Jimmy Carter

I had not been to bed since early Sunday, and I was discouraged and almost exhausted. Many agonizing hours without sleep had removed any bright visions of the future or vivid memories of the past. I could think only of the current challenge.

It was my last day in office, and in many ways these were the most dramatic moments of my presidency. America's diplomatic, military and economic forces were marshaled, ready to respond to my command. It was a challenging and at times tormenting experience. I needed to be constantly alert, but there were periods when I realized I was not at my best. I was searching for new ideas, trying to understand more clearly one of the most intricate financial and political problems ever faced by any nation. At stake were the lives of 52 human beings imprisoned in Iran for 444 days, and almost $12 billion of Iranian assets.

Sometimes I was alone in the Oval Office, but most often Hamilton Jordan and Jody Powell were with me. Rosalynn stayed whenever she could, repeatedly urging me to get some rest. I spent most of the time at my desk, but when the action was slow, lay down on one of the small couches before the fireplace, often with the telephones on the floor beside me. I was talking to a number of people at different places in the world, and I took meticulous notes so that I would not become confused or forget what they said. I watched the big grandfather clock by the door. Time was an ever present concern.

I knew that the reputation and influence of our country were hanging in the balance, and I cannot deny that I was eager to resolve this crisis while I was still President in order to justify the decisions I had made. I had a major responsibility and not much time left to carry it out. At noon, I would no longer be President.

The holding of the American hostages had cast a pall over my own life and over the American people since Nov. 4, 1979. Although I was acting as President, I also had deep private feelings. The hostages sometimes seemed like part of my own family. I knew them by name, was familiar with their careers, had read their letters written from their prisons in Iran. More than anything else, I wanted those prisoners to be free.

Four days earlier my final effort for their freedom had begun, keeping us occupied throughout the weekend. On Friday, Jan. 16,1981, we had worked out with Iran the general terms for the release of the hostages. Since then, we had been afflicted by constant delays.

Throughout this grim experience, it had been almost impossible to negotiate with the suspicious and irrational men who refused to communicate directly with me or any other American. We all knew that the Iranians with whom we were working were under heavy attack from more militant officials, who vehemently opposed any plans to release the hostages.

An Algerian team under Foreign Minister Mohammed Benyahia were acting as intermediaries. The Iranians, who spoke Persian, would talk only with the Algerians, who spoke French. Any question or proposal of mine had to be translated twice as it went from Washington to Algiers to Tehran; the answers and counterproposals had to come back over the same slow route.

As the arrangements were highly technical, they had to be translated meticulously and in proper legal form. Ten days after the hostages were imprisoned, I had impounded all Iranian assets held by Americans, including billions of dollars in gold and bank deposits. Provided, of course, that all the hostages were returned unharmed, I had always been willing to release the assets. Now, about two-thirds of the total would be transferred out of American control: those funds held by the Federal Reserve Banks and by the overseas branches of twelve American banks. The remaining third, in domestic commercial banks, would be unfrozen.

During the past 14 months, our financial institutions had managed these huge sums under unique circumstances, and now the twelve major banks had become part of the negotiating process. They had to be certain that these enormous sums were transferred legally and properly to avoid making costly mistakes or exposing themselves to future courtroom battles. Nor did I want to make a mistake.

Not only in Algiers and Tehran but also in London, Istanbul, Paris, Bonn and other world political and financial capitals, related negotiations had been under way for weeks. Sunday, on my last visit to Camp David, I had signed the 15 documents necessary to initiate the financial transactions. Under the agreement worked out through the Algerians, enough Iranian funds would be held in escrow to pay any legitimate American claims. The Bank of England had been chosen to hold the escrow account in the name of the Algerian central bank. The balance would be returned to Iran. The Iranian gold we had seized had been transferred to the Bank of England on Friday so that there would be no unnecessary delays when the final hours came.

I returned from Camp David and, on Sunday afternoon, Jan. 18, I began to coordinate our efforts from the Oval Office. I stayed there nearly all the time; whenever possible, Fritz Mondale, Presidential Counsel Lloyd Cutler and Treasury Secretary Bill Miller joined me. The lawyers and Treasury officials seemed awestruck by the sheer size of the sums being handled, certainly one of the largest financial transactions in history.

Ten of the banks had been cooperating, but at times I had been angered because the Bank of America and one smaller bank seemed to be trying to compensate for unwise investment policies by claiming income from the Iranian deposits that they had not earned. Now the twelve were in agreement, but we had to be careful not to make a mistake that might tear apart our fragile arrangement.

The necessary forces of our Government were focused on our task. The communication networks of various agencies were alerted and available to our team around the world. Secretary of State Ed Muskie was at his desk, maintaining contact with Algiers, where Warren Christopher was conducting the fitful discussions with Benyahia. Harold Brown was In the Pentagon, arranging for services that would be needed in the Persian Gulf region and at other points along the route to freedom, which we prayed would soon be taken by the hostages. Hundreds of U.S. and other officials were waiting for the final move of the cumbersome negotiating mechanism. It crept slowly, haltingly, sometimes in reverse, and its progress, or lack of it, was nerve-racking.

The moments of consternation continued to the end. Sunday, after we thought all other arrangements had been made, we were checking to be sure that we were ready to transmit Iranian money from our Government depository to the Bank of England. Cutler whispered that there was no way to transfer the Iranian money: the Federal Reserve Bank of New York had no funds available. Fortunately, a shift of funds among the banks of the Federal Reserve System corrected the problem. We had narrowly avoided a most embarrassing oversight.

Early Monday morning, I received word through Algiers that medical examinations of the hostages had been completed and all were fine; that the airplanes were ready for their flight; and that the Americans had been moved out to the vicinity of the airport. We eventually obtained tentative agreement from the reluctant Algerians that if absolutely necessary, their pilots would be willing to leave Iran after dark. When that message came, I felt that I could relax for a few minutes.

At my desk in a small private room near the Oval Office, I sat alone in the dark, troubled by an uneasy feeling that would not go away. Our signed agreements with Iran prescribed a rigid procedure for handling the funds, after which our hostages would be released. Everything seemed to be going well, except for that lingering concern in the back of my mind. I turned on the light and went down my handwritten list of sequential events that would have to take place. Finally, I realized that the Bank Markazi, Iran's central bank, had not sent the technical instructions required for the transfer. I called Christopher, Miller, Cutler, Powell and Muskie, in that order, to tell them to check. I was right, it was indeed a problem. Benyahia discovered that the Iranian bank officials did not agree with the terms negotiated and were refusing to cooperate.

Everything else seemed ready; but as the hours passed, the Markazi officials would not issue the necessary papers. I discovered that they were justified in not agreeing to the terms. Many of the financial records of the Iranians had been lost or were out of date because of the revolution and our seizure of their assets.

Under the current proposals, the Iranians would not have been permitted to question the deposit and interest figures in the future, even if a mistake were discovered.

The planes were returned to standby. The Americans, presumably, were back in prison. Again I began to fear that the hostages would not be freed. The chance of their release on Monday had now passed; we would have only one more chance before I left office.

That afternoon, as I bade goodbye to my Cabinet, Muskie brought more bad news. Christopher, normally an optimist, was discouraged because the Algerians' sense of urgency seemed to have vanished. We decided that Christopher should inform Benyahia that our authority would expire at noon the next day; his plane should stand by for his departure from Algiers at that time. We hoped this order would impress on the Algerians and the Iranians that there was a deadline: noon, Tuesday, Jan. 20. After that, neither Christopher nor I could speak for the U.S., and the entire negotiations might have to begin anew.

To resolve the problem with the Bank Markazi, we decided to amend the agreement by deleting the objectionable language and to permit deposit records to be verified later. Drafting this change consumed several precious hours.

Shortly before midnight Monday, the telex message from the Iranian bank began coming through--a test message that would have to be perfected to constitute the final instructions so funds could be moved. I had been assured by Treasury officials that this kind of message would be sent using the most modern electronic technology for speed and accuracy.

Instead, the message was garbled and confused; it came through a few letters at a time. We made wry jokes about revolutionary-guard typists. The sloppy Iranians were aggravating, and my friend Charles Kirbo commented, "Now I can understand why so many Iranians got shot."

There was little we could do. The American banks simply could not afford to act without legally accurate instructions. Time was running out. I received a series of reports early in the morning of Inauguration Day, and I jotted down some rough notes as they came in:

1:50 a.m., from Treasury: "The machine is burping!" The Bank Markazi was to send specific instructions to each of the twelve banks, authorizing the transfer of exact sums of principal and interest amounting to $5.5 billion. Lawyers and officials of all twelve, the Federal Reserve System and the Treasury Department were huddled over Teletype machines in London, Washington and Algiers to check the accuracy of the instructions. (However, it seems the Iranian operator was only playing with the telex machine or checking out the line.)

2:23 a.m., from Bill Miller at Treasury: "The message is moving. It looks good." (In fact, the first key test number was garbled, but Bill didn't have the heart to tell me.)

2:40 a.m., from Miller: "The message is continuing but garbled. If the test number at the end is accurate, we will buy it." 2:45 a.m., from Christopher: "I am ready to go to Benyahia, but a serious difference has now developed among Americans concerning the escrow language--between Treasury and the Federal Reserve." (This involved the Iranian money to be held to settle legal claims.) The Fed lawyers state that they cannot sign the necessary documents. (Treasury officials reported to me that the agreement was adequate. Representatives of the Fed, an independent establishment, were not convinced.)

I issue an order: "Treasury represents my position. Notify the Fed officials to comply. Let's move!"

3:05 a.m., from Miller: "The test number at the end is correct, but now we will have to correct all the errors."

I decide: "Tell the banks to move using the garbled text.

They can assume that the earlier draft version from the Bank of England is correct."

3:16 a.m., from Miller: "The money is moving to London." (Cheers.)

3:40 a.m., from Robert Carswell, Deputy Treasury Secretary:

"Federal Reserve attorneys in Algiers still refuse to sign. Tony Solomon is the only one who can change their position."

The lawyers are claiming that without the deleted language they cannot approve the settlement terms. I call Anthony Solomon, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and ask him to instruct his attorneys to sign the agreement. He is at home. We connect him through State Department radiotelephone circuits to his lawyers in Algiers.

4:20 a.m.: I listen to an unbelievable argument between New York and Algiers, with one of the irate Fed attorneys in Algeria finally saying that he is fainting and cannot discuss the subject any further! The other Fed lawyers in Algiers now claim they have never seen the agreements with Iran. Again I tell Solomon: "Have them sign the agreement."

Solomon: "Mr. President, there are problems, but we can sign with some very minor amendments." The amendments are drafted for approval by the Algerians.

4:35 a.m., from Miller: "The money [from the private banks] is in. Will now transfer to the Fed account in London. We're checking on whether the Algerians and the Bank of England are signing the escrow agreement."

A total of $7.977 billion of Iranian money [the $5.5 billion held overseas by the twelve U.S. banks plus $2.4 billion in frozen Federal Reserve accounts] would have to be in the Bank of England and ready to be transferred from our account there to the Algerian account, the last step before the hostages can be released. I tell Miller to be sure the Bank of England is ready with its certification of deposit, so we will have no further delay after the funds are in London.

4:38 a.m., from Christopher: "There is still a problem, and it is serious. Algiers will not accept any amendments proposed by the Federal Reserve lawyers unless they are first approved by Iran."

I tell Cutler: "Get Solomon, Christopher and the lawyers on the same line. I will use all the authority I have to get this resolved. We can use the escrow agreement, the written understandings and today's telex messages combined to cover any possible procedural problem. We can work out the remaining questions later." I eventually convince the Fed officials and attorneys that the package is adequate.

5 a.m.: Finally, Solomon tells his attorneys, "Sign it."

5:10 a.m., from Miller: "The Bank of England will have to check the deposit. It will take about 15 minutes."

5:20 a.m., from Miller: "It only took two seconds to transfer the money to London. Now all we need are three things: the signed escrow agreement, the certification of deposit from our account to the Algerian account, and for Algiers to notify Washington and Tehran that all agreements have been fulfilled."

6:05 a.m.: The Operations Center reports a message from Tehran control tower: "Line up Flight 133."

6:05 a.m., from Christopher: "All parties are now signing the escrow agreement. Iran has been informed. Benyahia states that the hostages will be moved out within an hour after notice from Algeria."

6:35 a.m., from Christopher: "All escrows were signed at 6:18 E.S.T The Bank of England has certified that they hold $7.977 billion, the correct amount. Now the bank must send this certification to Algiers."

6:47 a.m., from Miller: "All the money is in the escrow account. The Bank of England will now certify this fact to Algiers."

I place a call to Governor Reagan to give him the good news, and am informed that he prefers not to be disturbed, but that he may call back later. I respond that I will call him when the hostages are released.

7:15 a.m., from Christopher: "Amounts are being checked off as received. The message to Iran will be sent within 15 minutes after the Bank of England completes its certification that the money is all there."

I reply: "Cy Vance's plane will be ready to depart Andrews Air Force Base when the hostages are airborne." I had asked Cy to welcome the hostages in Germany. He had already waited a long time at the airfield.

7:30 a.m.: I tell Miller to push the Bank of England. Its delay is inexcusable. The officials there just seem to be enjoying the limelight. "The Bank of England would have been faster if they had hired the Iranian telex operator!" I exclaim.

7:35 a.m.: Rosalynn comes in with my razor, followed by a barber. She says, "Jimmy, you have forgotten to shave, and you need a haircut." I go to the bathroom for a quick shave, and then the barber cuts my hair while I talk on the telephone.

7:55 a.m., from our Operations Center in Washington: "The planes are getting ready to take off." I am personally receiving reports on radio traffic almost halfway around the world--between the Tehran airport control tower and the three planes poised at the end of a runway.

The long-awaited message has come to me from the Operations Center through satellite and other relay stations. I shout, "Flight 133 is ready for takeoff!" The Oval Office is filled with cheers. Now we need only the final word from Algiers to Tehran.

Flight 133 consisted of three airplanes. Two were 727s, commercial passenger planes: one to bring out the American hostages and the other to serve as a backup or possible decoy. The third was a smaller corporate jet that would carry home the Algerian medical team that had examined the captive Americans.

8:18 a.m., from Christopher: "The bank certification was completed at 8:04. Algeria confirmed this at 8:06. They are now notifying Iran."

Our agreement with Algeria and Iran provides that when the Algerian central bank certifies that the required amount has been placed in the Algerian escrow account, "Iran shall immediately bring about the safe departure of the 52 U.S. nationals detained in Iran."

I tell Operations Center: "I want a report on takeoff and also when our people have cleared Iranian airspace."

8:28 a.m., from Operations Center: "The planes are now standing at the end of the runway. One Iranian F-4 [fighter plane] is active. May be escort."

I then get a series of reports about escort planes orbiting the airport and a jeep checking the runway. I confirm the serial numbers of the two 727s to be sure they are the right ones. (Having dealt with the Iranian officials for many months, we were not surprised when they delayed the takeoff, for no apparent rational purpose.)

9:45 a.m., from Christopher: "Takeoff is not imminent, but I can state for certain that it will be before noon. Iran asks Algeria not to announce departure until after the planes clear Iranian airspace."

I answer, "We will try to comply."

10:45 a.m., from Rosalynn: "Jimmy, the Reagans will be here in 15 minutes. You will have to put on your morning clothes and greet them."

Free at Last

I left the Oval Office reluctantly, after making arrangements to be kept informed about every development, and walked rapidly over to my private quarters in the White House. As I put on my rented formal suit, I was able to transfer my thoughts for the first time to the Washington ceremonies now about to begin. They seemed like a dream; reality was in the Oval Office, Algiers and Iran.

I combed my hair in the President's bathroom, a convenient cubicle with rows of electrical outlets installed when Lyndon Johnson once found electrical devices plugged into all the existing ones. As I looked at myself in the mirror, I wondered if I had aged so much as President or was just exhausted. As I rode to the Capitol and sat through the Inaugural ceremonies, the hostages were always on my mind. I still had no assurance that my efforts would be successful, and no way to know that this would soon become one of my happiest days, even happier than that day exactly four years earlier when President Gerald Ford had greeted me on the way to my own Inauguration.

Less than two hours later, I was notified through Secret Service radios that at 12:33 p.m. the first aircraft had been allowed to take off; nine minutes later the other had followed. I was no longer President of the U.S. The hostages were free.

It is impossible for me to put into words how much the hostages had come to mean to me, or how moved I was that morning to know they were coming home. At the same time, I was leaving the home I'd known for four years, too soon for all I had hoped to accomplish.

I was overwhelmed with happiness, but because of the hostages' freedom, not mine.

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