Hope Rises from the Rubble

Out of Lebanon's agony, some prospects for peace

The traumatic events in Lebanon have changed the shape of politics, diplomacy and geography in the Middle East. TIME Chief of Correspondents Richard Duncan, Washington Bureau Chief Robert Ajemian, Associate Editor Henry Muller and Correspondent Harry Kelly last week ended a tour of the region. From their interviews with Israelis, Lebanese and Palestinians, they concluded that the opportunities for progress toward peace are brighter than they have been in years. Their assessment:

The most urgent task, in the view of nearly everyone, is the withdrawal of all foreign armies from Lebanon. Many of the officials interviewed expressed confidence that an agreement could be reached before the end of the year. The Syrians, who have had an army in Lebanon since 1976, appear willing to accept their own withdrawal as the price for the pullout of Israeli forces, which are poised only about 20 miles from the Syrian capital of Damascus. Jerusalem, for its part, is anxious to avoid the political and economic burdens of a prolonged occupation in Lebanon. The main difficulty is Israel's demand that 5,000 to 6,000 P.L.O. fighters who remain in northern Lebanon and in the Bekaa Valley leave at the same time.

If all foreign forces withdraw from Lebanon, the question will then be whether the new government of Amin Gemayel, who was elected only two weeks ago, can effectively reconcile the Christian and Muslim communities that have been at odds since the beginning of the civil war in 1975. Unlike his brother Bashir, who was assassinated only nine days before he was supposed to take office, Amin remains an unknown quantity. Though perceived as weak and inexperienced, Amin should benefit from his record as a conciliatory figure in Lebanon's fractious political world. While Bashir attempted to impose Christian supremacy in Lebanon, Amin remained in touch with the country's other religious communities. Christians and Muslims alike seem to be exhausted by their internecine battles and, viewing the devastation of their country, may once again be willing to understand that they have no choice but to live together. Although most Lebanese believe that elements of the Christian Lebanese Forces were responsible for the Sabra and Shatila massacre, Muslims have conspicuously avoided the opportunity to discredit the country's new President.

Israel, at the same time, has developed a more realistic attitude toward its northern neighbor. The Begin government, which helped train Bashir Gemayel's militia, was badgering the late President-elect only a few weeks ago for important concessions, including a peace treaty with Israel. After one meeting in which Begin repeatedly addressed Bashir, 34, as "young man," an insult in the Middle East, Bashir returned to Beirut protesting that "they won't let me have my dignity." Amin does not share his brother's fondness for Israel, and the Begin government is determined to treat him with more consideration. Officials say that they will not insist on a peace treaty, and concede that the best guarantee of security along Israel's northern border is a peaceful, united Lebanon.

Although the Israeli government has been chastened by the domestic reaction to the Beirut massacre, Begin's opponents should not underestimate his recuperative ability. The decision to create a judicial commission of inquiry, belated though it was, will probably defuse emotions for the next few months. Moreover, even if Begin had to step down, Israeli policy on many of the key regional issues--sovereignty over Jerusalem, negotiations with the P.L.O., the future of the West Bank--would differ more in tone than in substance.

Nonetheless, Begin may now face a nation that is more skeptical, more conscious of how its image in the world has changed and less willing to give its leaders carte blanche to pursue military adventures. The massacre may also have curbed the Israeli tendency to regard all Palestinians indiscriminately as terrorists. The images of massacred women, children and old men, shown in gory detail on Israeli television, may create new perceptions about Palestinians, notably the 1.3 million in the occupied territories.

With the departure of its fighters from Beirut, the P.L.O. faces a major test of leadership. The organization's military option has been diminished, if not eliminated, for at least a year or two. As a result, the P.L.O. has become more vulnerable to diplomatic influence from a number of directions, not the least of them the U.S. While Chairman Yasser Arafat and his entourage consider what to do next, there are promising hints of change among Palestinians in the West Bank. Even some of the more radical P.L.O. supporters have reacted favorably to President Reagan's initiative of five weeks ago proposing Palestinian self-government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in association with Jordan.

For all the horror and suffering it has generated, the war in Lebanon may have the positive result of breaking the Middle East's diplomatic logjam. Both in Israel and in the Arab countries, preconceptions are being challenged and positions are changing. While few observers would be optimistic enough to suggest that peace is at hand, most agree that a renewed outbreak of war in the Middle East is unlikely in the near future.

Arab leaders have complained bitterly that the U.S., through its political and military support for Israel, shares responsibility for the invasion of Lebanon. Still, the Arabs are almost unanimously looking to the U.S. for leadership. (The Soviets, who have watched their military proteges take a drubbing in Lebanon, have not found any diplomatic opening to re-establish themselves as honest brokers or benevolent mentors in the region.) Thus the U.S. has been handed a rare opportunity; it can play an active role in persuading Israel, Syria and the P.L.O. to withdraw quickly from Lebanon. The U.S. can also help Lebanon rebuild not only its devastated capital but its political institutions and its army.

Meanwhile, President Reagan must try, in spite of Israel's outright rejection of his peace plan, to persuade the Begin government to return to the negotiating table. That is where the issue of Palestinian autonomy, the central question in the Middle East, will have to be addressed. Begin rejected the Reagan peace plan in large part because it put the U.S. closer than ever before to those who have been insisting that Israel must restore Arab sovereignty to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. As long as Begin refuses to budge on that point, a lasting Middle East peace will remain elusive.

Finally, the U.S. will have to continue to re-examine the long-held premises that its interests are identical to Israel's and that only Israel can decide what to do with the material support it receives from Washington. The ultimate test for the U.S. will be whether it will have the patience to maintain an active, creative policy in the region, or whether, as it has so many times in the past, the U.S. will lose interest once the immediate crisis is over. If the U.S. does not seize this opportunity, the various parties are almost sure to return to then" rigid, entrenched positions. The result, sooner or later, would be more bloodshed.

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