Starting the Great Debate

By WALTER ISAACSON

Reagan's plan for arms reduction gets a mixed reaction

"Reaching agreement with the Soviets will not be short or easy work. But I believe that the Soviet people and their leaders understand the importance of preventing war. And I believe that a firm, forthright American position on arms reduction can bring us closer to a settlement. "

With words that conveyed both firmness and flexibility, Ronald Reagan last week began the campaign for his plan to reduce the nuclear arsenals of the world's two superpowers. In a prime-time press conference, he elaborated on and defended his proposal, outlined the previous Sunday at Illinois' Eureka College, for Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). Reagan's plan would require deep reductions in the Soviets' large land-based missiles, which form the bulk of their arsenal. "I think you start with first things first," the President said, referring to the massive rockets that he calls the most "destabilizing" of all arms systems. But he also indicated a willingness to halve eventually the present number of U.S. long-range missiles and to discuss weapons in which the U.S. has an edge, chiefly cruise missiles and manned bombers. Said Reagan: "Nothing is excluded."

The President's desire to appear both resolute and open-minded on arms negotiations reflects the divergent concerns of the three audiences-- in the U.S., Western Europe and the Kremlin--to which his message was addressed. Despite their differences, those listeners appeared to share one basic and important reaction: relief that the Administration, after 16 months of delay and internal dissent, had come forth with a plan to get the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. back to the strategic arms bargaining table. The only group that expressed dismay at the President's intentions were some hard-line U.S. conservatives, who feel betrayed by Reagan's more moderate approach.

There was, however, criticism of the specifics of the President's plan from some advocates of arms control who claimed that it would be patently unacceptable to the Soviets. To reach Reagan's target of only 2,500 land-based warheads for each nation, Moscow would have to dismantle more than 3,000 of them. At the same time, the U.S. would be allowed to add 350. Although each side now has roughly 7,000 strategic warheads, the Soviets put more than twice as many of theirs on big land-based missiles. In turn, the U.S. would have to dismantle almost 2,500 submarine-based warheads, while the Soviets could add to their fleet. Reagan's speech, with its stated focus on land-based warheads, put some Americans in the awkward position of doubting the sincerity of their own leader. Said former Secretary of State Edmund Muskie: "What troubles me about the program is that it may be a secret agenda for sidetracking disarmament."

Muskie contended that while the START talks get under way, Congress should ratify the SALT II treaty signed by President Carter in June 1979. "The only way to hold the Soviets in check while modernizing our weapons is to give formal approval, in some way, to the unratified SALT I treaty," Muskie said. Both the U.S. and the Soviets are informally honoring the terms of SALT I and SALT II, although neither is officially in effect; Moscow has even dismantled nine submarines in accordance with SALT II's restrictions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have also urged Reagan to honor the pact, arguing that if it were tossed aside, the Soviets would be able to add new warheads much more quickly than the U.S. Some officials are worried about signs that the Soviets may soon resume testing of the SS-16, a mobile intercontinental missile that was forbidden by SALT II.

Other Democrats in the forefront of those urging Reagan to accept SALT II are former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Senators Sam Nunn of Georgia and John Glenn of Ohio and Congressman Les Aspin of Wisconsin. To that chorus last week came an influential voice from the Republican side, Henry Kissinger. In a speech at The Hague, Vance and Muskie's predecessor as Secretary of State said of SALT II: "It seems to me a reasonable way to end the current impasse, establish a baseline for later reductions and end the agitation for quick fixes." Kissinger, who helped lay the groundwork for SALT II, recommended modifications to the treaty, such as slightly lowering the ceiling for delivery systems in order to "symbolize" a commitment to reductions. Stressing that he was speaking as a private citizen who has had "next to no access" to the current Administration, Kissinger observed: "I have great difficulty understanding why it is safe to adhere to a nonratified agreement while it is unsafe formally to ratify what one is already observing."

Reagan responded to such suggestions at his press conference. "I think SALT was the wrong course to follow," he said, noting that the agreement would allow the Soviets "to just about double their present nuclear capability."

Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Alexander Haig was even more blunt: "We consider SALT II to be dead and have so informed the Soviets." (The treaty has not actually been formally rejected, however, and is still technically before the Senate.) But one high Administration official indicated that the U.S. may find some method of accepting SALT II without formally ratifying it. Internal discussions are under way, he said, about working out some "mutual restraints," which would be similar to the SALT I and SALT II restrictions now being informally observed, for both sides to honor while negotiations are in process.

Western Europeans were less concerned with the substance of Reagan's proposal than with the fact that he had at last made one. The President is scheduled to travel to Paris, Rome, London, Bonn and West Berlin in three weeks, and he faces the prospect of large street demonstrations by members of the Continent's burgeoning peace movement. In Bonn, as many as 150,000 protesters are expected to mass on the banks of the Rhine across from the building where Reagan will be meeting with the leaders of other North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations. The tone of such rallies may be somewhat muted by Reagan's Eureka proposal. In Paris, the centrist daily Le Monde said Reagan was asking the Soviets to make most of the sacrifices, but the paper still praised his willingness to resume negotiations.

The Soviet reaction was a blend of disapproval and curiosity. The Kremlin had summarily rejected in 1977 a proposal by Carter and Vance for deep reductions in the strategic arsenals of both nations. But Vance said last week that some Soviet officials have told him their unwillingness to consider the plan may have been a mistake. Despite the sharp criticism of Reagan's speech by the official news agency TASS, the Kremlin so far has kept the door open to discussion. Radomir Bogdanov, a Soviet arms-control specialist who is deputy director of Moscow's Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, has been examining the President's initiative. He told TIME: "Reagan's proposals are not fair. They are not equal. They are an attempt to disarm us." Yet Bogdanov did not reject the President's offer, nor did he dwell on the American failure to ratify SALT II. "What we are objecting to is not the offer to negotiate," he said. "It is the way the offer has been tendered. Our principal position is that we are ready to negotiate."

That seems to be Reagan's principal position too. This shared willingness to talk may be, at least for now, as significant as the substantive abyss that separates the two sides. That point was stressed by one of the Administration's most ardent hardliners, Eugene Rostow, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Said he: "Arms control negotiations are not bargains among peasants haggling over the price of potatoes. The two leading nuclear powers should do whatever is possible to help lift the cloud of war from the horizon.'' --By Walter Isaacson. Reported by Erik Amfitheatrof/Moscow and Laurence L. Barrett/Washington

With reporting by Erik Amfitheatrof, Laurence I. Barrett

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