A Holy War's Troublesome Fallout

By William E. Smith

Iran's victories over Iraq threaten the moderate Arabs

Ya Mohammad ibn Abdullah! Ya Mohammad ibn Abdullah!

As this code signal was broadcast over walkie-talkie radios early last week, some 65,000 Iranian troops and militia launched the most ambitious counterattack of the 20-month border war between Iran and Iraq. The prize: the Iranian port of Khorramshahr, which the Iraqis had captured soon after crossing to the Iranian side of the Shatt al Arab at the start of the war.

The predawn Iranian attack routed the Iraqi forces with an ease that surprised even the Iranian commanders. By noon, two Iraqi divisions and two border guard brigades had been surrounded and almost entirely taken prisoner; the rest of the Iraqi force of about 12,000 men was fleeing. Said an Iranian captain afterward: "Some were so frightened that they threw themselves into the shaft and struck out for the Iraqi shore. I saw a few drown. They could not swim, and their comrades, desperate to save themselves, let them go down."

Thus ended the decisive battle of a gruesome war that has already cost the two adversaries an estimated 100,000 lives and $150 billion. But even though Iraq's forces have retreated almost to the prewar border (see map), the guns along the Shatt al Arab are not about to fall silent. Iran's Ayatullah Khomeini, in pursuit of his vendetta against Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, has threatened to invade Iraq in an effort to topple him.

A change in the Iraqi leadership would be welcomed not only by Saddam's domestic rivals but by another enemy, Syrian President Hafez Assad, and by Libyan Leader Muammar Gaddafi, both of whom enjoy Soviet backing and have helped Iran in the war. But Saddam Hussein's fall would cause great concern in the capitals of moderate Arab states, notably Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, which have been supporting Iraq. In consequence, the U.S. is also concerned. In a speech devoted entirely to Middle East policy, Secretary of State Alexander Haig told the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations last week that the course of the Iran-Iraq conflict "may lead to unforeseen and far-reaching changes in the regional balance of power, offering the Soviet Union an opportunity to enlarge its influence in the process."

The war was started by Saddam Hussein in September 1980 to seize part of Iran's oil-producing Khuzistan province. He had hoped to become the region's strongman, but he has suffered an ironic reversal. Iran has regained nearly all of Khuzistan, and Iranian guns along the Shatt al Arab are shelling Iraq. Saddam Hussein, who had wanted to weaken Khomeini's Islamic regime, is now in serious danger himself.

In Tehran, tens of thousands took to the rooftops chanting "Allahu akbar" (God is great). Automobile drivers honked their horns, and mosques sounded the azan, the Muslim call to prayer. As the extent of the Iraqi defeat became known, Iranian leaders declared that they would stop at nothing, including the invasion of Iraq, in order to achieve two objectives: the downfall of Saddam Hussein and the collection of huge war reparations. Tehran has been telling Arab governments that Iran has a right to square accounts with an aggressor that has inflicted more than $100 billion in damage, killed and maimed tens of thousands of Iranians, and rendered at least 1.5 million homeless. The Khomeini government is insisting that it has no territorial ambitions, either in Iraq or other countries of the gulf, but that it cannot afford to allow the survival of a regime in Baghdad that might unleash another attack against Iran at any time.

In private, however, Khomeini, 82 and ailing, is said to have a harsher plan in mind for Arab governments that choose to side with Iraq against Iran. Three weeks ago, he told colleagues that Iran has a right to go into the territory of any government that is engaging in war against Iran. Last week Khomeini said publicly: "I warn the governments of the region to deal with us according to the tenets of Islam. Otherwise, if their behavior should require the enforcement of Koranic injunctions, we shall enforce God's command." Added Majlis (parliament) Speaker Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani: "We shall stop at nothing in order to gain our legitimate rights, and the fall of Saddam Hussein is our greatest right." In a particularly revealing gesture, 116 Majlis members sent a congratulatory message to Khomeini, noting that it was time to push for the establishment of an Islamic republic in Iraq.

That idea is anathema to practically every state in the Middle East and is an indication of the extent to which an Iranian victory over Iraq is causing fear and consternation throughout the region. Saddam Hussein may somehow survive in spite of his army's defeat, but he is vulnerable because he is a Sunni Muslim in a country whose population is 60% Shi'ite, the branch to which Iran's Ayatullah belongs. Although Saddam Hussein could be replaced by another Sunni, the gulf states are most worried by the thought of a Shi'ite government coming to power in Baghdad, thereby creating the conditions for a Shi'ite alliance that would include Iran, Iraq and Syria. Such an alliance could carry with it an Islamic fundamentalist force that could topple secular Muslim governments throughout the gulf.

In the war, Iraq has been supported by a majority of Arab countries, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the other gulf states. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak declared last week that his country had provided arms and ammunition to Iraq after "we discovered that Iran was getting weapons from every direction." He denied that Egypt had sent fighting men to Iraq but acknowledged that "there may have been some Egyptian volunteers." Mubarak warned Iran against crossing the border into Iraq. He also declared that a forced change of governments in Baghdad would "not serve the interests of the region because it would lead to the unknown, possibly bringing a political leadership that would not help the purpose of peace in the area."

Iran has indeed received support from practically every direction. Among its backers have been the Soviet Union, which is trying to form a long-term friendship with Tehran; Syria, which regards Iraq as an implacable enemy; and, in the early days of the war, the Palestine Liberation Organization, which felt obliged to follow Syrian policy because of the strong Syrian role in Lebanon. An unlikely backer of the Tehran regime has been Israel, which regards Iraq as a more dangerous threat than Iran and thereby follows the ancient adage "The enemy of my enemy is my friend." Last week Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon surprised even his Cabinet colleagues by confirming reports that Israel has indeed been providing Iran with a limited amount of military aid, reportedly consisting of ammunition and spare parts for planes. U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger made clear to Sharon that the U.S. did not appreciate the Israeli aid to Iran.

The role of the Soviet Union in the present conflict has been an anomalous one. Anxious to retain its longstanding ties with Baghdad while building a new relationship with Tehran, Moscow was hoping to negotiate a peace settlement between the two countries and use that agreement as the basis of a new pro-Soviet alliance. No way, said Khomeini, adding that the real test of Soviet friendship rested on whether Moscow would publicly condemn Saddam Hussein as the aggressor in the war and would halt all arms shipments to Iraq. The Soviets temporized, finally concluding that there was little they could do to dissuade Khomeini from his determination to destroy Saddam Hussein. With Moscow's blessing, Syria gave Iran a shipment of sophisticated, Soviet-supplied weaponry (including missile batteries and antitank rocket launchers) as a gesture of friendship.

Iranian officials say that Khomeini has treated the Soviets with a mixture of opportunism and cynicism, relying on them for security assistance when he needed it and pretending to be interested in cooperation in other spheres. Comments one senior cleric in Tehran: "Khomeini could turn out to be a bigger disaster for the Russians than he has been for the Americans. For three years, the Russians have had an uncontested field in Iran, but they have gained little more than ulcers from this supposed boon."

The U.S. is considerably less sanguine in its assessment of the situation. It realizes that an independent Iran, even an Islamic republic run by Khomeini, is the most reliable buffer between the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf. Washington therefore will do nothing to push Iran into the Soviet orbit. On the other hand, the U.S. strongly favors the survival of Saddam Hussein, who in his quest for Western support has steadily moderated his anti-Israeli and anti-American radicalism. The U.S. probably welcomed Saddam Hussein's thrust into Iran in September 1980, believing it would increase the pressure on Khomeini's revolutionary regime. But the U.S. did not aid Saddam Hussein directly, nor does it plan to do so now. Some U.S. experts argue that Iraq's greatest need at the moment is something nobody can supply: a highly motivated army with the determination to win. In any case, concludes a high-ranking U.S. diplomat, "we have been and are the least likely candidate to get anything done."

Nonetheless, the Reagan Administration realizes that the outcome of the Iran-Iraq war will inevitably affect U.S. vital interests. Secretary of State Alexander Haig pledged last week that the U.S. would henceforth take a "more active role" in the dispute.

The most important question now is whether the Iranians will carry through on their threat to attack Iraqi territory. If they do, the Iraqis would have two basic options: to replace Saddam Hussein with a new regime whose first mission would be to negotiate a peace with Iran; or to call for assistance from the Arab world to stave off an Iraqi defeat. Such assistance, at least in manpower, could come only from Egypt. If Egypt refuses, the fall of Saddam Hussein becomes a strong possibility, along with the emergence of Iran as the dominant force in the gulf and of Syria's Hafez Assad as the region's most conspicuous power broker.

The smaller gulf states, if they survive, could move closer in policy to that of the radical Arabs. The pressure on Mubarak to rescue Iraq may become intense, but Mubarak may conclude that it is already too late to do anything for Saddam Hussein. In any event, Mubarak has made it clear that whatever aid he gives Iraq will not change Egypt's commitment to peace with Israel.

Bolstered by its successes against Iraq, the Khomeini regime is expected to enjoy a period of relative popularity. Soon, however, it will undoubtedly be obliged to offer the newly unified and victorious army a greater voice in the affairs of the nation. Says a senior Iranian officer in Tehran: "Obviously all the regime wants us to do is win wars. But I don't think the army would be prepared to remain restricted to this role forever." Victory, no less than defeat, can prove troublesome for national leaders.

-- By William E. Smith. Reported by Raji Samghabadi/New York and William Stewart/Beirut

With reporting by Raji Samghabadi/New York, William Stewart/Beirut

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