444 Days Of Agony
By Jimmy Carter
Keeping Faith: Part II
It was, writes Jimmy Carter, "the beginning of the most difficult period of my life." He was referring to the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran by Iranian militants who took scores of Americans hostage. The date was Nov. 4, 1979, and for the next 444 days, "I listened to every proposal"for freeing the hostages, "no matter how preposterous, including dropping an atomic bomb on Tehran."
The hostage crisis is the centerpiece of TIME'S concluding excerpt from Keeping Faith, Carter's account of his four years as President. Carter describes the high expectations and dashed hopes that punctuated the long-running drama. He tells how he tried to deal with the Ayatullah Khomeini as if he were "a rational person, "even though, Carter writes, he "was acting insanely." Carter provides a Commander in Chiefs view of the U.S. military rescue effort that ended with the abandonment of flaming aircraft and eight American bodies in an Iranian desert. He vividly describes the all-night negotiating vigil of his last hours as President and tells how he felt as he listened to his successor deliver his Inaugural Address just moments before the hostages were finally flying out of Iran.
The excerpts also include Carter's observations on three presidential achievements of which he is most proud: his emphasis on human rights as a high-priority principle of U.S. foreign policy; his politically damaging and difficult campaign to negotiate treaties yielding eventual control of the Panama Canal; and his steps to reduce America's dependence on foreign oil and seek an end to a situation in which "the greatest nation on earth was being jerked around by a few desert states."
Fall of The Shah
On the South Lawn of the White House, I stood and wept. Tears were streaming down the faces of more than 200 members of the press. In the distance we could hear a mob shouting at the mounted police who had just released canisters of tear gas to disperse them. Unfortunately, an ill wind seemed to have been blowing toward us as we greeted the leader of Iran, and the fumes had engulfed us all.
With television cameras focused on me as I welcomed the Shah and his wife, Farah, I tried to pretend that nothing was wrong. But that day--Nov. 15, 1977--was an augury. The tear gas had created the semblance of grief. Almost two years later, and for 14 months afterward, there would be real grief in our country because of Iran.
Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi tolerated little political opposition at home, but allegations were increasingly heard in the U.S. that his secret police, SAVAK, were brutalizing Iranian citizens. The Shah was a likable man--erect without being pompous, seemingly calm and self-assured in spite of the tear gas incident, surprisingly modest in demeanor. The air of reticence in his first conversations with me could not have been caused by his unfamiliarity with American Presidents. I was the eighth he had known!
I continued, as other Presidents had before me, to consider the Shah a strong ally. I appreciated his ability to maintain good relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and his willingness to provide Israel with oil in spite of the Arab boycott. At the time of his visit I was especially eager to secure his influence in support of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's dramatic visit to Jerusalem, which had just been announced.
My briefings revealed that despite increases in Iran's standard of living from oil revenues, the Shah's pursuit of his own goals had engendered opposition from the intelligentsia and others who desired more participation in the political processes of Iran. I was informed that there were 2,500 (the Shah said "below 2,500") political prisoners in the Iranian jails. The Shah was convinced that immediate suppression was the best response to opposition, and he was somewhat scornful of Western leaders (including me) who did not emulate his tactics.
In my small private room near the Oval Office, I asked if I might speak frankly, and he agreed. "I am familiar with the great improvements which have been made in your country," I told him, "but I also know about some of the problems. You have heard of my statements about human rights. A growing number of your own citizens are claiming that these rights are not always honored in Iran. I understand that most of the disturbances have arisen among the mullahs and other religious leaders, the new middle class searching for more political influence, and students in Iran and overseas. Iran's reputation is being damaged. Can anything be done to alleviate this problem by closer consultation with the dissident groups and by easing off on some of the strict police policies?"
The Shah paused for a few moments before he replied somewhat sadly, "No, there is nothing I can do. I must enforce the Iranian laws, which are designed to combat Communism. This is a very real and dangerous problem for Iran, and, indeed, for the other countries in my area and in the Western world. It may be that when this serious menace is removed, the laws can be changed, but that will not be soon. In any case, the complaints and recent disturbances originate among the very troublemakers against whom the laws have been designed to protect our country. They are really just a tiny minority, and have no support among the vast majority of Iranian people."
Ten months after that exchange, on Sept. 8, 1978, the Shah declared martial law throughout Iran. A bloody confrontation between the police and a large crowd of demonstrating Muslims followed. Several hundred people were killed by bursts of machine-gun fire. After this, the strength of the demonstrators grew as they demanded the Shah's abdication and he attempted to control the disorders with ever more stringent military discipline.
At times, the Shah tried to pacify the dissidents. He granted amnesty to hundreds of opposition leaders--including Muslim leader Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini, who had recently moved from Iraq to Paris. Yet his problems mounted.
Frequent reports from our embassy in Iran indicated the gravity of the Shah's troubles. Still, Ambassador William Sullivan joined all my other advisers and me in believing that the Shah was our best hope for maintaining stability in Iran.
The Shah was trying to decide whether to set up an interim government, set up a military government or even abdicate. We encouraged him to hang firm and to count on our backing.
However, it was becoming increasingly evident that the Shah was no longer functioning as a strong leader, but was growing despondent and unsure of himself. I knew he needed all the support the U.S. could properly give him, short of direct intervention. I sent him a message stating that whatever action he took, including setting up a military government, I would support him.
Until this time, those opposing the Shah had been fragmented. Now an identifiable leader was emerging. Perhaps because of his remoteness and air of martyrdom enhanced by 15 years of exile, his constant and unswerving opposition to the Shah, his religious beliefs bordering on fanaticism and his militant attitude in demanding action and violence, Khomeini had gained increasing influence over the anti-Shah forces. Although he was still in Paris, Khomeini was calling for general strikes, the overthrow of the Shah and the establishment of a republic.
Still, there was no question in my mind that the Shah deserved our unequivocal support. Not only had he been a staunch and dependable ally for many years, but he remained the leader around whom we hoped to see a stable and reformed government organized in Iran. We knew little about the forces contending against him, but their anti-American statements were enough to strengthen our resolve to support the Shah.
By early November, Ambassador Sullivan had become convinced that opposition leaders would have to be given a much stronger voice in Iran's affairs than the Shah was willing to consider. I could not disagree, but my basic choice was whether to give the Shah our complete backing in his crisis or to predicate support, as Sullivan increasingly seemed to prefer, on the Shah's acquiescence to suggestions from the American embassy.
The Shah's basic plan of asking one leader to assemble a coalition government seemed sound, but he was having a hard time convincing anyone of stature to serve. At the end of the year, Shahpour Bakhtiar, a Western-educated moderate, accepted the position of Prime Minister. The newly chosen leader demonstrated surprising strength and independence, immediately calling for the Shah to leave Iran, for the secret police to be disbanded, for those responsible for shooting demonstrators to be tried and for civilians to be in charge of Iran's foreign affairs.
It was obvious that the Shah would have to leave the country before order could be restored. However, I agreed with him that he should do so with dignity, in accordance with his own schedule and only after a stable successor government had been established. Sullivan, however, was recommending that we oppose the plans of the Shah, insist on his immediate departure and try to form some kind of friendship or alliance with Khomeini. I rejected this recommendation because the Shah, Bakhtiar and the Iranian military leaders needed consistent American support.
Because Sullivan seemed unable to provide us with adequate reports from the military, a crucial source of information and advice, Defense Secretary Harold Brown and I concluded that we needed a strong and competent American representative in Tehran who would keep me informed about the military's needs. One of his responsibilities would be to strengthen the resolve of the military leaders and encourage them to remain in Iran to maintain stability even if the Shah should leave. I ordered General Robert Huyser, deputy commander of U.S. forces in Europe, to carry out this assignment.
Some of Iran's top military leaders had told Sullivan, "We will not permit the Shah to leave Iran. We will at least place him on an [Iranian] island. We plan a coup to take over the government, to clean up Iran and to eliminate violence. Bakhtiar may form a token government, and we will give him token support."
The Shah told Sullivan that he had complete control over the military leaders and that they would make no move to restrain him in any way. He said he planned to leave Iran in order to strengthen Bakhtiar, and that those who had considered a military coup would instead support Bakhtiar's government but would stand by to take over if he should fail. General Huyser reported that the military leaders indeed supported Bakhtiar.
Sullivan apparently lost control of himself, and on Jan. 10 sent a cable bordering on insolence, condemning our asking the French President to contact Khomeini instead of doing it ourselves. He used such phrases as "gross and perhaps irretrievable mistake," "plea for sanity" and "incomprehensible." He seemed unable to present an objective analysis of the situation in Iran. I was well aware that he had been carrying out some of my directives halfheartedly, if at all. Now, since he had changed his mind in recent weeks about supporting the Shah, his activities and statements had cost him much of the confidence he had previously enjoyed from the Shah and his associates--and from me. From then on I relied primarily on General Huyser, who remained cool and competent and, as far as I could tell, always sent back balanced views. (In April of 1979, Sullivan resigned.)
On Jan. 19, more than a million marchers in Iran rallied to back Khomeini. He announced from France that he was forming a provisional government, ending his 15 years of exile and returning to Iran. Bakhtiar then offered to resign and let the Iranian people choose their form of government, provided Khomeini would remain in Paris.
The departure of the Shah from Iran to Egypt and then to Morocco was curiously anticlimactic, because we had been anticipating his move and because the Shah and his retinue wanted it seen as a temporary absence rather than a historic event. Nevertheless, this marked the end of his 38-year reign. Khomeini flew into Tehran on Feb. 1, to be welcomed by hundreds of thousands of supporters.
Americans In Peril
During all this time, we were busy evacuating the many Americans who wanted to leave Iran. Since the beginning of the disturbances, we had brought out more than 25,000, but almost 10,000 were still there. Sullivan now said that all American citizens except diplomatic personnel could no longer be protected and should leave the country. Millions of Iranians were in the streets, and thousands had already been killed in the struggles between the government officials and the Khomeini forces. Almost miraculously, no American had been attacked, in spite of the Ayatullah's picturing us to his supporters as foreign devils.
After a few days, the Iranian military simply disintegrated, and on Feb. 11, Bakhtiar and the members of the Majlis resigned. Mehdi Bazargan then became Prime Minister and, with the support of Khomeini, began to consolidate his authority. He and his predominantly Western-educated Cabinet members cooperated with us. They protected our embassy, provided safe travel for General Philip C. Cast, who had replaced Huyser, and sent us friendly messages. Bazargan announced publicly his eagerness to have good relations with the U.S. But he soon ran into trouble from Khomeini's revolutionaries, who formed armed bands all over Iran and arrested hundreds of people, trying them on the spot and executing them.
We got word that our military observation sites in northeastern Iran were under siege and that we could no longer operate our equipment, which was designed to monitor Soviet test missile launchings across the border. The most disturbing incidents were the capture of American personnel. First, there was the short-lived seizure of our embassy in February 1979. Then 20 Air Force employees were taken by Iranians at one of our intelligence monitoring sites and released after several frightening days. The street mobs sometimes whipped up anti-American feelings to a fever pitch. As quietly as possible, we continued to urge the several thousand Americans remaining in Iran to leave. Before and immediately after the Shah's departure from Iran, we had left open our invitation for him to come to the U.S., but he had decided to stay in Morocco. Now we began to hear that King Hassan wanted him to leave. On March 15, King Hassan requested that we accept the Shah. Primarily because of the intense hatred now built up in Iran among the mobs who controlled the country and the vulnerability of the many Americans still there, I decided that it would be better for the Shah to live elsewhere. I asked Cy Vance to help him find a place to stay.
The Shah settled upon the Bahamas but later complained about the high prices and moved on to Mexico. Despite his great wealth, he seemed obsessed with the belief that people were trying to cheat him. He still wanted to come to the U.S., where he had some enthusiastic advocates. Henry Kissinger called to ask me to let the Shah come to the U.S. David Rockefeller came to visit, apparently to try to induce me to let the Shah come into our country. Rockefeller, Kissinger and my National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, seemed to be adopting this as a joint project.
A vocal group of the Shah's friends approached Vance and Brzezinski repeatedly and on occasion appealed directly to me. They had an ally in Zbig, but could not convince me or Cy. Each time, we explained the potential danger to those Americans still in Iran, emphasizing that the Shah had been living comfortably in Morocco, the Bahamas and now Mexico. Each time, they went away partially mollified, only to return again. Some were merely representing the Shah's interests, while others, like Zbig, thought we must show our strength and loyalty to an old friend even if it meant personal danger to a group of very vulnerable Americans. I adamantly resisted all entreaties. Circumstances had changed since I had offered the Shah a haven; now many Americans would be threatened, and there was no urgent need for the Shah to come here. As I wrote in my diary at the time, "I don't have any feelings that the Shah or we would be better off with him playing tennis several hours a day in California instead of in Acapulco."
Predictably, our embassy people in Iran recommended against our inviting the Shah to the U.S. We had already reduced our Tehran diplomatic staff to fewer than 75, vs. 1,100 before the revolution began. We had also completely revamped the embassy's security features, and were convinced that with the support of the host government, our people would be safe. However, the staffs recommendation confirmed my own decision to continue moving Americans out of Iran and to let the Shah stay in Mexico.
On Oct. 1, 1979,1 heard about the Shah's illness. In his evening report Vance noted that David Rockefeller had sent his personal physician to Mexico and that if the Shah's ailments were serious we might be asked to admit him for treatment. Cy added, "Our charge d'affaires [Bruce Laingen] in Tehran says local hostility toward the Shah continues and that the augmented influence of the clerics might mean an even worse reaction than would have been the case a few months ago, if we were to admit the Shah--even for humanitarian purposes."
On Oct. 17, Cy received another report from Rockefeller telling us the Shah was quite ill with a disease difficult to diagnose and to treat. Some of the doctors suspected cancer. The physicians wanted to bring the Shah to Cornell University Medical Center in New York City An eminent Columbia Medical School professor was to see the Shah on Oct. 18 and then consult with the State Department medical director before making a joint recommendation to Vance about what treatment the Shah required.
Cy explained this to me on Oct. 18 and added, "If we permit the Shah to come to the U.S. for treatment, we would want to inform the Iranians that we were doing so for humanitarian purposes and to leave open any question of future residence." In the margin I wrote "O.K." and returned a copy of the document to Vance.
The following morning, a Friday, Cy made it obvious that he was prepared to admit the Shah for medical reasons. I was now the lone holdout.
It happened that Henry Precht, the State Department s Director for Iranian Affairs, was in Iran with Laingen at the time. They were instructed to inform Bazargan and Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi of the Shah's condition, tell them of our possible plans to provide treatment for him and seek their assistance. The next day I received a message from Laingen. He had told the two top Iranian officials that neither the Shah nor his wife would be involved in political activities while in the U.S., and asked for a guarantee of protection for American citizens in Iran. They had responded that there undoubtedly would be a sharp reaction, but that they could guarantee protection.
On Saturday, Oct. 20,1 went to Camp David. There I received a "supersensitive" memorandum from Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher. He reported, "We have now learned the Shah's illness is malignant lymphoma compounded by a possible internal blockage that has resulted in severe jaundice. The lymphoma responded satisfactorily when chemotherapy was started several months ago, but recently the chemotherapy has been less effective. The Shah has not had tests necessary to establish proper diagnosis and further chemotherapeutic approaches. Dr. Benjamin Kean of the Cornell Medical School, who last saw the Shah yesterday, has advised us that these diagnostic studies cannot be carried out in Mexico, and he recommends that the examination take place in the U.S. David Rockefeller has asked that we admit the Shah to Sloan-Kettering Hospital in New York City for diagnosis and treatment. The State Department's medical director supports Dr. Kean's recommendation."
I told Brzezinski to permit the Shah to go to New York for medical treatment and to inform our embassy in Tehran. I told the State Department to notify Iranian officials--not to seek their permission or approval. Vance reported to me on Oct. 22: "The Iranian government reacted with moderation. We have told them that neither the Shah nor Shahbanou [Empress Farah], who will arrive in New York tonight, will engage in political activity." On Monday the Shah arrived in New York. There were objections in Iran but no reason for alarm about the safety of the Americans there.
Through the State Department I received a series of reports about the Shah. Rockefeller's staff told us that the Shah's lymphoma was a Class III malignancy that may be too advanced to irradiate and that chemotherapy would require a minimum of eight months. His doctor told us the Shah had a fifty-fifty chance to survive the next 18 months; if he did so, he could then live for several more years. Meanwhile, recuperation from his operation would require another two or three weeks' hospitalization. [The Shah died in Egypt on July 27, 1980.]
The Embassy Is Seized
Sunday, Nov. 4,1979, was a date I will never forget.
Early in the morning Brzezinski reported that our embassy in Tehran had been overrun by about 3,000 militants and that 50 or 60 of our American staff had been captured.
Immediately afterward, Vance reviewed with me again the assurances of protection we had received from Iranian officials. We were deeply disturbed, but reasonably confident that the Iranians would soon remove the attackers from the embassy compound and release our people. Never, so far as we knew, had a host government failed to attempt to protect threatened diplomats. We had a firm pledge from both the Iranian Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister to give our staff and property this protection; during the past week or two, even Khomeini's forces had helped to dispel crowds of demonstrators near the American embassy. Prime Minister Bazargan did his best to keep his word, but after a few hours passed without forceful action we grew increasingly concerned. We contacted officials in the Bazargan Cabinet and within the so-called Revolutionary Council, where govern-ment and religious leaders decided the nation's policies. All our efforts were fruitless. The militants had become overnight heroes, Khomeini praised their action, and no public official was willing to confront them. Bazargan and Yazdi resigned in disgust.
It was not at all clear what the militants wanted. My impression was that originally they had not intended to remain in the embassy or to hold the Americans captive beyond a few hours. However, when they received the adulation of fellow revolutionaries and the support of Khomeini, they prolonged their illegal act. As kidnapers, they seemed to have no clear ideas about ransom, except to demand the return of the Shah and his money.
I wrote in my diary on Nov. 6,1979: "We began to assess punitive action. We still have 570 Americans there. I directed the companies that employed these people to get them out of the country. We also asked the Algerians, Syrians, Turks, Pakistanis, Libyans, P.L.O. and others to intercede. It is almost impossible to deal with a crazy man, except that he does have religious beliefs, and the world of Islam will be damaged if a fanatic like him should murder 60 innocent people in the name of religion. I believe that is our ultimate hope for a successful resolution. We will not release the Shah, of course, as they demand."
The first week of November 1979 marked the beginning of the most difficult period of my life. The well-being of the American hostages became a constant concern. I would walk in the White House gardens early in the morning and lie awake at night, trying to think of steps I could take to gain their freedom, without sacrificing our honor and security. I listened to every proposal, no matter how preposterous, all the way from delivering the Shah for trial to dropping an atomic bomb on Tehran.
Although Khomeini was acting insanely, we always behaved as if we were dealing with a rational person. I asked Pope John Paul II to contact Khomeini directly, which he agreed to do. (Later, the Ayatullah made an insulting speech about the Pope.) To prepare for possible military action, I had satellite photographs taken to determine where Iran's airplanes and other armed forces were located. I wanted to prevent the spilling of blood on both sides, but it would be inevitable if the hostages were harmed. I was restrained from a pre-emptive military strike by the realization that the Iranian fanatics would almost certainly kill the hostages in response.
On Nov. 6, two days after the embassy was taken, we commenced plans for a rescue operation. Various proposals were discarded as impractical or unlikely to succeed without considerable loss of life on both sides. The greatest problem was the inaccessibility of the embassy compound--more than 600 miles from the nearest operating aircraft carriers and deep within heavily populated Tehran. Although we had regular surveillance of the embassy grounds, there was no way to know precisely where the hostages were being held, and our reports indicated that the guards were determined and quite alert.
We decided that should a public trial of the hostages occur, we would interrupt all commerce with Iran. We studied detailed maps and charts of the coastal waters. My own judgment was that the best and surest way to stop all ship traffic would be to mine the entrances to all Iranian seaports. Effective minesweeping operations by Iran or its potential supporters would be almost impossible. A naval blockade might have been equally effective, but it would have involved repeated confrontations with ships of many other nations, some of which might have been damaged or sunk if they had tried to run the blockade. We also had to meet the possibility of punishment or execution of the hostages. In this case, I was prepared to make a direct military attack on Iran. We pored over aerial photographs of oil refineries and many other strategic targets.
The Iranian militants were now demanding that the Shah be turned over to them for trial, which would almost certainly be followed by execution; that the U.S. apologize for "crimes against the Iranian people"; and that financial damages and the Shah's assets be paid over to Iran. I never gave serious consideration to any of these demands. It would have besmirched our nation's honor to do so.
During this difficult time, we needed all the support at home that we could get. One of my concerns was Kissinger. A stream of his criticisms to foreign diplomats and others in the U.S. and in Europe had reached our ears. His remarks had particularly infuriated Vance, so I asked Kissinger to come by for a talk to work out our differences. Kissinger said that some of his published criticisms had been taken from interviews given prior to the hostage seizure, that he would avoid similar comments during the crisis. After this conversation, things were better for a few days--then reverted to their former state.
We had been successful in keeping secret the presence of six American diplomats who had found refuge in the Canadian embassy at the time our embassy was taken. (Some news organizations knew about these diplomats, but at my request did not reveal the information.) In January, with the streets of Tehran quiet, it was time to bring them out. This was a real cloak-and-dagger story, with American secret agents being sent into Iran to rehearse with the Canadians and Americans the plans for their departure. The agents and those being rescued would have to be furnished with disguises and false documents, and they needed training to convince Iranian officials that they were normal travelers from other countries.
One agent was sent in as a German--with a forged passport, of course. He adopted a false name, with the middle initial "H." At customs, an official stopped him to comment that it was strange for a German passport to use an initial rather than the entire name; he had never seen one like this before. He began to interrogate our man more closely, and the quick-witted messenger said, "Well, my parents named me Hitler as a baby. Ever since the war, I've been permitted to conceal my full name." The customs official winked and nodded knowingly, and waved him on.
On Jan. 28, I received word that the six Americans were free.
(On the same day, Abolhassan Bani-Sadr was declared the newly elected President of Iran.) Until some of the Canadians and our intelligence agents were also out of Iran, we could not reveal that our first rescue mission had been successful, but when the news was finally released on Jan. 31, Ambassador Kenneth Taylor and the other courageous Canadians became instant heroes.
On March 22, after all our efforts to negotiate with Iranian officials had proved fruitless, Mondale, Vance and I had a full briefing from our military leaders about the latest plans for a rescue mission, which were much more feasible than those presented at the outset of the ordeal. But they still needed more work, and I was not yet convinced that we should proceed.
One of the possible staging areas for our rescue team was in an isolated desert region about 200 miles south of Tehran that seemed from aerial photographs to be smooth enough for night landings by transport planes. I authorized the flight of a small airplane for a close visual examination of the desert sand, to see how smooth and firm it was. I was not making a final commitment; at the same time, I wanted training operations and planning to continue.
On April 2, I received a report that our small plane had flown into Iran at a very low altitude, landed in the desert, examined the possible rescue staging site and returned without detection. The pilot reported that it was an ideal place--a smooth and firm surface, adequately isolated, with only a seldom-used country road near by. We decided to complete plans for a rescue mission, to assemble the necessary equipment and to prepare the team that might be sent in.
It was obvious to me that the Revolutionary Council would never act and that the hostages were not going to be released. I decided to act. On April 11, my top advisers and I went over the rescue plans again. In the Cabinet Room with me were Mondale, Brown, Brzezinski, Christopher, Central Intelligence Director Stansfield Turner, General David Jones, Hamilton Jordan and Jody Powell. (Vance was on a brief and much needed vacation.) Because the militants had threatened to "destroy all the hostages immediately" if any additional moves against them should be launched, we had to plan any action with the utmost care. General Jones said that the earliest date everything could be ready was April 24. I told everyone that it was time for us to bring our hostages home; their safety and our national honor were at stake. When Vance returned, he objected to my decision to rescue the hostages and wanted to present his own views to the National Security Council Group. At a meeting on April 15, he argued that we should be patient and not do anything that might endanger their safety. No one changed his mind.
Disaster in The Desert
We took every possible step to conceal our moves in preparation for the rescue mission, encouraging the few people who had to know about airplane and helicopter movements to believe they might be related to laying mines. On the evening of April 16, we met in the Situation Room for a thorough review of the operation. This session lasted 2 1/2 hours, and I was particularly impressed with Generals James B. Vaught and Philip C. Gast and Colonel Charles Beckwith, who would direct the mission after I authorized it to begin.
In their meticulous description of the operation, I received satisfactory answers to my many questions. I informed the military leaders that they had my complete confidence and support, and I made it clear that there would be no interference from the White House while the mission was under way. However, I wanted to be kept constantly informed.
Although I was concerned about what the future might hold, I had no doubt that the time was ripe. Because I was so clear in my resolve, I looked forward to the mission. The plans and training had been completed; the necessary helicopters and transport planes on American aircraft carriers had been stationed south of Iran or near by in such friendly countries as Oman and Egypt. We did not notify the leaders of these countries about the purpose of our visits, letting observers surmise that they involved aid to Afghan freedom fighters or some kind of mining operation along Iran's coast.
We had blueprints of our embassy buildings in Tehran, of course, and we had talked to the black and female hostages re-leased before Christmas, although they were unable to tell us much about the others. Much more important, we received information from someone (who cannot be identified) who was thoroughly familiar with the compound, knew where every hostage was located, how many and what kind of guards were there at different times and the daily schedule of the hostages and their captors. This was the first time we knew the precise location of the Americans.
Our agents, who moved freely in and out of Tehran under the guise of business or media missions, had closely studied the degree of vigilance of the captors. The guards had grown lax, and security around the compound was no longer a serious obstacle to a surprise entry by force. Our satellite photographs of the embassy compound and the surrounding area kept us abreast of changes in the habits and composition of the terrorists' guard details.
Life for the guards seemed to have become relaxed and humdrum, perfectly designed for a lightning strike by a highly trained and well-equipped force that, with night-vision devices, could distinguish in the dark between our people and the Iranian captors. We would need six large helicopters to fly into the center of Tehran, pick up the three Americans in the Foreign Ministry building and the other hostages in the embassy, and carry them and the rescue team to safety.
The biggest problem was how to travel the enormous distance from the sea or from other countries to extract the hostages from the center of Tehran. Our solution was to fly in eight helicopters (to provide two backups) from our aircraft carriers in the Gulf of Oman to the remote area now known as Desert One that had been surveyed earlier. The only drawback of this site was the seldom-used dirt country road going by it, but the team was prepared to hold passersby, hide their vehicles and release them when it was too late for the operation to be disrupted. Everyone was under strict orders from me not to harm innocent bystanders was under strict orders from me not to harm innocent bystanders and to avoid bloodshed whenever possible.
The helicopters were scheduled to take off Thursday, April 24, at dusk (10:30 a.m. Washington time) and arrive about six hours later. This 600-mile flight from the Gulf of Oman would push to the limit the capabilities of these aircraft. They would be joined at Desert One by six C-130s carrying the 90 members of the rescue team, plus fuel and supplies. After the team was transferred from the C-130s to the helicopters, the airplanes would leave Iran, and the helicopters with the rescue team would fly a short distance northward into the nearby mountains. They would arrive at about 4 a.m. and be hidden from view the following day. This place was remote and uninhabited, and detection would be highly unlikely. Communication between the Pentagon and the rescue team, using satellites and other relay facilities, would be instantaneous. I would receive telephone reports from General Jones and Harold Brown.
The next night, trucks that our agents had purchased would be removed from a warehouse on the outskirts of Tehran, driven to the mountain hiding place and used to carry the rescue team into the city. At a prearranged time, the rescue team would simultaneously enter the Foreign Ministry building and the compound, overpower the guards and free the hostages.
Guided by radio communications, the helicopters would land at the sites [in Tehran] on prearranged schedules, pick up our people and carry them to an abandoned airstrip near the city. From there, two C-141s would fly the Americans to safety across the desert area of Saudi Arabia. The helicopters would be left in Iran. I planned to notify the Saudis only after the rescue mission was completed.
Vance, worried about the risk to the hostages, was still concerned about whether we should make the rescue effort at all, although he and I had agreed previously that if I decided to act with force, a rescue mission would be preferable to a mining operation. Cy had threatened to resign on several earlier occasions. I still needed Cy, valued his opinion and relied heavily on his services. He said he would stay on, but reserved the right to say that he disagreed with some of the policies on Iran.
My persistent anxiety was to maintain secrecy. However, I was forced to share the news with one other Head of Government when I learned about disturbing stories originating with a former British officer in Oman employed by the Sultan. He had reported to London that we had planes in Oman and that they were loaded with ammunition and supplies for the Afghan freedom fighters. The British and the Omanis were getting nervous, and I had to send Warren Christopher to London to brief Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington about the true purpose of the planes. We heard only one other indication of a leak. In monitoring radio broadcasts all over Iran, we heard a story from up near the Iraqi border of an attempted rescue mission. It turned out to be a repeat of a conjectural story that had run earlier in the Washington Star. No damage was done.
On Wednesday, April 23, I received a last-minute intelligence briefing about Iran. The substance was that there was little prospect of the hostages' release within the next five or six months and that everything was favorable for the rescue mission. Our agents in and around Tehran were very optimistic. The next day I wanted to spend every moment monitoring the progress of the mission, but had to stick to my regular schedule and act as though nothing of the kind were going on. I asked Zbig to keep notes for me, while I tried to keep my mind on such routine duties as a private session with Israeli Labor Party Leader Shimon Peres and a briefing for Hispanic leaders about our anti-inflation program.
Here are some of Brzezinski's notes, using Washington time, with my own comments in brackets added later.
10:35 a.m. President briefed by Z.B. on latest intelligence and on the initial stage. Takeoff as planned.
12 p.m. Lunch: President, Vice President, Vance, Brown,
Brzezinski, Jordan, Powell. First indication that two helicopters may be down short of landing site. [Although the weather forecast had been good, the helicopters ran into severe localized dust storms. One returned to the carrier, and another was left in the southern desert. We never knew until it was over that this helicopter crew had been picked up. It was a major worry for me through the mission.] Iranian post noted two aircraft flying low, without lights. [Our intelligence services were monitoring radio broadcasts throughout Iran.]
3:15 p.m. Two helicopters down; naval task force thinks rest have landed and picked up crews, and thus six are on the way. Should know about Desert One in about half an hour. No upgrading of gendarmerie alert. [The Iranians had small police stations scattered in the villages and towns. We successfully avoided them.]
All C-130s have landed. Initial problem: three vehicles observed. One got away. One of the above, a bus with some 40 people, presumably detained. Brown/ Brzezinski agree that no basis for abortion; will consult further and Brzezinski will brief the President and obtain his guidance. [This was unexpected bad luck. We had observed this site for weeks, and traffic near it was rare. Almost immediately after our landing, though, there was a busload of people, and then a fuel truck, followed closely by a pickup truck. The two latter appeared to be driven by smugglers of gasoline, who took off in the pickup. It was highly unlikely that they would go to the police. In fact, Colonel Beckwith believed they thought our team was Iranian police. But the bus passengers would have to be prevented from sounding an alarm. I approved the removal of all of them to Egypt by C-130 until the rescue itself was concluded, when they would be returned to Iran.]
4:21 p.m. General Jones has heard from General Vaught [who was in Egypt and in overall charge] that everything is under control at Desert One. No one hurt or eliminated. Escaped vehicle proceeded southwest to town 15 miles away, which has gendarmerie post, unmanned at night. Four helicopters refueled at 4 p.m. E.S.T.; two being refueled. [One had been forced down temporarily in the sandstorm, then pressed forward to join the others. This put us somewhat behind schedule, but in itself was no problem.] Vaught expects everything to be over in 40 minutes. Has report that everything "green" at dropoff, and transport is ready.
4:45 p.m. Brown to Brzezinski: "I think we have an abort situation. One helicopter at Desert One has hydraulic problem. We thus have less than the minimum six to go." C-130s to be used to extract. Request decision on mission termination from the President literally within minutes [because of the importance of completing the operation at night].
4:50 p.m. The President, after obtaining a full report from Brzezinski, requests full information from Brown and Jones and specifically the recommendation from the ground commander. [Beckwith and Vaught in Egypt both recommended termination, complying with the plan requiring a minimum of six helicopters.]
4:57 p.m. The President to Brown: "Let's go with this recommendation," and the mission is aborted.
At this point, the Vice President, Christopher, Powell and Jordan joined me and Zbig in my small study, later followed by Vance and then Brown. Although despondent about the failure of the mission, we felt we had the situation under control. I was grievously disappointed, but thanked God that there had been no casualties.
5:18 p.m. Brown informs President that we don't know whereabouts of one helicopter and don't know the crew loss.
5:32 p.m. President calls Jones on secure phone and learns all crews not accounted for. President instructs that needless military action be avoided; air cover if needed for extraction, but an engagement should be avoided. Show of force first before shooting down any Iranian planes. [All of this referred to the helicopter crew we believed to be on the ground in southern Iran. If necessary, I was ready to send in military forces from the aircraft carriers to protect the crew. At one point, intelligence sources reported a beeper signal from the downed helicopter.] Discussion of what commmunication to make to the Iranians and of the needed report to the American people. [After our rescue team departed, I needed to calm the Iranians.]
5:58 p.m. President on secure phone informed by Jones that a helicopter smashed into a C130; some casualties; may be very serious; team transferring into another C130. [I was sickened with concern about our men. Brief delays seemed like hours as I waited to obtain accurate reports about casualties. I prayed.]
6:21 p.m. President informed by Jones that a number dead in the crash--helicopter crew, pilot of C-130 and some passengers [members of the rescue team]. The rest are being extricated by C130. [In taking off to move away from the loaded planes, the helicopters' swirling blades had kicked up clouds of dust. In the poor visibility, one of the helicopters had flown into the nose of the airplane, which itself was preparing to take off. The two aircraft were engulfed in flames, and it was impossible to extract the bodies of the dead Americans. All others were loaded into the other five C-130s and left Desert One, en route to Masirah, a small island off the coast of Oman. Our men had been on the ground about three hours.]
7:05 p.m. President informed by Jones that at least six probably dead; the team will be [in Masirah] around 10 p.m.
7:45 p.m. The group without the President convenes in the Cabinet Room to work on necessary notifications and statements. [I sat alone in my small office, listing everything I needed to do to prevent any harm to our hostages, to protect our agents in Tehran, to notify leaders of other nations in the area and to inform some American leaders and later the general public. First, we had to get our rescue team out of Iran, undetected if possible.]
8:05 p.m. The President joins group in Cabinet Room. [I sent for CIA Director Turner to determine how much time our agents in Tehran for the rescue mission would need to leave the country or to protect themselves from discovery.]
9:05 p.m. Turner joins the group. Discussion of the situation in Iran and implications for public statement. [We had a long discussion about the timing. It was necessary to delay any acknowledgment of our presence in Iran until all our team was out of the country. As soon as it was safe, we wanted to anticipate the Iranians with our announcement, to prevent their exaggeration of the rescue mission into an all-out invasion--a version that might cause them to harm the hostages. We had a number of people in Tehran with trucks, radio equipment and other compromising materials, who had to be notified and given a chance to protect themselves.]
11:05 p.m. Brown provides fuller debrief: all helicopter crews accounted for; eight dead and three burned.
11:55 p.m. The President decides announcement at 2 a.m.--changes that to 1 a.m. Congressional calls to begin immediately.
The cancellation of our mission was caused by a strange series of mishaps--almost completely unpredictable. We had every possibility of success because no Iranian alarm was raised until two or three hours after our people had all left Iran. I am still haunted by memories of that day--our high hopes for success, the incredible mishaps, the bravery of our rescue team, the embarrassment of failure and, above all, the tragic deaths in the lonely desert. I actually slept a couple of hours, then got up early to prepare my television broadcast, which would explain to the American people what had occurred.
In my statement, I took full responsibility for the mission, outlined what had happened and gave my reasons for the effort. I reminded the world of the Iranian crime and praised the courageous volunteers who had given their lives.
As soon as they returned home, I wanted to meet the members of the rescue team. Without any notice to the news media, I flew to see the team on Sunday, April 27. Their identities and location were confidential. When I stepped off the helicopter, Colonel Beckwith was waiting. He was really a tough guy, a former University of Georgia football player who had grown up a few miles from Plains and had dedicated his life to self-sacrifice for our country in the most dangerous and personal kind of combat service. His chin was quivering and tears were running down his cheeks. I opened my arms, and we embraced and wept together. He said, "Mr. President, I'm sorry we let you down!" I expressed with all my heart my appreciation for what his men had done.
Then he said, "Will you let us go back?" I told him I meant to bring them out, and I would certainly rely on his team, as before, if I decided it was necessary.
Beckwith told me that after the last helicopter had failed in the desert, he had made an instant decision to recommend withdrawal, and that he had no doubt it was right. I asked why they had not destroyed the remaining helicopters and he explained that the helicopters were loaded with ammunition; any fires or explosions would have endangered the C-130s on which their lives depended.
I also met with five Iranians who had helped us with the mission. They too were eager to return and assist us. I went around and talked to every one of the men, expressing our nation's gratitude for their heroism. They were superb. I would not hesitate to put my own life into their hands.
We then had to respond to a rash of false news reports about the operation. Among them were charges that I had slashed the plans and made them inoperable and that Colonel Beckwith and his men had wanted to go forward with the mission, but I had terminated it over their objections. Brown wanted to let Beckwith answer some questions from the press, but Charlie had been trained to conceal his identity and was reluctant to do it. He insisted on coming by to explain to me why he was going public. While he was in the Oval Office, he paid me a compliment that may never be exceeded. With some embarrassment, he said, "My men and I have decided that our boss, the President of the United States, is as tough as woodpecker lips."
One of the most difficult duties I had to face as President was the memorial service held on May 9 at Arlington National Cemetery for the eight servicemen killed in Iran. All of the families were to be there, and I was painfully aware of their sorrow. I wanted to express my condolences and thanks to them, but feared that some of them might rebuff me because I was the one who had ordered the rescue mission to be launched. As Rosalynn and I entered the small waiting room, I saw the wives, children and parents of the men whose bravery we had come to recognize. They were watching me as we approached. One of the young wives came forward and held her hands out to me, and she was soon in my arms. They all seemed more concerned about my feelings than their own sorrow. I was overwhelmed with gratitude toward the brave men who had been lost, and to their families who gathered around me. Their quiet courage and sensitivity exemplified in a special way the voluntary sacrifice and nobility of the men and women who served in the military forces, dedicated to preserving the freedom of us all.
Carter had used his aide Hamilton Jordan to work with two secret emissaries, Argentine Businessman Hector Villalon and French Lawyer Christian Bourguet, in conducting covert negotiations with Iranian officials for freeing the Americans. The talks had often looked promising, but repeatedly failed when the erratic Khomeini refused to order that control of the hostages be transferred from their militant captors to his government. After the rescue attempt, little progress was made until Algerian diplomats agreed to serve as official intermediaries between the U.S. and Iran. Through this channel, complex legal questions involving the disposition of the frozen Iranian assets were tackled and Iran dropped its demands that the Shah and all his financial holdings be returned to his homeland. As the election of Nov. 4,1980, approached, Carter believed that "if the hostages were released, my re-election would be assured. If the expectations of the American people were dashed again, there was little chance that I could win." After his loss to Ronald Reagan, Carter continued to press the hostage negotiations right through his last day in office, Tuesday, Jan. 20,1981.
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