The Uses and Abuses of Ambiguity

Even as the ink was drying on the "Framework for Peace" that was part of the Camp David accords, euphoria over the breakthrough was being tempered by disagreements over precisely what was, and was not, included. The document's strength was also the root of its weakness: the artful use of constructive ambiguity allowed each signatory to proclaim agreement while holding different interpretations of what the words really mean. In some instances, those diverging views are spelled out in letters that accompany the text signed by Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and President Jimmy Carter on Sept. 17, 1978. For example, Sadat and Carter, in separate letters, stated their views that predominantly Arab East Jerusalem is part of the West Bank.

In his letter, Begin said that Jerusalem is an indivisible city and the capital of Israel. Begin has taken a rather legalistic approach to the text, and this formed the basis of Israeli complaints last week that Reagan's plan violated the Camp David accords. Administration officials emphatically disagree. Among the charges and countercharges:

Status of East Jerusalem. Reagan urged "participation by the Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem in the election" of a self-governing authority for the West Bank and Gaza. The Israeli communique says that Jerusalem is not mentioned in Camp David and that such voting would in effect lead to its repartitioning. True, Jerusalem is not cited in the accords, but the accompanying Egyptian and American letters clearly indicate that two of the parties do not acknowledge Israel's authority over the entire city.

Settlements. Reagan called for "a real settlement freeze." Carter thought that Begin had verbally agreed to this and would put it in writing. In an interview with TIME the week after Camp David, Begin insisted: "I didn't give such a commitment." He eventually sent Carter a letter pledging a three-month freeze; Carter rejected it and called future settlements "illegal." Said Carter last week: "My understanding of what Begin promised was very clear. There would be no new settlements."

Full Autonomy. Reagan in his letter to Begin defined this phrase as giving "Palestinian inhabitants real authority over themselves, the land and its resources." Israel argues that the phrase means giving Palestinians the right to govern themselves, but not authority over the land and resources of the West Bank and Gaza. The meaning of "autonomy" was deliberately left undefined in the accords. According to U.S. participants in the talks, Camp David envisioned a transfer of authority linked to resolution of Israel's security concerns. Says an Egyptian official: "Whenever we had a difference of opinion in the autonomy talks, the Israelis would raise the issue of security."

Association with Jordan. Reagan proposed "ties between the West Bank, Gaza and Jordan" as a method for achieving a durable settlement. Israel says that Camp David makes no reference to this approach. Indeed, the accord leaves open to negotiation the final status of the territories, but the document explicitly states that "Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations on the basis of this framework."

Sovereignty. Reagan ruled out "Israeli sovereignty or permanent control of the territories." Israel responds that nothing "precludes the application of Israeli sovereignty over Judea, Samaria [Begin's preferred biblical names for the West Bank] and Gaza." Camp David addresses the issue indirectly by incorporating United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 "in all its parts." Unanimously adopted after the Six-Day War of 1967, it refers to "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war," and calls for the "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied" and the right of all nations in the region to "secure and recognized boundaries."

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