An Interview with President Reagan

Reflections on summitry and the Soviet challenge

A long day of combat over the budget was behind him, and Ronald Reagan was heading for his retreat, Rancho del Cielo, near Santa Barbara, Calif., to mix the woodsy labor he loves with cramming for his forthcoming summit meetings in Western Europe. Before he left Washington, the President discussed his trip with TIME White House Correspondent Laurence I. Barrett and Senior Correspondent John F. Stacks. The President's voice was raspy--the result, he said, of a malfunctioning fireplace that had filled his den with smoke the night before--but he seemed relaxed as he talked about foreign policy. Highlights of the interview:

Q. This double summit is certainly your biggest and most important foreign journey so far. Besides the general good-will aspects of it, what problems with the Western alliance, in your view, most need attention?

A. We have had some ups and downs in the relationship in NATO in the past, and when I say the past, I mean before our Administration was here. I think there is now a far better relationship than we have had for some time, and this visit will give us an opportunity to further cement that.

I think all of us have economic and trade problems that we need to talk about, because we can't separate ourselves out from the others and think that our problems and our economic situation don't have something to do with theirs. If there are any things that need clarification with regard to our relationship as allies, when we get to the Bonn meeting we will take those up. I think the very fact of our proposals recently for arms-reduction talk's means that we need to see each other face to face so they can feel comfortable with any problems they may have about our intentions.

Q. How have things changed since your meetings with Western leaders at Ottawa last July?

A. We're all on a first-name basis now. We all know each other. There were several of us who were brand new [in office] then. I was meeting some of them for the first time. But now we have met, we have worked out issues we brought up there, as well as worked on things that we can further develop.

Q. William Clark, your National Security Adviser, in a speech the other day describing the Administration's approach to the Soviets, said that Moscow must be made to pay the price of its economic failures. Just how would that be done and to what extent would the U.S. depend on cooperation from the allies?

A. I think that what he really was talking about was the economic situation of the Soviet Union, which is very desperate to day. I don't see this as a confrontational problem. I see this as an opportunity once again to see if the Soviets cannot be persuaded to give more consideration to rejoining the family of nations. Obviously, their obsession with the military at the expense of their people's standard of living has not paid off for them, other than in having the greatest military buildup in world history. But we are offering an opportunity--by way of these arms-reduction talks--to indicate to them that there is another road, that there is a road of cooperation. But it is going to take deeds, not words, to convince us of their sincerity if they choose to take that road.

Q. It has been suggested that by pursuing certain policies we can influence the post-Brezhnev succession in the direction of some accommodation on Moscow's part. Is there a set of policies that could influence that?

A. I don't have anything specifically in mind right now, but I would think that that would have to be a consideration if they are, as we have speculated about, now in the situation of looking at the line of succession.

We are aware of their expansionism policy. We know that it goes with Marxism-Leninism. From the very beginning, every Soviet leader down the line, including the present one, has stressed the dream of a world socialist state. But coupled with that is the belief on the part of many people, and with some evidence maybe to support it, that the Soviets also have a kind of paranoia, a fear that they may be the target for aggression. I don't think that has ever been true. There isn't anyone in the Western world that has aggressive intent toward the Soviet Union, that thinks in terms of invasion or conquest or anything of that kind.

And maybe--this is what I mean by opportunity--maybe this could have some bearing on the succession if they could be convinced that our concern for their expansion is not only as great as whatever fear they may have, but is based more on reality than their fear. And if they would by some deeds show us that they were willing to give up the one, I think we could convince them that they have no reason to fear aggression against them.

Q. Many observers inferred from Clark's speech that you would like to tighten the screws on the Soviets, at least in the short term, on economic matters. Are you going to be discussing that with your counterparts at Versailles and Bonn?

A. This is very obviously one of the things we are going to talk about. The Western world went into the business of sanctions with Poland, and we still have the unsolved Afghanistan problem. We have been openly negotiating with our friends and allies with regard to limiting credit, and in the present Soviet economic situation, that should be very effective. It doesn't seem to make much sense that we should be subsidizing their continued military buildup with low-interest credit.

Q. Are you satisfied that the allies have given the U.S. sufficient support in this regard?

A. That is again one of the reasons for meeting, to talk about these things and to point out the long-term gains versus possible short-term hardships of our moving and working together.

Q. They will throw back at you the U.S. grain sales.

A. Yes, it is true we withdrew that sanction, imposed when they invaded Afghanistan, simply because it was having a worse effect on our own farmers than it was on the Soviet Union because there were so many other places where those grains were available. Now, I still would use agriculture as a weapon, but only as part of an overall sanction. To ask the farmers to bear the brunt of our national security problems, and no one else was asked to, doesn't seem to me very fair.

Q. You will get an earful about interest rates. Will you have an earful for them about whether the allies are really pulling their own weight in other areas?

A. Yes, I am kind of looking forward to that discussion. We have made some headway in making them realize that high interest rates were not a part of our economic program, that they were as disastrous for us as they say they are to them. I look forward to the opportunity once and for all to reveal to them that we are doing everything we can, particularly with what we have done with regard to inflation. No one can match that record.

Q. What can you tell us about Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev's written response to your latest proposals on strategic arms negotiations. Overall, was it encouraging?

A. Well, yes, he has agreed to the idea that we should get together on this. I cannot go into any details beyond that. There is no date set. But he has agreed that such talks would be desirable.

Q. When you get together with him, do you plan to bring up all the problems in U.S.Soviet relations, or have you a more restricted agenda in mind, concentrating on arms reduction?

A. I would think that would be a time for putting on the table various things that have caused tensions between us. And to point out the wisdom of Demosthenes 2,000 years ago in the Athenian marketplace when he asked: "What sane man would let another man's words, rather than his deeds, prove who was at peace and who was at war with him?"

For the Soviet Union, it is time for some demonstration on their part that their utterances about peace are not just talk. You know, it is a little hard to accept someone iterating and reiterating, over and over again, that they are the peace seekers in the world while they sit there behind the greatest military buildup in all history. We are saying: "Well, look, join us. We do not want an advantage over you. We want to bring the arms level down to where the whole world can breathe easier." Well, if they really mean peace, I would think that they would jump at that.

Let me just say that I think it would be good to sit down and eyeball each other, and say these things face to face. I do not think exchanging letters really gets at those problems.

Q. Do you feel that we can reach a START agreement with the Soviets before the end of this presidential term?

A. I hope that we will reach an agreement as soon as possible. I recognize that it will be challenging. We are calling for major reductions, but if they approach the talks with the same sincerity and good faith that we have, we should be able to make faster progress than many people expect. We won't set a deadline. That could create harmful pressure on our negotiators.

Q. Does the conflict in the South Atlantic cast a pall over the summit meetings?

A. Oh, I think all of us would hope that it was not there. And I think all of us hope for an end to the bloodshed and a peaceful settlement. But I do not see why that should really be coloring these meetings all that much.

Q. You will be seeing Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin shortly after your return from Europe. The autonomy talks are stalled. Do you plan to ask Begin to change his policies regarding Jewish settlements in the West Bank and his insistence on meeting Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Jerusalem?

A. I'm looking forward to meeting Prime Minister Begin and discussing ways to advance the peace process under the Camp David framework. Both he and President Mubarak have pledged their countries' commitment to that framework, and we are prepared to work closely with them. Camp David is clear on the future of autonomy [for the Palestinian Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza], and we will proceed based on that understanding. As for the location of the talks, we're working on that now. But they will be resumed. I have no doubt of that.

Q. What changes do you see in American relationships in the Middle East as a result of the recent developments in Iran's war with Iraq?

A. We have long hoped for a conclusion to that conflict. The U.S. believes, along with many others in the region, that the territorial integrity and sovereignty of both nations should be maintained. We are in contact with others about how this tragic and costly war could soon be ended.

Q. You came to office without a lot of practical foreign policy experience. After 16 months at the helm, has your view of the world changed in any way and has anything in this realm surprised you in one way or another?

A. Well, not really too much. I have been interested in and studied the world situation for a long time. I have confirmed for myself, however, one thing that I always clung to before. I said that until you are where a President sits and have access to all the information he has, you can't really criticize. You can't know the reason for some of the moves that have been made. And I still feel that way.

But what I have come to learn has not changed in any way how I felt about the Soviet Union, how I felt about relations with our NATO allies.

I have always subscribed to the belief that the North Atlantic Alliance was not merely us generously helping our allies. It's mutual--as much of a defense line for us as it is for them.

Q. Some Presidents have found that foreign affairs is in many ways more challenging, more pleasant and more exciting than domestic policy because there is a greater freedom of action. Has that happened to you?

A. No, that can hardly be true with the economic mess that we came into office with. And what we are trying to resolve here--and, as a matter of fact, they do kind of dovetail--are mutual problems in the field of economics and our trade problems and so forth. I think the United States plays a very important role in the world economy. One of the most helpful things we can do for our allies is to put our country on a sound economic footing. And that's pretty exciting too.

"We are offering an opportunity--by way of arms reductions talks--to indicate to them that there is another road."

"The Soviets also have a kind of paranoia, a fear that they may be the target for aggression."

"It doesn 't make sense that we should be subsidizing their continued military buildup with low-interest credit.'

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