"Europeans Fear a New Cold War"

Gro Harlem Brundtland, 43, chairman of the Norwegian Labor Party and Prime Minister from February to October 1981:

Transatlantic relations have been the subject of discussion and controversy since the end of World War II. But Europe, America and the rest of the world are changing. New generations are assuming the leadership of nations. Their perspectives and frames of reference are different from those that were shaped under the impact of the wartime struggle.

We are witnessing a globalization of many international issues. Events outside Europe and the U.S. have an impact on the Western world and affect our vital interests. It is necessary, therefore, that political consultations be broadened. A global policy has to reflect the complexity and diversity of international society. It has to be responsible to the needs and aspirations of the poor and suppressed who yearn for the same freedoms that we enjoy and strive to protect. If we reduce complexity and diversity to the simple question of Soviet-American competition, international relations will harden and the dangers of confrontation will increase. Considerable pessimism can be felt before the economic summit. Mounting economic problems and increasing unemployment are real threats to the atmosphere and to cooperation.

It is important that President Reagan emphasize the continued commitments of the U.S. to a real and true partnership with Western Europe. This involves a commitment to common values and a willingness to develop common policies. Such policies must be the result of shared assessments and open discussion.

For Europeans, the characteristic of the day is a sense of powerlessness. The Soviet Union has constantly been deploying nuclear missiles targeted exclusively on Western Europe. At the same time, more than one voice in Washington mentions the possibility of a limited nuclear war.

The results of the policy of detente have been experienced in different ways. Not that the Western Europeans have any illusions about the Soviet Union or its objectives. They have learned, however, that detente can yield benefits for the West and that the Soviet Union also has to pay its price. The West Europeans fear the possibility--and the consequences--of a new cold war.

For the European members of the alliance, a return to the dual NATO objectives of detente and security implies the strengthening of their own conventional defense. Over the years we have become too accustomed to the picture of overwhelming Soviet conventional forces that have to be met by the U.S. and its nuclear forces, thereby indirectly leaving the question of Western Europe's defense mostly to the Americans. The Western Europeans should be interested in reducing the role of nuclear weapons in defense of their own continent.

Europe has strongly and continuously been criticized by American representatives for not controlling its growing peace movement, which is viewed by the U.S. as a dangerous threat to NATO. Today, similar sentiments of rampant protest and distrust are spreading within the U.S.

The peace movement is not a sign of neutralism or pacifism, but a reaction to strong words and a new and harder confrontation with emphasis on arms and military strength. The same kind of movement is now developing in the U.S. That should be a point for reflection. It must be clearly realized that a genuine feeling of danger is involved. Also that behind it we find distrust in political decision making and leadership. This should be a point of deep concern to our political system and to political leaders.

It is important for Reagan to underline America's readiness to negotiate for arms reduction. The President should associate himself clearly with the broadly felt concern that the nuclear arms race constitutes a danger to peace and to the future of our civilization. He should make it clear that the U.S. is now ready to engage in serious negotiations with the Soviet Union about substantial reductions and relevant qualitative limitations of strategic nuclear arms, as well as to reach the aim of a zero-option in the Geneva talks on intermediate-range nuclear weapons.

The present NATO military strategy was adopted in 1967. The time has come to re-examine the content rather than the principle of the idea of flexible response. American readiness to cooperate in a high-level re-examination of the military strategy for the alliance would be a wise move, especially from the point of view of integrating it with a strategy for the pursuit of arms control and disarmament that would be in consonance with deeply felt and real needs of our time. A revision of NATO strategy should encompass the objectives of reducing our dependence on nuclear weapons in an overall sense and on reducing pressures for early use of nuclear weapons in particular.

The policy of detente, combined with the necessary will to defend ourselves, is not one of fear and defeatism. It is a policy based on the conviction that our system and our values are superior. Neither is detente a capitulation vis-`a-vis the Soviet Union. It is, on the contrary, an active policy contributing to greater independence for the Eastern European countries. Striking the right balance between the double objective of the alliance--defense and detente--is necessary. It is also indispensable to secure a firm commitment to NATO from our own peoples.

Stability and balance in Western Europe are of vital interest to the U.S. Our relationship is one of interdependence. The management of a real partnership is a challenge to the states on both sides of the Atlantic. This is the challenge that should be placed at the top of President Reagan's agenda in Europe.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.