Turbulent Flight for the C-5B

By Richard Stengel

In a fierce lobbying war, Lockheed shoots down a tough rival

Each morning in his office at the Pentagon, the Air Force general and his allies mapped out their strike plan. The target was not an enemy capital but Capitol Hill, and the battle was over which firm would land a multibillion-dollar contract for military cargo planes. The allies in this case were Lockheed executives working in tandem with the Pentagon to sell Congress the C-5B over its rival, Boeing's 747. In one of the fiercest and, some say, most shameless lobbying battles Congress has seen in decades, the issue of which plane was better often became obscured in partisan crossfire. The air war ended last week when the House, by a vote of 289 to 127, decided to spend $860 million to begin the purchase of 50 Lockheed C-5Bs rather than modified 747s.

The complicated quest for a cargo plane began last year, when a secret Pentagon study pinpointed a critical need for a plane able to carry outsize cargo, such as tanks and helicopters for the new Rapid Deployment Force. The Air Force already had 77 Lockheed C-5A Galaxies, a plane capable of handling large loads but with a checkered history of cost overruns and technical troubles. A design competition for a new carrier was won by McDonnell Douglas with a plane subsequently called the C-17. The Pentagon thus faced three options: to develop the C-17 (whose cost was never made public), to buy and convert new and used 747s for considerably less money (the new planes would cost $72 million each), or to build 50 of Lockheed's modernized C-5Bs (at a cost of $118 million each). Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger decided that the most sensible choice, both militarily and financially, was the C-5B.

Boeing's unexpected response was to challenge the judgment of the Pentagon, with whom it had some $2.7 billion in contracts, ranging from the cruise missile to AWACS planes. After the Defense Department rejected the company's argument that it would be more efficient for the Air Force to buy remodeled 747s, troops of Boeing lobbyists marched on Capitol Hill armed with charts, glossy photos and lavish brochures. Meanwhile, Democratic Senator Henry Jackson of Washington, Boeing's home state, strenuously campaigned for the company, asserting that the purchase of 747s "would assist the troubled airline industry." On May 13, the day the Senate voted on the defense authorization bill, Braniff declared bankruptcy. Looking to trim money from the military budget and to help distressed airlines, the Senate by voice vote approved Jackson's proposal to buy the 747s.

Stunned, the Pentagon and Lockheed announced that they had just begun to fight. Under Secretary of Defense Richard DeLauer warned Boeing's chairman, T. A. Wilson, "We're going to fight you tooth and nail." The strategy for the House battle was disclosed in June, when a Lockheed computer printout was leaked to the press. The 27-page document revealed that Lockheed executives and Air Force and Department of Defense officials had met almost every morning in the office of Air Force Major General Guy Hecker Jr. for strategy sessions. The printout listed more than 250 Congressmen who were to be lobbied by either military personnel or some 40 companies that would do subcontracting work on the C-5B. It included references to letters written by Lockheed Chairman Roy Anderson to airlines with military hauling contracts. At least one of the letters hinted darkly that a Boeing success "could adversely affect revenues from Government contracts."

As the House debate began last week, both Lockheed and Boeing extolled their planes in a flurry of splashy full-page ads in the New York Times, Washington Post and Wall Street Journal. Smooth-tongued Georgians led the House forces for the C-5B, which is to be built in Marietta, Ga., while a squadron of Boeing backers from Washington and Kansas derided Lockheed's plane as the Edsel of the air. Democratic Representative Thomas Downey of New York echoed Boeing supporters: "The C-5B is in the top five of turkeys. The alltime turkey hall of fame."

The lobbying may have subsided, but the accusations have just begun. The General Accounting Office is inquiring whether the Pentagon used its equipment and funds for lobbying, while the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Investigations is probing the possibility that the Pentagon broke a little-known (and never enforced) 1919 law that proscribes Government officials from spending tax dollars to influence legislation. Representative Norman Dicks of Washington, who spearheaded the battle for the 747 in the House, claimed that the printout "was a prima facie violation of the statute preventing Executive lobbying." Weinberger indignantly retorted that the Pentagon's effort was "solely as a result of the extraordinary volume of distorted information that they [Boeing] themselves have disseminated on Capitol Hill."

In a letter to Democratic Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin, who called for the GAO investigation, Deputy Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci argued that the Pentagon's decision to buy the C-5B "was based on a careful analysis of our airlift needs." Indeed, experts predict that the joint congressional committee responsible for reconciling the two versions of the 1983 defense authorization bill will almost certainly follow the Pentagon's wishes. Unlike the 747, the C-5B can carry such outsize cargo as M-l and M-60 tanks and self-propelled howitzers, which can easily roll up the ramp on the rear of the C-5B and roll off on the ramp at the front. To load a 747, however, equipment must be hoisted 16 ft. off the tarmac and pushed through nose or side doors.

At a congressional hearing in May, five Pentagon experts were asked whether the difference in performance was worth the extra cost of the C-5B. Absolutely, was the unanimous reply. Thus the public can take consolation from the fact that the House may have made the right choice--even if it made it for all the wrong reasons. --By Richard Stengel.

Reported by Bruce W. Nelan/Washington

With reporting by Bruce W. Nelan

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